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ABSTRACT 
"Commerce Between India and the Arab world During 19"* 
Century", is the theme of our doctoral dissertation. In the first three 
chapters we have studied and analyzed India's maritime trade in the 
18"' century with the Arab world. In order to understand the 
development of trade and commerce during the 19'*' century between 
India and Middle East, it is significant to note that India had a 
dominant position as a prosperous trading nation till the 18"* 
century, and in many respects, enjoyed a far better position than 
those of European companies. Indian goods in Middle Eastern 
countries were in greater demand and her credit market was 
flourishing. India's shipbuilding technology was more advanced 
than that of Europe. By the 1** half of 19"" century, India was even 
competing with the European companies in the markets of Middle 
East. It was only with the coming of steamships and the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869 that British superiority over the Indian 
Ocean commerce became an established fact. In turn the Indian 
economy as a whole received a crippling blow with the penetration 
of British capitalism in India vis-a-vis the Arab world. Indian 
interests were subordinated to British interests leading to the ruin of 
Indian handicrafts and industries. Nevertheless, India continued its 
supplies of cotton cloth and silk to the littoral countries of Red Sea 
and the Persian Gulf. Indian goods were still in demand in Turkish 
markets, though industrial products of Britain were fast replacing 
Indian handicraft goods in these markets. 
The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The chapter 
one is mainly based on India's trade relations with the countries 
bordering the Arabian Sea during 18"" century. During this period 
while the rest of the ports of India had their orientation towards the 
south-east Asian regions, Surat was the only port of importance that 
was closely linked with the littoral countries of the Red sea and the 
Persian Gulf. Another significant change that one can observe is the 
concentration of Indian shipping operating in the direction of the 
two channels under the East India Company's flag. This trend 
indicates that there was no other powerful European nation or 
company other than the English East India Company which could 
control or assure protection to shippers on the high seas. This is 
evident, therefore, that by the 2""* half of the 18*'' century EIC had 
emerged as a single power in the western Indian Ocean which could 
not be challenged by any other European power. India's export to 
and import from the channels of Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and 
the countries of the Arab world actually did not decline. India 
enjoyed a favourable balance of trade with the countries of Middle 
East and her volume of trade remained high throughout the century. 
Her return cargo consisted of bullion besides items such as iron, 
copper, sena leaves, almonds and Venetian false beads etc. whereas 
India's export commodity composition was mainly based on gruff 
goods such as piece goods, varities of textiles, sugar, rice etc. 
In chapter two we have brought out facts and discussed about 
certain ethics, navigational conventions and customary laws relating 
to wreckage and compensation. From the point of view of their 
application it appears these were common to all the littoral 
countries of the ocean shores from the Straits of Madagascar to 
Japan. As a matter of fact, these were not statutory rules but their 
violation was considered a serious offence. However, as a matter of 
fact, there were some exceptions to the rule as well. 
Plunder of ships by pirates on high seas was a clamity that the 
shippers of the Indian Ocean had to face. Indian rulers, however, 
always favoured the suppression of piracy but in the absence of any 
strong naval force generally succumed to the pressure of pirates. 
BY 1800 all Indian ships which sailed from Surat were made 
to carry the Company's flag and enter "Mochulka". Having failed to 
observe this rule a shipper was subjected to payment of penalty. 
Certain conventions for carrying freight as well were prevalent in 
the Indian Ocean. 
The third Chapter concentrates on participation of Sultan Tipu 
in the Indo-Arab trade. Designated as chief merchant or Malikut 
Tiijjar he had a well organized trade by establishing commercial 
links with littoral countries of the Persian Gulf. He had various 
commercial depots or Kothies within as well as outside India. The 
Kothi which is frequently referred to in his correspondence was 
established at Muscat. He had one at Jedda as well. He had agents 
appointed to all these Kothis who were entrusted with the charge to 
look after them and promote the commercial interest of Mysore. It is 
through these agents that he made transactions and purchased 
commodities which he required from littoral countries of the Gulf. 
He imported war horses, green plants, rock-salt and technical know-
hows such as pearl-divers, experts on silk-worm rearing and 
shipbuilders. His export commodities mainly constituted of 'gruff 
goods', such as rice, cloths, spices and sandalwood. 
Sultan Tipu deserves and could be called a planner and 
economist in his own right. The officials of East India Company had 
treated him as their deadliest enemy. Sultan Tipu had a plan to build 
a strong navy to defend his country and keep the Indian Ocean safe 
from the encroachment of Europeans, particularly the British. 
He always laid emphasis on the construction of new ships by 
the merchants of Mysore. He activised the officials of his state by 
asking them to collect the items of trade from their respective 
Kachehris and store them to meet the requirements of various 
Kothies outside Mysore. Prices of sale and purchase were the 
special subject of consideration for Sultan Tipu. He, therefore, was 
not only the chief merchant of his state but a moderniser and 
innovator with foresight. 
The chapter four is sub-divided into three sections. The first 
section relates to bills of exchange, drafts ant currency rates in Red 
Sea trade. Bill of exchange or "hoondi" was used on a large scale by 
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Indian merchants as remittances from overseas to India during 18 th 
and 19"* centuries. 
The returning Indian merchants from the Red Sea had no other 
alternative but to send their cash to India by purchasing bills of 
exchange, particularly, from the agents of the East India Company 
at Mokha. Another crucial reason that made the Indian merchants to 
sell their dollars in the money markets of Mokha was the fair deal in 
rupee-dollar ratio. The Company on the other hand induced the 
Indian merchants to sell their dollars mainly on account of 
acquiring this currency for purchase of coffee as the trade in coffee 
during 18*'' century had become very lucrative and its demand was 
very high in European markets. According to international 
conversion rate various currencies were converted into rupees and 
bill was issued to be drawn on the President and Council of EIC at 
Bombay or Surat or any port-city of India payable thirty days sight 
from stated dates. A table showing names of drawees and drawers 
together with the amount drawn has been attached with this section 
(i.e. Chapter 4-A). The day the twenty sets of bills were issued the 
rupee-dollar (Spanish) was in the ratio of 2:1. The section discusses 
by citing examples of issuance of numerous bills of exchange during 
different interval of times. 
Precious metal from Europe as well found its way to the Red 
sea. Medium of transaction was particularity Spanish dollars. 
European companies brought gold and silver for their purchases of 
Indian goods and Mokha coffee. A fairly good quantity of this 
precious metal found its way to India as well, either for minting or 
as treasure brought by Indian merchants. Its magnitude, however, is 
difficult to determine. 
The second section of the chapter exclusively deals with the 
mode of customs levied on export-import goods at various ports of 
the Red Sea for which data is available for the IS*** and IQ**" 
centuries. Port customs was by far the main source of income for 
the Imam of Yemen. Europeans in 1730 paid 3% on all description 
of goods whereas Muslim and Hindu merchants were subjected to 
customs payment ranging from 5 to 7.5 %. In 1737 Imam of Sanaa 
granted an exclusive privilege to the East India Company. Evidently 
there was no uniformity in the customs rates. It differed from port 
to port and from time to time. 
Customs regulations exempted a merchant from payment of 
customs at Yembo (a port under the jurisdiction of Mohammad AH 
Pasha) provided he had made the requisite payment at Jedda. In 
1850, according to the provision of a treaty, the Pasha exempted the 
British Government from all charges except the regular customs 
duty. Similarly if ''Raftias" or exit permits were issued by the 
Egyptian customs authorities the goods of EIC were exempted from 
payment of duty for the second time. Sublime Porte to some extent 
regulated such customs rates that were levied at the ports of the Red 
Sea and Basra. But in Yemen and Jedda practice of illegal exactions 
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such as ''Majaba", "Sambookia", and "Ittasibiah" continued for a 
long period during 19**^  century. Indian trade was also subjected to 
such exactions. 
Collection of extortion money by the customs authorities of 
Yemen was a subject of frequent complaints by the Indian 
merchants. Extortions in various forms were prevalent and those 
who showed resistance against such corrupt practices were 
subjected to various pressures and sometime punished. 
The third section of the chapter discusses the significance of 
Basra as a strategic and commercial port of the Persian Gulf. Basra 
in the Persian Gulf was the main port for the Turkish merchants 
since the 11^^ century. A discord between the Mutasallim and the 
official incharge of the Residency at Basra led to imposition of 
embargo by the officials of EIC which resulted in the incident of 
1820. 
From the petitions of claim on account of losses submitted in 
1820 to Governor in council by two Bombay-based prosperous 
merchants and shippers namely Nurseydass Purshotamdass and 
Shaik Aboo Bucker it is quite evident that the main sufferers on 
account of discords between the Turkish Government at Basra and 
the Company's officials were the Indian merchants and those 
officials paid little heed to their losses. The early decades from the 
turn of 19"^  century are also characterized by the British gunboat 
policy in the Gulf. 
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Chapter five is divided into two parts. The first Part deals 
with the shipping of Mohammad Ali Pasha into the Indian ocean and 
his trading affiliation with the East India Company. This aspect of 
his policy towards commerce between Egypt and India was hitherto 
not much known. During his reign India's main ports of supply to 
the Red sea were Calcutta, Surat and Bombay. We have much 
information on English export to Suez from Bombay. Trade touched 
a high level mark between the Bombay Presidency and the Red Sea 
during 1816-18. Evidence also suggests that the volume of trade 
between the Indian ports and the Pasha's ports of the Red sea was 
very high. There was a sharp upward movement in the volume of 
trade between 1815 and 1838. Jedda as a leading port of the Red Sea 
thrived only on Indian commodities. In 1833 the port received 
10,000 tons of shipping. The Pasha also formulated customs 
regulation, and discouraged import of those commodities which 
were either produced or manufactured in his dominion. His reign is 
marked by the execution of various treaties of trade and commerce 
with the British Government. Whereas the other section of the 
chapter by and large deals with the merchant shipping in the Red 
sea. The period covered is the P' half of the 19"* century, and we 
have endeavoured to assess the Indian trade with the Red Sea. We 
shall see that many petitions of claim against the Imam of Sanaa 
have been submitted to the Governor in Council at Bombay. The 
amount of losses particularly guide us to the value and level of 
trade the Indian merchants had with the ports of Mokha, Jedda and 
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other ports of the Red Sea. We also understand that a large number 
of Indian merchants belonging to Surat and Bombay had regular and 
prosperous trade with Mokha, Jedda and other ports of the Red Sea 
and had faced many maritime problems. We have valuable 
information, which had not been hitherto taken note of relates to 
blockades organized by the East India Company in order to warn the 
government of Sanaa and punish the governor (Daulah) of Mokha. 
The documents indicate that the merchants from Bombay and Surat 
had lodged complaints with the East India Company, pleading that 
their goods were either seized, or robbed. The Company's officials 
were requested to direct the Rresident at Mokha to take care of the 
safety of ships and goods belonging to the Indian merchants. The 
chapter largely deals with all these complaints and grievances of 
Indian merchants operating in the Red Sea region. 
The chapter six deals with the coming of steamships in the 
Indian Ocean and its impact on Indo-Arab trade. Replacement of 
sailing ships by steamships was indeed a revolution in navigation 
and world trade. But it gave a crippling blow to Indian and Arab 
owned sailing fleets. Apparently the steam shipping and Suez Canal 
helped the European trade more. On the opening of the Red Sea 
route to Europe and with the coming of steamships passing through 
the Suez Canal, the major beneficiary was thus undoubtedly Britain 
and Indo-Arab trade did not gain much as a consequence. 
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The chapter seven is divided into two parts. The first part 
mainly concentrates on the significance of the Suez Canal which 
was constructed by the French under De Lesseps. The Canal was 
opened for shipping in 1869. Interestingly, Palmerston was opposed 
to the construction because of the fear that during a war France 
might close the Canal to the British. As a matter of fact the Suez 
Canal shortened the sea route between Europe and India. Cheaper 
and faster voygages through the Canal became possible. While 
Damascus and Aleppo commercially suffered set back with the 
opening of the Suez Canal but it brought Iraq more firmly in the 
orbit of Indian Ocean trade. India and Britain came to have greater 
share of Iraq's trade. By 1914 India and Britain accounted for 50% 
of Iraq's exports and 2/1 of its imports. Trade of Venice with India 
as well revived with the opening of the Suez Canal. It served as 
entrepot of Indian goods and its volume rose to a very high level. 
Even though Indian goods lost some of their Middle Eastern markets 
owing to inflow of British industrial goods into those markets, 
however, evidence suggests that Indian piece goods had captured 
the Middle Eastern markets of Turkey and Aden and her volume of 
trade was rising. By 1893 English trade through the Suez Canal had 
increased tremendously. 
The second part of the Chapter describes as to how the port of 
Aden came into prominence following the opening of the Suez 
Canal and the increased traffic that passed through it. Aden under 
the pretext of maladministration came under the British imperial 
network in 1838. There was rapid rise of population of Aden since 
1839. By 1880 its population had gone up to 35,000. The settlement 
was placed under the Bombay Presidency. Its prosperity as a 
thriving port got a boost up but only on the cost of Mokha and, 
Hodaida. Its commercial prosperity would have been further 
advanced had railways been constructed from Sanaa to Aden. The 
annual exports and imports of Aden which in 1839 were Rs. 
1,900,000, in 1897 reached a high water-mark to over 
Rs.30,000,000. There was a marked development of re-exports of 
gum and coffee from 1877, of ivory and spices from 1875 and 
rubber and hides from 1876. The value of coffee increased five 
times between 1870 and 1880 and was re-exported to London, 
Marseilles, Trieste and New York. Its main exports were cotton 
textiles since 1874. The port of Hodaida only competed with Aden 
while Mokha was on the dwindling. 
Chapter eight is the overall assessment. What is important to 
note in this context is that the pace with which the industrial 
manufactures of Britain were capturing the Middle Eastern markets, 
survival of Indian textile goods into these markets was in spite of it 
quite flourishing. So long the Suez canal was not constructed, 
Bombay was the redistributive centre for EIC's British industrial 
manufactures to the Arab world. At the same time India's textile 
goods were also in great demand in Middle East. This further finds 
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corroboration in EIC's enumeration of Indian textiles like "dotties", 
fine piecegoods, "bowchas" and "asloof which were exported to 
the Middle Eastern markets. 
After the opening of Suez Canal there are varying indications 
that Indian textile was on diminishing. But Turkey still imported 
Indian textiles and silk through the Red sea. Her export of piece 
goods from Surat to the Red Sea was higher than from Bombay. 
Exports of Indian cloths and silk were also made to Damascus, 
Kaseem and Lohaj. Urban markets in both the Middle East and 
South-East Asia had remarkable influence on the growth of cotton 
in Gujarat and on Eastern coastal India. It is quite obvious, 
therefore, that during 19*'' century while Middle Eastern craft was 
dwindling the Indian craft was improving. This also shows that the 
British industrial manufacture of cheaper and attractive textiles had 
yet to occupy its prominence in textile export in the Middle Eastern 
countries. 
XII 
COMMERCE BETWEEN INDIA AND THE ARAB 
WORLD DURING 19TH CENTURY 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
Bnctnr of $f)ilns!npl)p 
IN 
HISTORY 
BY 
IFTIKHAR AHMAD KHAN 
CENTRE OF ADVANCED STUDY 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH-202002 (INDIA) 
2001 
C^' c^^' 
0^0^  
-^^^'^:' ^''' 
\ i 
r 
\cc. 
•Ar-'^-'^y^/ 
4 
r^i.. 
I 7 APR /0C2 
T5577 
CENTRE OF ADVANCED STUDY 
_ , . J External: (0571) 400146 
Telephone j j ^ , ^ , ^ ^ 3 4 j ^ ^ 3^, 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH—202002 (UP.), INDIA 
CHAIRMAN & COORDINATOR 
Certified that the thesis entitled Commerce Between India and the Arab 
World During 19 Century, is the original work of Mr. Iftikhar Ahmad Khan, 
supplicating as a teacher under clause 7 of chapter XXV of Academic Ordinances, 
A.M.U., for the award of Ph.D degree in History. 
March 2001 
(Professor S.P. Gupta) 
Chairman / Coordinator 
PREFACE 
Maritime history of Indian Ocean region has been a 
subject of great interest among historians. Beginning with W.H. 
Moreland many modern historians of maritime history have used 
both the indigenous as well as European sources to construct the 
history of the Indian Ocean region. The maritime trade and 
commerce has been studied by J.C. Van Leur, Holden Furber, 
Denys Lombard, K.N. Chaudhri, Ashin Das Gupta, Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam and others. Fernand Braudel, by and large, 
stands as a giant among all these, who although does not 
directly fall into their line; yet his wok remains a lighthouse, 
bringing the Indian Ocean in his bid to 'look East' into the 
arena of greater Mediterranean. 
My dissertation entitled "Commerce Between India and 
the Arab World During 19"' century" seeks to focus on 
important region which has been left out by our predecessors or 
referred to in passing from an Euro-centric emphasis. My 
attempt is to make the theme more Indo-centric. Thus, there has 
been a long standing need of a work of such a kind in which 
Indo-Arab trade relations during 19"* century in the context of 
Asian vis-^-vis world economy should be studied. The present 
work is an humble attempt to fill in this gap. 
The Indian trade and commerce during the IS"* century 
was not declining. Its industrial production was voluminous and 
a great volume of export and import was passing through the 
customs house of its important ports of Surat, Broach, Cambay, 
Manglore etc. Although, EIC had started shifting its commercial 
activities from Surat to Bombay from 1664, the former however 
remained a principal port on Western coast till the end of the 
17*'' century. We have also evidence that Surat continued to be a 
prominent centre of commercial activities during the 18*'' 
century. It was only from the beginning of the 19"* century that 
Surat's importance started declining because of 
deindustrialisation ensued in India that synchronized with 
British political domination and the rising importance of 
Bombay. 
It is interesting to note that many Indian rulers also had 
active participation in trade and commerce of their states. These 
great traders were the Nawab of Surat, Nawab of Arcot, Nawab 
Haider Ali and Sultan Tipu of Mysore. Their participation in 
trade and commerce must have been a source of encouragement 
for the ordinary merchants of their states as well as for those 
from abroad. Tipu Sultan, particularly to mention, went to the 
extent of having established diplomatic relations with a number 
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of Gulf countries and utilized his embassies there to supervise 
trade with those countries. At important sea-ports of the Gulf 
region commercial houses known as Kothis were established 
where agents (gumashtahas) were stationed to look after the 
commercial depots (or Kothis) and take care of whatever passed 
in between the port of Mysore and the Gulf. 
The source material for it is varied and contained in 
foreign languages. It is important to note that for the 18*'' and 
19"' century India's commerce with the Arab world material is 
available in Persian, as well as in the local Indian languages 
like Marathi, Gujarati, Rajasthani, Bengali and in four south 
Indian . languages. Of special significance is the collection of 
Sultan Tipu's own letters and orders in Persian contained in 
Hukmnamaha-i Tipii Sultan (India office Library, London). 
Some of these orders have been translated and published by 
William Kirkpatrick in his book. History of Tippoo Sultan. For 
the 18' century trade on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts we 
have the diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai which is extent in several 
volumes besides collection of other private papers. There are 
also the letters, orders and grants of Nawab of Arcot in Persian 
many of which have been translated in English and preserved at 
the Tamil Nadu Archives in Chennai. Documents for the IS'** 
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and 19"" century India's trade with Malay peninsula are also 
available in Malay language. 
While the European sources in Portuguese, Dutch, French 
and English provide rare and important information on the 
subject, data on Asia and Africa are also available in the 
Factory Records of the East India Company. These records also 
shed considerable light on commercial activities of Indian 
merchants with countries bordering the Indian Ocean shores. 
Besides, we get valuable information on the 19"* century Indian 
commerce with the Arab world in the useful accounts of 
travellers. But the accounts of Indian merchants' commercial 
activities are recorded mainly in context of their closer ties with 
the Company's affairs in the East. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Arabian Sea trade with India is believed to have begun 
from the third millenium BC when the merchants from ancient 
Dilmun traded with the cities of the Indus Valley. During this 
period the European trade with India across the Mediterranean 
was carried through intermediaries. While the Phoenicians 
dominated the western section of the trade routes, the routes on 
the eastern side passed through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. 
This concentration or "narrowing" of the great commercial 
pathways between the east and the west in the 'Levant' or the 
'Fertile-Crescent' remained a unique feature of world commerce 
till the rounding up of the Cape of Good Hope offered an 
additional passage. 
The discovery of monsoon in the early Christian era helped 
replace 'Coasting'. It is this achievement that made sailing 
possible from ports of the east African coast and the Red Sea to 
the western coast of India. 
The period from 13 BC to 96 AD witnessed the zenith of 
Graeco-Roman trade with India. Pliny (69-79 AD) assessed 
Rome's trade with India at 125,000,000 dinart and the outflow for 
Arabian and Chinese trade at 12,500,000 dinari. But after 300 
AD the Roman Empire declined and its coinage depreciated. As a 
result, its Indian trade also began to decay. The Greek sea traffic 
in the Indian Ocean declined correspondingly. There is complete 
absence of Roman coins in India after Caraculla (212-217 AD), 
suggesting a practical closure of the Roman-Indian commerce. 
Upon the decline of the Roman Empire, Byzantine inherited 
control over this important commerce, since both Egypt 
(commanding the Red Sea) and Syria (with its entrepots receiving 
goods from the Persian Gulf) became parts of the Byzantine 
Empire. However, despite various ups and downs the oriental 
wares did reach the Roman territories. Thus owing to declining of 
Roman influence, Abyssinia, extended its limits to the Nile and to 
the straits of Bab al-Mandab, imposed tribute on chiefs and 
protected sea-routes of crucial significance. It also took over 
Yemen and dominated the Red Sea trade.The Greeks who 
occupied a premier position in the eastern parts of the Roman 
Empire were now quite familiar with the various countries of the 
Indian Ocean, the markets of south-west Arabia, East Africa, 
Ceylon and Bay of Bengal, the mouth of Ganges as far as the 
'Golden Chersonese'. The Arabian peoples who had served as 
carriers and middlemen in the Indian trade with the 
Mediterranean during the period of the Roman Empire gained 
much from contacts with India and China, in the east, and Sabea 
and Egypt in the west. Arab settlements on the Indian shores seem 
to have already existed prior to the advent of Islam and these 
became more numerous on the coasts of Malabar and Ceylon 
thereafter. The author of Christian Topography in the 6'^ century 
AD comments on the rarity of visits by the Roman merchants at 
the entrepots of Eastern Commerce. Asian trade was by now 
shared mainly by Arabs, Abyssinians and Iranians. 
From the establishment of Prophet's power at Medina till 
the period of Caliph Muawiyah, the Islamic regime could not pay 
much attention to seafaring and maritime trade. Foreign ships cast 
anchor in the little Bay of Shoaiba. Occasional voyages can only 
be cited from the Jiddah coast which replaced Shoaiba as the port 
in the period of Caliph Usman. Muawiyah (661-80 AD) is said to 
have been the first Arab ruler to have built a navy, but it was 
mainly confined to the Syrian coast. The Arab Caliphate from the 
time of Umar brought Egypt and the Fertile Crescent under the 
control of a single power, almost for the first time since 
Alexander. The immediate result was not helpful to Indo-
Mediterranean trade; indeed, Henri Pirenne in his classic 
Mohammad and Charlemagne speaks of a closing of the Western 
Mediterranean. Though Pirenne's thesis might have been 
overstated, there does seem to have occurred a considerable 
decline in commerce between the western and eastern portions of 
the Mediterranean, and Alexandria also seems to have declined. 
But if the trade with Western and Southern Europe decayed, 
the newly unified Middle East itself offered a vast market for 
Indian (and Chinese) goods. A new impetus to sea trade can be 
discerned soon after the establishment of the Abbasid dynasty in 
750 AD particularly with the removal of the capital from 
Damascus to Baghdad in 762 AD. The ports on the Arabian coasts 
from which trade was conducted with Indian ports included Basra, 
Ubullah, Siraf in south-western Persia, Sohar, Muscat in Oman. 
By the mid 9**^  century, Muslim control over the Eastern and 
Central Mediterranean was firmly established and Byzantine fleet 
rarely ventured from its home bases. In the Indian Ocean, Arab 
supremacy was unchallenged. 
By the 9**' century India's seaborne trade was monopolized 
by Arab sea-farers. But during the 10'^  century this monopoly of 
trade by the Arabs gradually weakened, especially in south-east 
Asia, and from the iz"* century when the Chinese, availing the 
opportunity, extended their navigations to the Malabar ports. The 
change partly reflected the decline of the Abbasid Empire in both 
political and economic terms. 
During the Fatimid period the Jews based at Cairo had a 
large share in the Indian Ocean commerce. Alberuni (early 11*** 
century) says that a Jew controlled the whole of the pearl fishery 
in the Persian Gulf. During the 10*'' century a group of Jewish 
merchants known as Radhnites obtained some prominence. Ibn 
Khurdadbeh (825-911) writes that this group of merchants carried 
merchandise from western Europe to the Near East and from 
China and India to the Mediterranean. The Radhinites, by and 
large, were engaged in luxury trade. Theirs was not a regular 
trade since they belonged neither to the Christian nor to the 
Muslim World. Voyages to India were made by Radhnites from 
Egypt through the Red Sea. 
Driving away 'unbelievers' from the important trade of the 
Red Sea and giving encouragement to the extension of the Arab 
control over the Arabian Sea traffic, Salah al-Din (b. 532 
A.H./1138 A.D.-d. 589 A.H./1193 A.H.) of Kurdish origin and 
founder of the Ayyubid dynasty) led to the rise of the Karimi 
merchants who were to play a prominent role in the mercantile 
activity of the Indian Ocean. Like Salah al-Din his successor 
and nephew, Taqi al-Din Umar also gave encouragement to Karim 
merchants. The Karim's commercial activities extended between 
the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean during the 11*'' and 12*'' 
centuries. Simultaneously, the mercantile community on the west 
coast of India was widely engaged with the Middle East. Before 
1147 the towns on the coasts of the Red Sea, Arabia and India 
were frequented by merchants from the larger cities of the Muslim 
West. 
Aden in the 12'** century was a small city, yet, strategically 
located was of great significance, a port in between the 'both 
sea'. From Aden ships sailed to Sind, India and China. 
Muslims and Jews acted in partnership in undertaking 
maritime commerce as the large business and banking houses were 
in Muslim hands in Egypt. There were also sleeping partnerships. 
The Meccan always kept his capital employed by this means. 
Merchants were also assisted by a fairly developed system of 
credit and finance found in all countries bordering upon Arabian 
Sea. A rudimentary system of banking existed in the Arab world 
by the lo"* century. Moneylenders in Sind and other Indian ports 
advanced loans of thousand dinars to merchants. The late 13"' 
century saw the growing dominance of the Karimis in the 
Middle Eastern countries. They held a monopoly of Egypt's trade 
with East Africa and the Far East. The Karim became so wealthy 
that they were capable of financing the Mamluk state. The 
organization of the Karim had its counterparts in the closely-knit 
caste or community of Hindu merchants in India. Ibn Battuta 
indeed compares the banyas of Deogir (Daulatabad) to the Karim. 
During the n*** and H*** centuries the merchant guilds in 
South India were known as Virabalanja Sumaya or the Ayyavali, 
of these the collector guild or Sankarlu held considerable powers. 
They collected duties on exports and imports and paid a fixed sum 
to the government. 
Indeed, when we examine the function of the guilds in 
South India we find that the amount of authority those guilds held 
was never enjoyed by the Karimis; nor do we have evidence that 
the Karim ever were authorised to collect taxes on the 
government's behalf nor did they enjoy authority to exempt any 
dealer from paying duty. But on the Indian coasts conditions must 
have varied a great deal. It is quite likely that in area like Gujarat 
the more individualistic Muslim merchants provided a competing 
(and complementary) element to the strongly knit Hindu trading 
communities. The details of this encounter and interaction -
their rivalry and relationship has not been taken account of. 
A feature of the trade organization of the time was that the 
mercantile community either owned ships or hired them. The 
owners of ships themselves were wealthy merchants whose ships 
carried cargoes of their own as well as others. In the 11'*' century 
the ship owners in the Middle East were largely Muslims except 
for a few Christians. Many ships were owned by the ruling class, 
such as the sultans, ladies of the ruling houses, governors, 
generals etc. and also by the wealthier merchants. Jews of Aden 
also owned ships. The prominent Jewish merchants in Cairo were 
actually termed nakhoda (ship-master) around 1200 AD. They 
earned this title, apparently because of their participation in 
navigation on the Indian Ocean. 
The Medieval sea-borne trade confronted and suffered 
considerably from piracy. Piratical activities on the Western coast 
of India continued in the subsequent centuries too. Marco Polo 
condemns their depredations. Sultan Qala'un (1279-1290 AD) and 
his successor had enforced very severe rules against pirates and 
also robbers harassing caravans between Nile and the Red Sea. 
Sultan Qala'un made efforts to safeguard and enhance both trade 
and commerce {Kitab al-Suluk, Vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 581-2). Apart 
from this often merchant ships were seized by the governments, 
and confiscated the cargo belonging to persons who had 
connections with the shipowners. 
Transactions in Arabian Sea commerce involved not only 
barter but large exchanges of uncoined metal as well as a variety 
of coins. In the Egypto-India trade of the ll**" and 12*** centuries 
the payment seems largely to have been made in kind. The orders 
for Indian goods were accompanied by payments in gold pieces, 
the international coinage of that period. Besides, metallic coins, 
countries of the Indian Ocean also used cowries as medium of 
transactions which were the particular export of the Maldive 
Islands.' In Bengal, Ibn Battuta witnessed cowry shells being 
exchanged for rice. The Yemenites used them as ballast in their 
ships. 
Merchants trading from the Arabian Sea ports suffered 
considerably from heavy taxation. The customs amounted to more 
than 10% of the value of the goods taxed. In some cases the 
government made trade a state monopoly. 
1. Idrisi (F!. 1152 AD). Kitab Nuzhat al-Mushtaqfi Khatiraq, (tr.) Maqbool Ahmad, India and the 
Neighbouring rerr/Zories Leiden, 1960, p. 155. See also, Surendra Gopal, Outiines of Indian 
Overseas Trade in the 17 Century: Impact on Coinage System', Medieval IndicfiOoinages: A 
Historical and Economic Perspective, 5 Intemation^ Colloquium. Febniary 17* -19*, 2(X)I: 
(ed ) Amitcshwar Jha. Nasik (Maharashtra, India), p. 8. Cf.M.P. Singh, Town. Market Mint and 
Port in the Mughal Empire, 1556-1707 (an administrative-cum-Ecoaomic study), New Delhi, 
1985, pp 287-88 
The main feature of the Indian trade with the Islamic 
and other countries during early medieval time had been generally 
that India exported spices, herbs and drugs and in exchange 
obtained gold and silver. India also exported iron and steel 
besides cloth, silk, indigo and other merchandise. Precisely, 
Indian cotton cloth and other textiles like shall, makhmal, 
kamkhab etc. were specially important items of export, 
particularly to South Asia and East Africa and even some reached 
Europe. These were carried by the Arabs to the Red Sea and from 
there to Damascus and Alexandria where they were distributed to 
the Mediterranean countries and beyond. 
The nature of trade and commerce changed as changes in 
shipbuilding technology were evolved following the intrusion of 
the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. There seems to be all round 
improvement in shipping activity, with the use of varieties of 
sails, capacity of accommodating more cargo, evolution of round 
ships that replaced the older junks etc. Constant efforts began to 
cover longer distance in shorter time etc. Infact what was lacking 
was not technique but the spirit of innovation for which the 
Indian shipwrights were making constant endeavours. These 
efforts seem to have nearly been achieved only by the end of the 
17"' century. 
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Carriers of Arabian Sea trade used divergent routes for 
their shipping to various ports. The routes on which Arab-owned 
ships plied were mainly those from Malabar to the Red Sea. Those 
ships also plied from Malabar and Konkan to Hormuz and from 
the Gujarat ports to the Red Sea ports. The routes on which 
Indian-owned ships sailed were from Gujarat and Malabar to 
Malacca, from Gujarat (rarely Malabar) to the East African ports, 
from Gujarat to Hormuz; from Gujarat and Konkan to the Red 
Sea; and lately, coastal routes on which smaller ships were 
employed. 
Before the discovery of the passage round the Cape of Good 
Hope the main outlets of Eastern commodities to Europe were 
Alexandria and Aleppo. The Mamluk Kingdom of Egypt thus 
stood astride the main channels through which traffic went from 
the Indian Ocean to Mediterranean Europe. Commenting on the 
significance of the discovery and its impact K.M. Panikar, wrote 
that "The real importance of the new 'discovery' (of the Cape 
route by the Portuguese) lay in the fact that it broke the monopoly 
which the Venetians and the Egyptians had so long enjoyed in the 
trade with India."' 
1. KM. Paniker, .1 History of Kerala, the Ai\uamalai University, 1%0, pp. 33-34. 
II 
The term 'Moor' embraced the Arabs as well as the 
Gujarati and Malabari Muslims. The Portuguese on their arrival 
found the 'Moors' dominating the Indian Ocean from Madagascar 
to the straits of Malacca. 
Till the Middle Ages the Arabs controlled a large part of the 
Indian Ocean commerce. They maintained a hold over shipping 
based on Hormuz where merchandize of the East of all 
descriptions could be had. 
At the mouth of the Red Sea, Aden too remained important, 
its merchants being described as very rich by Ibn Battuta. By 
1500 A.D. Arabs' commercial activity had extended to south-east 
Asia. Tom Pires mentions the presence of Arab merchants at 
Malacca from Cairo, Mecca, Aden, Abyssinia, East African States 
and various other West Asian countries {Suma Oriental, vol. -1, p. 
174). The Arabs also traded with Japanese ports. They traded 
mainly in pepper and took it from Malabar to the Red Sea and to 
Hormuz in their own ships. The Arabs based at Cairo functioned 
as intermediaries between Europe and India. Commodities of 
Italy, Greece and Damascus brought by the Arab merchants to 
Cairo were taken to the Red Sea and thence trans-shipped in their 
own ships to Gujarat. Their Cargoes consisted of gold, silver, 
quicksilver, vermilion, copper, rose water, wools and brocades. 
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These goods at Cambay were exchanged with the indigenous 
cotton cloth and spices from Malabar and Malacca.^ 
Gujarati merchants and navigators were also very prominent 
in the Indian Ocean trade c. 1500. Their ships were of larger size 
and had expert seamen to man them. Their pilots possessed much 
skill and did a great deal of navigation. After the decline of the 
Delhi Sultanate the only North Indian state that took keen interest 
in sea trade was Gujarat. Gujaratis were strong element in the 
trade of the Malay Archipelago. There were in Malacca in the 
early 16''" century, at least, 1,000 Gujarati resident merchants and 
5,000 "transient sailors". It appears that Gujarati Muslims traded 
more on the Aden-Gujarat-Malacca line. 
The Gujaratis maintained brisk trade with East Africa as 
well. The people of Sofala and the city states like Kilwa, Malindi, 
Pemba, Mogadishu purchased Cambay cloth in exchange for gold, 
ivory and slaves. The Gujarati merchants were trading with 
Hormuz long before the Portuguese intrusion in the Indian Ocean. 
These merchants brought horses from Persian Gulf. There were 
Gujarati Muslim merchants on western Indian coast. Albuquerque 
noted the Hindu "banyas of Cambay" trading with those parts. 
I. Diuirte Barbosit, The BookofDiiarte liarbosa, (tr.) Mansel Longsvorth Dames, London: 
Haklmt Society, vol. 1, pp. 54-55. 
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Pearson is of the opinion that the crews of the ships owned by 
the Hindus, were largely Muslims. The Gujaratis often sailed on 
long-distance routes. They sometimes kept themselves away from 
their homeland for quite a long period. For instance the ships of 
Rander remained for years away from their home in Gujarat. 
The Malabaris, both Muslim and Hindu, traded with 
Malacca, at that time major entrepot for the goods of Chinese and 
Spice Islands. They owned their own ships. At Calicut, the Arabs 
purchased goods brought by Malabaris from Malacca, while they 
also carried away pepper and other produce of Malabar. The 
position of Calicut in the 14 and 15 century was that of an 
emporium where every thing could be obtained. Pepper grew all 
along the coast of Malabar. Zakariya Qazvini, a geographer in the 
13"* century, in his description of Malabar wrote that, "pepper 
goes from extreme East to the extreme West".* In a letter by 
Rashiduddin which contains a list of order for Indian 
commodities, we find a demand for 300 mans of pepper. The 
Malabaris traded extensively with Kathiawad and Gujarat, as well 
as the Coromandel Coast, Ceylon and Maldive Islands. From the 
description of European travellers it appears that the majority of 
the merchants in Malabar were Muslims. Nairs were often found 
1. Sulcyman Nadvi, Commercial Relations of India with Arabia', IsUvnic Culture, vol. 7, April. 
1933. p. 306. 
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working with these Muslims as secretaries. Malabaris were 
very good sailors. Muslim shippers employed fishermen. Malabari 
collaborated with the Muslims in Sea commerce. 
Stagnation of Hindu seafaring or for that matter the 
dominance of Arab shippers did not restrain Hindus to continue 
their navigational activities. Enumerating various reasons for such 
restraints as it is contained in the Dharmshastra A.L. Basham is 
of the view that the text probably only applies to the Brahmins.* 
The question arises whether there was any stagnation at all to sea-
travel in the Indian Ocean seafaring. Even if Dharmshastra 
deemed it a pollution to travel overseas, Hindu merchants and 
sailors had established settlements abroad. The Cairo Geniza 
documents refer to the presence of a number of Hindu merchants 
at Cairo. The documents also record the sinking of the ship of one 
Patam Soami, driven to Berbera. There were a number of other 
small boats of the same person which safely reached Aden.^ 
Portuguese, successfully crossed the Cape of Good Hope. 
Their success was spectacular as an example of their 'Crusading 
Spirit' as well as a result of their expertise and technical 
superiority in navigational techniques over their adversaries. The 
1 A L Basham, Studies in Indian History and Culture, Calcutta, 1964, p. 162. see also Lakshini 
Subrainanian, Medieval Seofanrs. Lotus collection (ROLI BOOKS) 1999, pp 9-10 
2 SD Goitcm. Studies in hlamic [listorv and In.stitutions,Lcidcn, 1966, p 349 
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ostensible aim was the "Search of Christians and spices" as 
king John II hoped, "for (the Kingdom of Prester John) would 
serve him as a way-station on the route to India, from hence 
Portuguese Captains would bring back those riches heretofore 
distributed by Venice.* 
The initial aim of the King of Portugal was to obtain 
monopoly of pepper trade in Europe by shifting the centre for 
pepper distribution from Venice to Lisbon by destroying the 
Levantine trade carried by Arab and Indian merchants. The main 
design of the Portuguese was to purchase pepper cheaply for Casa 
da India and to sell it almost at monopoly prices in Europe by 
extracting high profits. The Portuguese made payments in bullion, 
gold and silver. According to an estimate "120 to 150,000 tons of 
spices were bought (during the 16"* century) almost without 
merchandise in return, for 150 tons of gold.^ 
In order to establish an empire and to have control over the 
pepper producers, they adopted the strategy of subjugation of the 
rulers of the regions of Malabar in whose states pepper grew. 
These attempts of the Portuguese did not materialize in Calicut as 
1. Immanual Wellerstein, The Modern World System, New York 1974, p. 326. See also the same 
author's article, "The Incorporation of the Indian Subcontinent into the Capitalist World-
Economy', The Indian Ocean Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics, (ed.) Satish 
Chandra, Sage Publications (New Delhi). 1987, p. 223. 
2. Immanual Wellerstein, op cit. p '2')n 
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the Zamorin did not agree with the terms and conditions of 
Portuguese. In Cochin they succeeded in forcing the rulers to 
cooperate. Their attempts to monopolize the supply of Malabar 
trade, therefore, failed. The Portuguese also failed in their efforts 
to block the trade in spices carried by the Indian and Arab 
merchants. Hormuz was seized in 1515 and the Persian Gulf route 
was brought under their control but the Portuguese remained 
unsuccessful in taking Aden. We may infer from it that so long as 
Aden was not taken by the Portuguese the Arab and Indian 
merchants could not be eliminated. There is evidence to suggest 
that the Portuguese blockade of the Red Sea proved ineffective 
and the Arab and Indian merchants carried their trade undeterred. 
Moreover in 1570s the Portuguese confessed the futility of their 
blockade effort and discontinued it.' 
The Levant trade-the mainstay of Indo-Arab Commerce-
retained its significance by and large throughout the course of the 
16"" century, in spite of disturbances created in the Arabian Sea 
by the Portuguese. The prosperity of the Commerce on this route 
increased during the 2"'* half of the century and continued to be as 
important as the Cape-route. The data of pepper export to Lisbon 
I M.N. Pearson, .\/t'rc7/(;///.V(W(//^(//c7-.v///(/wyrtrrt/, California. !')"('. pp 4(>-47, 
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and to Levant, given by Jan Kieniewiez, supports such an 
assumption.* 
The royal Portuguese monopoly could not become a reality 
and the Levant trade continued. The Portuguese failed to 
overcome their basic economic weakness by their naval 
supremacy. Among other factors responsible for Portuguese 
failure, was the growing power of the Ottoman Turks. 
The Portuguese tried to operate in Asian waters from a position 
of comparative dominance based on naval power. Their attempt was to 
destroy rivals particularly the Arabs and Indian Muslims by controlling 
and caring the trade. Yet, the Portuguese could never succeed in 
controlling fully the trade in Asian waters, and their prime object to ban 
all Red Sea trade was not successful. Panikkar is of the view that the 
gap created by the partial ouster of the Arab merchants, the Portuguese 
cartaz system was not filled up by the Portugues£ themselves but was 
mainly by the Indian merchants who "were able to carry on their trade 
without competitions". By 1530s the Turks became active again in the 
Persian Gulf and the Portuguese share in carrying trade started 
declining. By 1560, Alexandria was exporting as much spices to Europe 
as in the late 15*'' century. 
1. Jan Kieniewiez. The Portuguese Factory and Trade in Pepper in Malabar during the lf>"' 
CcntuPt'. Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol. 6(\). 1^ )69, p. 62. 
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During the course of 16"' century the trade in the Asian 
waters adjusted itself to the new realities imposed by the 
Portuguese. The Asian merchants had largely retained their 
existing trade owing to the inherent weaknesses in the Portuguese 
system. 
The dawn of the 1?"' century was marked by the 
establishment of two north European trading companies. The 
English East India Company was established in 1600 and the 
various Dutch companies merged to form the VOC in 1602. 
Naturally the emergence of these companies affected the entire 
pattern of Arabian Sea commerce. The Dutch had naval 
superiority over the slower and bulkier Portuguese carracks, 
hence they struck at the weakest and most crucial spot of their 
hold. 
The Dutch reached the Spice Islands by avoiding India. The 
interlocking nature of Asian trade, created an immediate impact 
on the Arabian Sea trade. The Dutch monopolised the Sumatran 
pepper, and by supplying it in large quantities to Europe they 
drove out the superior Malabar pepper from the European and 
even Ottoman markets. 
The Portuguese did not only face the Dutch onslaught, a 
number of other forces, too combined together to hasten their 
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passing away. The Turko-Persian conflict resulted in the 
decay of the silk trade through Aleppo, therefore, Hormuz 
declined. The Safavids' attempts to develop Bandar Abbas 
(Gombroon) also contributed in the decline of the significance of 
Hormuz. In 1622 the Persian and English joint forces captured 
Hormuz from the Portuguese. The seizer of Muscat by the Arabs 
in 1647 completed their rout in the Persian Gulf. 
For the Dutch the Arabian Sea area was a zone of secondary 
interest, whereas to the English East India Company it turned out 
to be of primary concern, during the 17*** century. They turned to 
the Mughals for a hold in the Arabian Sea, and established a 
permanent English factory at Surat in 1613. 
One of the major sources of early conflict between the 
English and the Indian merchants and the Mughal authorities 
originated in their attempts to participate in Gujarat's trade with 
the Red Sea. This the Mughals would not agree to; and the 
conflict led to English plundering Indian ships calling at Red Sea 
ports in 1612 and causing considerable though temporary loss to 
the Gujarat trade. 
To keep the English out of the Red Sea trade the Gujarat 
merchants resisted them in Mokha as well and were powerful 
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enough to succeed at least temporarily in their endeavour in 
1610. In 1618 they (the English) had succeeded in procuring a 
farman from the Pasha of Sanaa allowing them trade with Mokha. 
In 1620s the Zaidi Imams of Sanaa ended the Turkish rule in 
Yemen, and the Imam's port of Mokha began to flourish at the 
expense of Aden which declined rapidly due to Turkish 
maladministration. The privileges at Mokha thus were very timely 
and provided the English with an opportunity to gain an edge over 
others in the Red Sea trade. 
In 1621 the Dutch tried to follow the English example and 
captured Gujarat ships in the Red Sea, and forced the merchants 
to take licenses from them on payment. The troubles continued 
during 1622-23 when the English again started attacking Gujarat 
ships. Even the vessels that had the licenses issued by the English 
were not spared. The ships belonging to Tavakkal Ali and Shivaji 
Baniya were captured. In 1623, Ganjbar, carrying 100 Gujarat 
traders of quality on board was captured. But Mughals owing to 
their pre-occupation in suppressing Khurram's revolt were unable 
to take cognizance of these incidents. 
However, the privileges enjoyed by the English at Mokha 
adversely affected the trade of the Indian merchants. This added 
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to the general set back suffered by Gujarat merchants' trade 
with the Red Sea as a result of the arrival of the Dutch and the 
English. 
The fall of Hormuz in 1622 generally established the 
English strength in the Arabian Sea. But the Dutch too extended 
their trade to Persia in 1623 and having better financial resources 
and spices to sell in the Persian markets, they began to rival the 
English. The Gujarati merchants too gained by the disappearance 
of the Portuguese control. Persian merchants also started visiting 
Surat. The Persian port. Bandar Abbas (Gombroon) now^ replaced 
Hormuz. 
In 1620s the hostilities between the Mughal and the Persian 
rulers provided a further fillip to Persian Gulf trade due to the 
stoppage of overland trade between the Mughal state and Safavid 
empire, much of the trade was directed to the Gujarat ports. When 
the Portuguese attacked the Gujarat shipping in the region, a 
short-lived alliance was formed between the Dutch and English 
and in 1625 they inflicted another defeat on the Portuguese. 
The volume of Gujarat trade with Persia was so high that 
apparently the Gujarat shipping alone was not sufficient to cope 
with it. The Gujarat merchants forced the Dutch ships to unload 
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rice and cotton and carry their goods to Bandar Abbas. 
Similarly the English too were compelled by Hari Vaishya and 
Virji Vora to transport goods of Surat merchants to Gulf ports or 
to repay the loan of more than 30,000 laris the English owed to 
them. The English had to comply. The Gujarat trade with the Gulf 
flourished and the English had to face stiff competition from the 
Gujaratis at Bandar Abbas. 
The Indian merchants' presence in the Persian Gulf in l?**" 
century is an illustration of both their enterprise and resilience 
and the capacity of pre-modern systems of commerce for 
accommodation and adjustment. Their presence is also a reminder 
that one should not assume that pre-modern ideological and social 
systems that were necessarily hostile to trade and enterprise. The 
presence of Hindu usurers in an Islamic country like Iran is proof 
enough of that. 
It appears that after the 1620s Gujarat and other Asian 
merchants re-asserted their position and were able to tide over the 
initial shock and setback to Arabian Sea trade. They were forced 
to concede some share to new rivals, the English and the Dutch, 
especially in carrying trade. On the whole a fairly large portion of 
the trade of the Arabian Sea was retained by the Indian shippers 
in spite of the flutter in the first decade of the 17"' century. 
23 
It does not seem thus possible to agree with Neils 
Steensgaard's thesis that the emergence of North European 
companies in the Arabian waters simply destroyed the trade of the 
Asian merchants, the so-called 'peddlers'. According to Neils 
Steensgaard in 1620s the Dutch and English share in the Asiatic 
trade rose so much that the Asian peddlers were simply forced to 
give way for the new entrants. There was now a direct 
international trade through the Cape of Good Hope, which 
increasingly replaced the Levant route and an 'Asiatic Trade 
Revolution' took place. Our evidence, however, suggests that 
contrary to this assumption the trade in the Asian waters remained 
with the Asian traders; they only conceded some share to 
Europeans who were to depend on Gujarat merchants to a great 
extent not for the access to the market but also for credit 
facilities. The Arabian Sea trade thus only readjusted itself to new 
realities and no change meriting the designation of a revolution 
took place. 
The Gujarat famine of 1630 adversely affected the Arabian 
Sea trade but the overseas commerce picked up quite soon. By 
1633 the Gujarat ships were back again at Mokha. Zahid Beg and 
Shahbandar (Port Officer) of Surat too resumed their trading 
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activities. The re-emergence of Aden too helped in the 
recovery of Red Sea trade. 
In the late 1630s the English resumed their piratical 
activities. This rekindled the hostilities between the English and 
the Mughal authorities. The disruption of links between Mokha 
and Cairo owing to Turko-Arab conflict further affected the Red 
Sea trade. But the Persian Gulf trade picked up as a consequence. 
In 1647 the Dutch attempt to monopolise Red Sea trade and their 
embargo on Gujarat ships, further disturbed the trade in the 
region. 
The English faced rough weather in the Persian Gulf as 
well. The Dutch who were financially better off than the English 
and had a large number of ships in their fleet started outstripping 
their trade in the Gulf. The Dutch slashed down their freight rates 
at 1/3 of the freight charged by the English and drove away the 
British from the carrying trade. But the English carrying trade 
soon recovered owing to the Dutch attacks and embargoes on 
Gujarat shipping. In face of these attacks the Gujarat merchants 
preferred English shipping. 
The troubles ensued during the 1660s as well. The English 
and Dutch refused to carry the cargo of Gujarat merchants as 
freight. The- situation worsened so much that the Armenians and 
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Persians left Surat for Bandar Abbas. The Gujarat trade with 
Persia and Persian Gulf declined sharply. 
The story of the Red Sea was somewhat different. Contrary 
to the decline of Gujarat trade in the Persian Gulf, the Gujarat 
merchants' trade with the Red Sea ports flourished during the 2"** 
half of the l?"" century. After the closure of the English factory 
the Gujarat shipping picked up. The English themselves began 
using Gujarat vessels. In 1662 they hired a ship from Beni Das to 
transport their goods to Mokha. The ships belonging to Armenian 
merchants too were used by the English. The Red Sea market 
came back fully into the hands of Gujarat merchants in 1660s. 
Trade in Mokha coffee developed particularly during this 
period. The Gujarat merchants brought coffee from Mokha to 
Surat. It was here coffee was bought and sent by the English East 
India Company to England. 
During the 1680s the Dutch East India Company too 
followed suit, they too began buying Arabian coffee at Surat. 
After the closure of their factory at Mokha in 1684, they were 
totally dependent on Surat supplies for onward shipments to 
Europe. The demand was so high that the Surat merchants started 
also obtaining Abyssinian coffee though it was inferior to the 
Mokha coffee. 
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The Asian merchants in general and the Gujarat 
merchants in particular maintained their control over the Red Sea 
trade down to the early decades of the 18"* century as they did 
during the subsequent period. Merchant princes such as Mulla 
Ghafur, Muhammad Saleh Chellaby and many others flourished. 
Mulla Ghafur who was a Bohra and came from a modest 
background achieved a runway success. At the turn of the 18 
century he possessed a fleet of 21 seagoing ships. His successor 
Mulla Muhammad Ali owned 24 ships. He had a bitter feud with 
the Chellabis. This finally led to the ruin of the Mulla's family in 
1730. But were the great days of Surat's trade over by the turn of 
the is"* century. Ashin Dasgupta, an eminent historian of 
maritime trade, is of the view that Sural whose prosperity was 
dependent on the stability of three empires namely the Mughal, 
Safavid and Ottoman Empire began to decline with the 
disintegration of those states.* But the ensuing account of Surat's 
trade with the Red Sea suggests that the trade continued and 
might even have surpassed the volume of the previous century. 
1. Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants anJ the dedineofSurat, C. 1700-1750, Wiesbaden, 1979, p. 
139 et passim. See also the same author's article.''the crisis at Surat, 1730-32! Bengal: Past and 
Present. Diamond Jubilee Number. 1967. p. 148. 
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Chapter - 1 
THE INDIAN TRADE WITH THE RED SEA, 18""" CENTURY 
The hanyas for generat ions had functioned as merchants and 
brokers at Surat as well as in marts of south-east Asia, Persian Gulf, 
the Red Sea In the early 1730s the banyas of Diu sailed to Mokha 
under Portuguese protection Mokha ' s Supercargoes Diary in its 
entry of 1 April 1733 records the arrival of ' the naqdy sway ' , a 
hanya ship under the Por tuguese colour from Diu * Evidence on the 
other hand, suggests no relaxation of Portuguese towards Muslim-
owned ships One of many instances may be cited from the Surat 
Factory Diary It mentions in its entry 'Saed Ship ' being attacked 
by two ghorabs belonging to the Portuguese ^ 
Other entries in the Diaries of 1733 at Mokha again record 
arrival of ships to Mokha owned by banyas of Surat Without giving 
names of owners the entries of 23 April, 7 and 8 May 1733 only 
record arrivals at Mokha of "Two Banian ships from Diu", "Two 
Banian vessels from Cormian" and "a Banian ship", whose port of 
origin does not find mention ^ 
1 MoV.\\;x, \ X^xiWllil), Mokha Supercargoes Diary r25 / 7 i i , No 74, p 102 
Documents used in this work are available at Maharashtra Archives, Mumbai 
2 Surat, 1 August ll'^Q, Surat Factory Diary, 1740 42 No 5, p 13 
3 Mokha. 28 April. 7 and 8 May 1733, Mokha Sit{HrLJn;oi'\ Diary 1725 i i 
No 74 pp 118 132. 172 
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Entries of the East India Company records also suggest that in 
the 1730s there were some very prominent families of merchants of 
Surat like the Sidis , and Chellabis whose ships frequently visited 
Mokha The entry of 23 April 1733 in Mokha Supercargoes Diary 
mentions arrival of "sidee ship" to Mokha from Surat ' 
Another entry of the same record of 1 May 1733 informs of 
the arrival of "a Gorab" at Mokha from Surat belonging to Hamid 
Chellabi ^ An early information in a late entry of 4 July 1733 shows 
arrival of "Fut tee Salam" on 23 April to Mokha whose owner is 
mentioned as 'Mohamed alley' from Surat ^ 
Jedda was the terminal for many ships from India 
Merchandise from Jedda to Cairo or further west to Damascus or 
Morocco was carried either by caravan or on dhow to the Suez area 
An entry of Mokha Supercargoes Diary of 20 July 1733 speaks of 
arrival of a " G o r a b " from Jedda belonging to "Shahe Rachid from 
Bassidie'"* Another entry of 3 August 1733 reports of the arrival of 
"the Gunjavar Mecky" from Jedda* 
The ship "Gunjaver Mecky" finds frequent mention in Mokha 
Supercargoes Diary and is reported making voyages between Surat 
and the Red Sea According to the entry of 6 August 1733 contained 
1 }Aok\\di.21> \^x\\ M'i'i, Mokha Supercargoes Diarv 1725-33,No 74 p l i s 
2 Mokha. 1 May 1733,/A;c/, p 130 
3 Mokha 4 July 1733,//j/J. p 172 
4 Mokha 20 July 1733,//)u/, p 188 
5 Mokha "? August 1731 fhn/ p 191 
in the Mokha Supercargoes Diary the owner of the ship was a 
'S iddy ' merchant But a ship of the same name had been owned by 
"Ibrahim Chellaby" and after his demise the ownership seems to 
have passed to Ismail Chellabi * It was under his ownership the ship 
was shown making voyage to Jedda ^ By this t ime its previous 
owner Ibrahim Chellabi was dead 
There is almost no evidence of rivalry among the Indian 
traders sailing to Mokha The Sidis and Chel labis made voyages 
together In an entry of Mokha Supercargoes Diary of 6 August 
1733 both the S id i ' s ship Gunjawar and Che l l ab i ' s Ghorab are 
reported to have sailed together to Surat •* 
Much information related to transportat ion of freight cargo of 
the East India Company to and from Mokha by Indian merchants can 
be noted in the Company's records Surat Factory Diary in its entry 
of 31 August 1740 mentions loading large quanti ty of coffee from 
Mokha, on behalf of the East India Company, by Ahmad Chellabi ^ 
In another instance, a vessel owned by Chellabi was hired by the 
Company's Surat factors for Rs 5,000 in September 1 7 4 0 " In yet 
1 Surat, 30 August 1742, Surat Factory Diary. 1742-44, No. 5. 
2 Surat, 25 March 1742, Surat Factory Diary, 1742-44, No 5, p. 109 
3 Surat, 30 August 1742, Surat Factory Diary. 1742-44, No 6 
4 Mokha, 6 August 1733, Mokha Supercargoes Diary, 1725-33, No 74, p 191 
5 Surat, 3 August 1740, Sural Factory Diary, 1740-44, No 5, p 13 Evidence 
to freighting of goods of European Companies on "India Vessels' arc 
numerous 
6 Surat, September 1740. Surat Factory Diary. 1740-42, No 5, p 191 
Chellabis throughout the 18th centur\ were making frequent voyages to the 
Red Sea There are frequent references to Chellabi's ships sailing to Mokha 
Mokha, 2 May 1795, Mokha Factor\ 1752 95, No 76, p 34 
another instance the Captain of the Ghorab 'Generous Friend' in the 
employment of the East India Company announced the depar ture of 
his vessel on 10 June, 1790 to Bombay.* 
Carrying coffee for freight by the Company's ships was not a 
rare sight. We have Thomas Lunn, master of the Ghorab Generous 
Friend announcing departure of his vessel from Mokha on 10 June 
1790. He agrees to take as freight to Bombay 300 bales of coffee at 
the rate of 3"/2 Spanish dollars a bale . The goods had to be taken out 
of the vessel within 10 days after the arrival of the vessel , 
o therwise they would be liable to demurrage. If agreeable to the 
sender he had to make an advance of Rs. 500 Spanish dollars for 
d ischarge at Bombay at the rate of Rs. 215 for 100 Spanish dol lars . 
Bills were to be drawn on the Company at Bombay, payable 31 days 
after sight.^ 
Thus there were certain convent ions prevailing for carrying 
freight to and from Mokha. For the transport of the East India 
Company ' s cargo the factor at Mokha had first to apply to the 
nakhoda and only after his approval the freight was loaded.^ 
1. Mokha, 29 April 1790, Mokha Factory, 1752-95, No. 76, p. 64. 
2. Mokha, 9 April 1790, Mokha Factory, 1752-95, No. 76, p. 64. See evidence 
of execution of an agreement between the Nakhoda Ghulam Husain 
Hanjeebhoy, agent for Taqi Chellabi and Messrs Lopcr and Ramsay, and the 
Factor of the East India Company at Mokha for freighting the Company's 230 
bales of coffee to Boniba\ on board the ship "Fez Soobhany" The owner of 
the ship in all probabilit\ was Hajjce Esoph Bushir IhuF p 65 
3 Mokha. 10 August 17'^ )5. Mokha l-'actory, 1752 9i. No 76, p 1.S5 
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According to another convention apparently the trader and 
shipper both had to enter into an agreement before the consignment 
was loaded ' When a ship was to be loaded for Bombay and other 
Indian ports there was a general announcement by the sh ip ' s captain 
himself Terms and conditions of the loading and charges by and 
large, depended on the decision of the captain himself.^ There is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that the cargo was carried by both the 
East India Company's ships and the ships of Indian t raders 
presumably on competitive terms. An entry of 18 July 1752 in 
Mokha Factory says: "sailed the Daddaboy & Speedwell, having got 
about Lacks of dollars on Freight between them"^. 
Numerous entries in Sural Factory Diary of 1740s contain 
references to Surat ships sailing to Mokha An entry of 30 
September 1740 mentions the arrival of "a moor ship at the Bar of 
Sura t" from Mokha. The owner of the ship was "Seyad Hosseni of 
Surat"^. Sayyid Husaini 's ships usually sailed between Surat and 
Jedda.^ 
The number of Indian ships visiting Surat in a part icular 
period can be easily taken as an index of the volume of t rade 
1 Mokha, April 1790, Mokha Factory, 1752-95, No.76, p. 155. 
2 Mokha, 18 July 1752, Mokha Factory. 1752, No. 75, p 60. 
3 Mokha, 18 July 1752, Mokha Factory 1752-1795, No 76, p 155 
4 Surai 30 SQ^tcrtihQT XIAO. Sural Factory Diary. 1740 1742, No 5, p 29 It is 
to be noted that the term "moors' assumes entireh different interpretation 
during the period under consideration 
5 Surat, March n4\. Surat Fictory Diary 1740 1742. No 5. p 313 
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between Mokha and Surat. Entries of 28 August, 3 and 8 September 
1740 mention arrival of three ships to the Surat Bar from Mokha. 
The owners of two of these ships are mentioned as moors. The name 
of the third owner is given as Mubarak ( 'Moobrah'); the ship is said 
to have come from Jedda.* The arrival of yet another vessel 'Jutly 
alcare Grab' from Aden belonging to Haji Salim Ahmad of Surat is 
also reported.^ 
In another entry another ship is mentioned as "Jutly Jung". 
The name of her owner was Fuckruddin (Fakhruddin). The ship 
plied between Surat and the Red Sea.^ Surat is said to have 
commercial contacts with Johanna (?) as it is well proved by the 
movements of ships between the two ports. An entry of 16 
September 1742 of Surat Factory Diary refers to the arrival of a 
ship from 'Johanna', owned by 'Seia Jean'.'* 
Entries in the East India Company's records of 1740 in Surat 
Factory Diary inform us of the incidents of depredations by 
Marathas and English. A letter of 16 September 1742 by the chief 
English Factor at Surat refers to the ships owned by the customs 
master of Surat. Referring to a 'Bottela' belonging to the customs 
master of Surat, the Factor mentions a plan to seize the ships. He 
1. Surat. 28 August, 1740, Surat Factory Diary, 1740-1742, No. 5, p. 10. 
2. Surat, 8 September 1740, Surat Factory Diary. 1740-1742, No. 5, p. 289. 
3. Surat, 23 March 1742, Surat Factory Diary. 1740-1742, No. 5, p. 289. 
4. Surat. 16 September 1742, Sural Factory Diary 1740 1744, No. 6. 
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says: "Resistance and the more we distress that Government sooner 
our Buness will be done" . 
An entry of 10 April 1742 reports the capture of a large ship 
of Surat (probably Sidi's?) worth between three & four lack of 
rupees", with its cargo being captured by the Marathas.^ Their aim 
was to render themselves "more formidableness to the traders of 
this port (i.e. Surat) and by that mean to enjoy the duties (duties of 
?) Juggir which the Sidis are now in possession off who are 
miserably reduced that they are neither able to protect the trade of 
this port or the other olow (low?) territories"."' However, even if the 
Marathas failed to achieve their desired goal of acquiring that port, 
"the subsidy they will oblige the merchants to take their pass"."* 
Another ship named "Phazee Mazor" of Mulla Fakhruddin was 
seized and carried over to Bassein by the Marathas "Last March in 
her passage to Judda". It seems the owner had to pay a ransom of 
twenty thousand rupees.' The vessel used to ply between Surat and 
the Red Sea. 
By the end of the 18"* century the Surat shipowners came 
under very heavy pressure from the East India Company. After 
1. Surat, 1 February 1742, Stirot Factory Diary, 1740-1742, No. 5, p. 265. 
2. Surat, 1 February 1742, Surat Factory Diary ,1740-1742, No. 5, p. 265. 
3. Surat, 1 February 1742. Ihui, p. 321. 
4. Surat, 1 February 1742. Ihul. opcit. 
5. Surat, 10 September 1742. Surat Factory Diary,1742 1744, No. 6. 
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Surat fell to the Company in 1800 all ships of "Indian sub jec t s" ' 
that left Surat had to carry the C o m p a n y ' s flag and were made to 
enter mochalka or ""Penalty Bond". In case the ships used flag other 
than " the British Flag" they had to pay heavy fines. Those 
merchants who resided in the Pers ian Gulf were refused the 
Company ' s passes.^ 
There were momentary depress ions in the Red Sea in the 18"* 
century. The market of Mokha in July 1752, for example, seemed to 
have been quite different. Owing to th is the goods of the French and 
Surat merchants remained unsold and " a great deal of money due on 
the country people also remained unrecovered".^ The Governor of 
Mokha was not helpful in gett ing their money recovered (i .e. "no 
satisfaction is to be obtained by applying to the Governor").^ In 
1752 the markets both at Mokha and Jedda had been very dull when 
merchants could not sell half the goods they carried there.* These 
condi t ions were confirmed by other repor ts as well: 
1. The term "Indian merchants" in the Company's documents does not cover all 
Indian merchants for the reason that during 18th century there were merchants 
of Indian origin who were designated as "English merchants" such as 
Chellabis and MuUa Fakhruddin and "English subjects". Michelgugeliembo 
Torri, 'In Deep Blue Sea: Surat and its Merchant Class.,.', The Indian 
Economic and Social History Review (lESHR), Vol. XIX (3 & 4), July~ 
December 1982, p. 272et passim. 
2. Bombay Castle, 22 October 1802, Secret and Political Department Diary No 
128, pp.60-69. 
3. Mokha, 29 July 1752, Mokha Factory, 1752, No. 5, p. 65. 
4. Mokha, 11 August 1752. Ihul. 
5. Mokha, 13 August 1752, Mokha Factory. 1752, No. 75. p. 78. 
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"Imported the Futtee Jung Gunjavar and small Dutch ship 
from Judda, who confirm the accounts already recovered from the 
place." Or again: "sailed the Dutch ship, which imported from 
Judda the Inst, for Nagapatnam, having been thus Long detained, in 
Recovering their money from the merchants who have retur. 
(returned?)".' 
When the markets, on the other hand, were favourable to the 
Indian merchants there were many advantages that the traders 
enjoyed. On their return voyage they brought treasure from the Red 
Sea, purchased the desired quantity of coffee and ivory and also 
advanced money to fellow-merchants. The Company too took loans 
from the Indian traders through bills drawn upon the president and 
Council in Surat or at other Indian ports. An entry in Mokha 
Factory of 9 August 1752 reports the arrival at Mokha of a ship 
"Futtee Rahimany" (Fath-i Rahmani) from Jedda. There were 
perhaps many merchants on board the ship having in their 
possession 51 bags of dollars which amounted to $29011.^ There is 
a manifest of the cargo of the Ghorab Marry Keteh whose owner has 
been described as Ruttonjee Monackjee. The ship arrived at Surat 
from Jedda the 14*** September 1796. The manifest contained a 
1. Mokha, 8 August 1752, Ihid., p.52. See also Mokha. Julv 1752, Ihid., p. 64 
2. /.n»>'«fton/.s-. Vol. 449 of 1796 1800 
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reference to 90 bags of dollars* Similarly another manifest of the 
cargo of the Ghorab "Coder Cua" belonging to Rustomjee Jasobhoy 
arriving from Jedda the 30 September 1798 listed 69 bags of 
dollars. Yet another of the manifest of the cargo of Boat Salamat 
Surat whose owner was Tahar Topral imported from Jedda and 
Mokha (October 1798) recorded 22 bags of dollars.^ 
There are many such records which contain references to 
export of money, silver, coin and treasure to India from Mokha by 
Indian merchants. Another method obviously the easier one for 
individuals to remit money was by bills of exchange. The entry of 7 
August 1752 in the Mokha Factory records a total collection of Rs. 
47300 by the officials of the Company in the form of bills mainly 
from Indian creditors.•* 
From an examination of the evidence contained in the East 
India Company's records there remains no doubt that the share of 
Surat merchants and shippers was dominant in the Red Sea trade 
even during the second half of the 18**' century. We have evidence 
relating to the year 1795. The ships arriving at Mokha in 1795 
sailed from the ports of Surat (9 ships) Bombay (3), Kutch (3) 
Calcutta and other ports of Bengal (4), Tellicherry (2) and Madras 
(1). The details are given in the table below: 
1. Latty Records, vol. 449 of 1796-1800 
2. Ihid. 
3. Mokha, 7 August 1752, Mokha Factory 1752 95, No. 76, pp. 69 71, 
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T a b l e - 1 
Figures showing ships imported at Mokha in 1795 from various ports in India 
Name of Ships 
Cader Bucks Gorab Snow 
Fez Sabhany 
a ship 
a Gorab 
Fez Cadry 
Boodam 
Merry Keteh 
a snow 
a Gorab snow 
Owner 's Name Ports of Departure 
Rustom Jasoo 
Chellaby 
Nabob of Surat 
Saif Mahomad of Muscat 
Tac Chillaby 
Ibrahim Mulna Ally 
Ratton Anty 
Mulla Fuckruddin 
Nanabhoy Bisaw 
Surat 
Surat 
Surat 
Surat 
Surat 
Surat 
Surat 
Surat 
Surat 
Total; 9 Ships 
Name of Ships Owner 's Name Ports of Departure 
Panther snow 
a Gorab snow 
Ship Mentor 
3 Dingies 
a Gorab Snow 
4 Snow and 2 Ships 
3 Ships 
Generous friends 
a ship success galley 
a ship surprise 
a Gorab Snow 
a Ship 
Swift Sloop of War 
Source: Mokha, 5 May 1795, 
Honb. Company 
Mahomed Ismael 
Mr. James Fab 
Merchant at Por Bunder 
Moosa Fackeerah 
Ally Rajah, Bebee of 
Cannanore 
Merchants at Muscat 
Nabob of Arcot 
Bombay 
Bombay 
Bombay 
Total; 3 Ships 
Cutch 
Total; 3 Ships 
Calcutta 
Bengal, Cannanore 
& Carwar 
2 from Bengal & / 
Bengal and ... 
Total; 13 Shins 
Tellichery 
Tellichery 
Total; 2 Shins 
Madras 
Total; 1 Shin 
Mokha Factory, 1752-1795, No. 76, p. 38 
Moosa Fackeerah 
Moosa Fackeerah 
His Britanick Majesty 
The years 1790s were prosperous years for the Indian 
merchants. We have a list of varieties of goods that were taken to 
Mokha and other Red Sea ports from many ports of India. This also 
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shows the kinds of goods that were in demand in the market of 
Middle East exported through various Indian ports. 
An entry of 5 May 1795 in the Mokha Factory records speaks 
of export of cargo from Porebunder that consisted of cotton, cotton 
thread, "Dungree cloth", and Cambay piece goods. These goods 
were carried to Mokha and Hodaida, both in the territory of 
Yemen.* The same entry says of goods being exported from Surat to 
the ports of Mokha, Hodaida and Jedda. The sundry goods that find 
mention in the diary are cotton, rice, piece goods etc.^ Cambay 
during the season 1795 exported goods to Mokha and Jedda which 
consisted of rice and sundry others goods. The diary also speaks of 
goods exported to the Red Sea ports from Bombay, but 
unfortunately other details are lacking.^ The same season two ships 
from Tellichery took to Mokha and Jedda cargo consisting of goods 
like rice, sugar, pepper and betel ieaf.** The imports at Mokha and 
Jedda from Madras consisted of piece goods, rice, raw silk, sugar. 
We also have information of a Cambay ship convoying 3 ships from 
1. Mokha, 5 Mav 1795, Mokha Factory 1752-1795, No. 76, p 35. 
2. Ihid. 
3. Ihid. 
4. Ihid. 
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Madras and carrying pilgrims to Jedda.* Calicut exported to 
Mokha and Jedda, Bengal sugar, rice, piece goods and tobacco the 
same season.^ Another list of goods exported or re-exported from 
some Indian ports to Mokha and Jedda is avai lable. But 
unfortunately the names of ports of exports do not survive owing to 
damage to the records. The goods include Bengal sugar, pepper, 
turmeric and Bengal and Surat piece goods, rice, cotton goods, 
tobacco, rice, Batavia sugar and iron."* 
On the other hand, we have manifests of cargo brought from 
Jedda. These contain information about varieties of i tems of trade 
and their quantity, the names of ships, their owners and the ports of 
origin and destination.'* The first manifest of the cargo is of "Grab 
Marry Keteh" whose owner was Ruttonjee Monackjee. The ship was 
reported to have come from Jedda, the 14 September 1796. The 
composition of its cargo is listed in table 2 below: 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Items of re-exports from the south-east Asian regions vis-a-vis Siam to the 
Persian Gulf and the Red Sea must have been made from South Indian Coastal 
ports as it is evident from various manifests of the cargo of ships. 
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Table 2 
Name of Item 
Copper broken 
Hiracasis 
almonds 
Sena leaves 
Arsenic 
Aual caro 
Hiracasis 
almonds 
glass beads and false coral 
brass leaves and glass beads 
brass leaves 
Dollars 
Quantity 
32 Parcel 
53 Parcel 
44 Parcel 
2 Parcel 
1 Parcel 
1 Parcel 
11 Parcel 
4 Parcel 
11 Chests 
7 Chests 
9 Chests 
90 Bags 
Source: Latty Records, Vol. 449 of 1796-1800. This may 
not surprise us if pagination is not shown with the 
reference. 
We have another manifest of cargo of the ship "Grab Cauder 
Cua" owned by Rustomjee Jasobhoy. The ship was reported as 
having arrived from Jedda and Mokha on 30 September 1798. The 
items of its cargo are given as under: 
Table 3 
Name of Item 
Copper broken 
Glass beads 
Hiracasis (Iron sulphate) 
Loadhar 
Nessue Ware 
Arsenic 
Looking glasses 
Hing 
salt 
Dollars 
Quantity 
7 Parcel 
4 Parcel 
2 Parcel 
6 Parcel 
4 Chests 
4 Chests 
3 Chests 
2 muslees 
100 gumbils 
90 bags 
Source Ljtt> Records, Vol. 449 of 17>)6-18()0 
41 
Yet another surviving manifest is that of the ship "Salamat 
Surat" owned by Tahar Topral, a Chellabi. The ship is recorded as 
having arrived at Surat from Jedda and Mokha in October 1798: 
Table 4 
Name of Item 
copper broken 
Hiracasis 
acceeliaro 
glass beads 
almonds 
Neniece (Venice?) ware 
Dollars 
Quantity 
12 Parcel 
2 Parcel 
4 Parcel 
11 Parcel 
5 Parcel 
19 Chests 
22 bags 
Source: Latty Records, Vol. 449 of 1796-1800. 
There are items which are common to all the three manifests. 
The listing of bags of dollars shows that silver dollars continued to 
be imported from the Red Sea. Other items include local products 
such as sena, false beads and false coral, hiracasis (iron sulphate) 
etc. There are also items which seem to have been re-exported from 
the Red Sea having their origin in the Mediterranean area. Some 
previously important imports such as elephant teeth (from Africa) 
and coffee are now missing. It would mean that these once popular 
items were either not much in demand in India any longer or there 
were now alternative sources for these. 
On the whole, taking the aggregate volume of import and 
export from the Red Sea it is possible to draw the conclusion that 
the trade during the second half of the 18"' century with the 
countries of the Arab world and India did not really decline. 
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Traders of Surat some of whose names have already appeared 
in these pages also imported goods to Surat from Siam. The nature 
of goods shows these were meant for sale either to European traders 
in India or to be re-exported to European countr ies or Middle 
Eastern markets either through the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea. 
The owner of the ship, Feze Soobhany was Tahar Topral 
Chellabi. The vessel arrived at Surat from Siam in October 1798 
(date not mentioned). Her cargo consisted of the following items: 
Table 5 
Name of Item 
Tin 
elephant teeth 
Pepper 
sugar 
agalawood 
sundries loose 
raw silk 
spanwood 
China ware 
sugar Candy 
Cloves 
Coir for her use deliverable to Syod 
Pepper 
Tin 
agalawood 
cloves 
Quantity 
10332 slabs 
1338 Pieces 
465 Bags 
250 Parcel 
5 chests 
Chests 
2 Chests 
3000 Pieces 
188 rolls 
11 Tabs 
4 Bags 
337 bags 
28 slabs 
2 chests 
2 chests" 
Source: Latty Records, Vol. 449 of 1796-1800. Tahar Topral seems 
to have as his agent Isacc Daood at Siam and the consignments were 
sent with his signature on the manifest. Ibid. 
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There is a manifest of the cargo of the ship ' C a u d e r b u x ' 
owned by Nawab Truyhled (?). The goods were exported by the 
N a w a b ' s agent, Seyam Lalldoss. The date of the sh ip ' s d ischarge of 
goods (from Siam) is recorded as 16 March 1799. The manifest has 
the following items: 
Table 6 
Name of Item Quantity 
Tin 
elephant teeth 
spanwood 
freighted 
Pepper 
agalawood 
BuUimal (BuUumal) 
China ware 
Salt 
Clove 
Dammar 
Cardamoms 
Tortoise shells 
nuhniq Polae 
Tin 
2 Boxes belonging to Mr. Soper 
(perhaps the Customs Master of Surat) 
Freighted goods belonging to the 
Arabs 
900 slabs 
905 Pieces 
500 Pieces 
3900 Pieces= 4400 Pieces 
350 Bags 
26 Chests 
250 Freighted 
9 Chests 
about 125 Bags 
5 Chests 
325 Bags 
3 Bags 
1 Chest 
I Bag 
245 slabs 7 chests 
S o u r c e : l.atlv Records. Vol. 449 of 1796-1800 
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Similar items are also listed among the cargo of the ships 
coming to Surat from Goomer and Dullah (pullah?). A comparative 
scrutiny of the items listed in the manifests of the cargo exported to 
the Red Sea from Surat and the manifests of the cargo imported at 
Surat from Siam would suggest that there are many identical items 
in the manifests, of both voyages. These goods must have been re-
exported to the markets of the Middle East. 
The participation of Indian rulers in the trade and commerce 
of India was not uncommon during the 18"' century. Rulers of 
coastal India keenly participated in trade and commerce. Among the 
18"* century rulers of western India, the most active were persons 
holding in various positions of authority in Gujarat, Mysore and 
Arcot. They styled themselves as chief merchants in the hierarchy 
of merchants and exported goods of their regions abroad in their 
own ships. Port officers and governors as well had their shares in 
this lucrative trade. The ships of the Nawab of Arcot carried 
English names such as ''Success Galley", "Generous Friends", and 
''Surprise", and were reported to have been sailing in convoy with 
English vessels.' The ship of the Nawab of Surat is reported to be a 
"Grab ship"^. It is however difficult to assess in the absence of data 
the amount of the share of the Arabian Sea trade carried in ships. 
1. Mokha, 28 April 1795, Mokha Factory, 1752-1795. No. 76, p. 37. 
2 I hid 
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Were the great days of Surat 's trade over by the turn of the 
IS^ *" century? Ashin Dasgupta is of the view that Surat whose • 
prosperity was dependent on the stability of three empires namely 
the Mughal, Safavid and the Ottoman empire, began to decline with 
the disintegration of those states. But the foregoing account of 
Sura t ' s t rade with the Red Sea suggests that the trade continued and 
might even have surpassed the volume of the previous century. The 
basic commodit ies still continued to be in great demand in 
commerce. Even Bombay, during the 18'^ century could not fully 
replace Surat in the Arabian Sea trade.* The exchange of 
commodities and import and specie from Jedda continued 
throughout the IS*"* century. Surat 's trade may have undergone 
momentary set-back but there was, perhaps, no overall constant 
decline. A d e n ' s prosperity, for instance, at the turn of the 19"" 
century depended largely on Indian trade whose major share was 
that of Surat.^ 
1. Besides the present survey on the 18th century Indian trade with the Arab 
world there is a very useful study on Indian Ocean trade by C. Northcote 
Parkinson, Trade in the Eastern Sea (1793-1813), Cambridge, 1937, pp. 317-
336. 
2. Fred Lawson, 'Hegemony and the Structure of International Trade 
Reassessed: a view from Arabia', International Organization, Volume 37(2), 
1983, pp. 325-28. Dr. Hove, for instance, found a large number of merchants 
of different races in Surat besides a flourishing export trade and shipping 
industry. The ports of Broach District as well did not show any sign of 
decline and as usual had prosperous coastal trade in the 18"' century. Tour for 
Scientific and Economic Research, 178f. vide Dharma Kumar (ed). The 
Cambridge Economic History of India (C. 1757-C. 1970), Oriental Longman, 
1982, Vol. 2, p. 7. K.N. Chaudhuri is of the view that the decline of Surat was 
gradual. The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 
(1660-1760), Delhi, 197S. p. 196. 
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Ashin Das Gupta seeks to substantiate his argument for the 
decl ine of Surat by the fall in the number of Surat ships at the end 
of the 17^ '^  century. But the evidence suggests that the Surat-based 
ships in 1795 still outnumbered the Indian shipping from Bengal 
and Bombay to the Red Sea, as we have seen above (9 ships from 
Surat at Mokha, compared with 7 from Bombay and Bengal).* 
1. List of shipping Imported at Mokha and other ports in the Red Sea this 
season 1795', Mokha. 5 May 1795, Mokha Factory, 1752-1795. No. 76. 
op.cit., p. 38. 
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Chapter- 2 
LAWS OF WRECKAGE AND NAVIGATION IN THE 
INDIAN OCEAN 
The Indian Ocean, over which much of the Indo-Arab trade 
was conducted, had its own laws and customs of navigation and 
wreckage, which developed over time, independently of the 
Mediterranean. 
For the Indian law of wreckage, Marco Polo (c.l300) provides 
us with our earliest evidence: "And this naughty custom prevails 
over all these provinces of India, to wit that if a ship be driven by 
stress of weather into some other port than that to which it was 
bound, it was sure to be plundered."^ About fifty years later Ibn 
Battuta reported that, "whenever a ship is destroyed, whatever is 
saved from it goes to the treasury." But in the region of Calicut, 
"lawful proprietors collect whatever is thrown up by the sea."^ He 
further mentions the occasion of a ship in the territory of the Raja of 
Calicut. The Raja personally came to the place of wreckage where 
"A fire was lit before him on the coast, and his police officers 
1. Vide John Fryer, A New Account of East India and Persia (1672-1681). (ed ) 
William Crooke, London: Printed for the Haklyut Societ\.(3 
Vols ),Vol l ,p206n Cf. Manuel Komroff (ed), The Travels of Marco Polo 
(The Venetian), New York. 1930, p. 204. 
2 Mahdi Husain (tr.). The Rehia of Ibn Battuta, Baroda. 1976. p. 192 
3. Ihid 
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{zabaniya) belaboured the people so that they should not plunder 
what the sea has cast up" . 
Abdur Razzaq (15"' century) observed that if a vessel bound to 
some port was driven away to another roadstead, the inhabitants 
according to the practice, plundered the ship. 
From the evidence cited above there remains no doubt that the 
customary law pertaining to seizure of wreckage had been in 
operation on the Malabar coast since early middle ages. The same 
old customary law continued in operation in the pre-modern period. 
During the period of Tipu Sultan (1785), for example, a dhow of two 
Muscat merchants namely Rutn Jee and Jeevan Dass, merchants and 
subjects of Muscat, was damaged in a storm and brought to Bhatkal 
('Bytekoal'), a seaport in Tipu's dominions. The cargo of the 
damaged ship was unloaded and retained by Government. On the 
persuasion of the owners of the damaged dhow, the Imam of Muscat 
wrote to Tipu requesting him to return the cargo and the dhow 
belonging to the Imam's subjects. In his reply, Tipu said that the 
dhow and its cargo had been restored to the owners, "although in 
such cases, it was customary for the prince, or the ruler of the place, 
where a ship happens to be wrecked, to take possession of it and 
whatever it contains".^ 
1 Rehla oflhn Batula, op. cil . p 192. 
2 R H Major (ed ), 'JourncN of Abdur Razzak', India m the Fifteenth Century. 
'* Deep Publication, Delhi. 1974. p. 14. 
-^  William Kirkpatrick, Letters ofTippoo Sultan, London. 1811, pp. 14, 181 
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Similar laws of wreckage appear to have prevailed on the 
Arabian coast. A wreck on the coast of Shihr and Dhofar is 
described by Nihawandi: The wreck was that of Rahimi, a ship 
belonging to Khan-i-Khanan. The vessel was on her voyage from 
Mokha to Surat. Nihawandi noted that the ruler of Shihr took away 
the entire property on board the ship. After the arrival of victims at 
Surat and having come to know of their misfortune Khan-i-Khanan 
issued orders to his officials at Surat to pay one lakh of rupees to 
them, out of which 50,000 rupees were paid to Mulla Shakebi and 
the other 50,000 to other victims.* 
While the laws of wreckage seemed to have been inexorably 
stern in the Indian Ocean, ethics seem to have recommended 
compensation. Nihawandi in Ma 'asir-i-Rahimi describes a shipwreck 
in River Indus which had on board Iranian merchants. The ship was 
laden with rich cargo as the merchants hoped to make a huge profit 
in extensive land like that of India. Those wrecked, however, lost 
much of their property, to local inhabitants.^ Khan-i-Khanan having 
come to know of the calamity issued orders to the vakils of his court 
to assess the cost of the cargo lost in the wreck and pay the affected 
1. Abdul Baqi Nihawandi. Ma'asir-i Rahimi, (ed.) Mohammad Hidayat Husain. 
Asiatic Society (Calcutta), 1925, Vol. II, p. 274. 
2. Ihid.. pp. 571-72. See also the account of another similar incident for 
compensation for loss by fire in Ihid., Vol. II, pp. 511-13>. 
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nieichants their cost of the cargo and the profit that they could have 
made in India by selling those goods. On the testimony of 
trustworthy merchants the net cost of the cargo amounted to Rs. 
1,25,000 which was sanctioned and entrusted for payment to the 
DiM-an-i-Kul, Rai Sunder Das, who disbursed the amount 
accordingly from the revenues of the jagir of Ferozpur which was 
Khan-i-Khanan's own assignment.' 
A 17*'' century traveller (1625-1631) and author of Bahrul 
Asrar, Mahmud bin Amir Wali Balkhi, in his account of voyage 
aboard a Portuguese ship sailing from Sri Lanka destined to Aji 
Rabiko and Shahr-i-Nau (both in the vicinity of China), describes 
the disaster when the ship was caught in a storm and wrecked on the 
coast near Cuttak in Orissa. The Portuguese made their escape from 
the scene of wreck, leaving everyone else behind because of the fear 
of the prevailing law of wreckage and navigation which authorised 
the port official to take possession of everything contained in the ill-
fated ship. Moreover, since the place of occurrence was a bandar-i 
ghair qauli (a non-contractual port) they feared capture inevitable 
and risk to their lives as well.^ 
1 . Ihid.. op.cit., Vol. 11., pp. 571-572. 
2 . See Mahmud bin Amir Wali Balkhi, Bahr-ul-Asrar, (ed.) Riazul Islam. 
Karachi, 1980, p. 640. The word 'Xarnauz' (Portuguese) or Shahr-i-nau 
(Persian) used for Authya. the capital of Thailand, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam. 
Persianization' and "Mercantilizm': Two Themes in Bay of Bengal History. 
1400-1700', OM Prakash and Denys Lombard (eds). Commerce and Culture 
w the Bay of Bengal. 1500-1800, (Manohar, 1999), p. 57. 
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While the customary law of wreckage on the one hand 
authorised the state to take possession of ship's estate, the excesses 
committed by Mughal officials on the other hand were not thus to be 
overlooked. The author of the Fath-i 'Ibriya says as soon as it 
reached the ear of the Mughal officials that if a wrecked ship passed 
without paying hasil, the vessel was liable to be seized. These 
unlawful practices continued except during the reign of Feroz Shah 
Tughlaq and much later under Aurengzeb who were the only rulers 
to have prohibited it.* 
Shivaji during his negotiations with an embassy dispatched by 
the East India Company over the restoration of the remnant of goods 
on board a wrecked ship expjained that it was against the "Laws of 
Conchen" (Konkan) to restore any ships or goods that were thrown 
on to the shore by storm or such other natural agency.^ He said that 
if he granted the English Company an exemption from this practice, 
the French, Dutch, and other merchants as well would claim the 
same right. He, therefore, not only declined to concede the demand 
of the Embassy but added that he would not violate the custom that 
had continued for ages.^ 
1 . Sliahabuddin Talish, Fath-i 'Ibnya, (Rotograph available at CAS, Department 
of History, AMU, Aligarh). ff. 128a-131b. 
2 . John Fiyer, Vol. I, p. 206. 
3 . Ihid. 
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There is another instance of shipwreck at Warli (then under 
the East India Company's jurisdiction). The wreck is said to have 
occurred on 15 August 1670. The Calicut-based vessel was on her 
voyage back from Muscat. Th ship consisted of 100 men among 
whom there were several banyas who carried valuables and horses. 
In the incident, only eleven men and two horses survived. 
Misfortune again fell upon the survivors. This time they were robbed 
of their belongings by the people of 'Verula' (Warli) and whatever 
still remained, the 'coolies' robbed them at the instigation of the 
Portuguese clergy of Bandara. Since the wreck took place within the 
jurisdiction of the Company stern measures were taken to punish the 
offenders. Investigation was conducted by Gray, then the Governor 
of Bombay, and those 'coolies' found guilty were whipped and kept 
prisoners. Inventory of recovered goods was made and sent to Surat. 
Recovery of a sum of 2005 abasses was made from the clergy and 
justices at Mahim were appointed in March 1671.^ 
One may infer from the above account that the English here 
held that, contrary to local custom, robbery of a wrecked ship was 
an offence. 
1. Charles Fawcett (ed.), English Factories in India (1670-1677), Oxford, 1936. 
pp. 19-22. 
5.1 
M. Torri in his article 'In the Deep Blue Sea', says that in 
1763 a group of 58 non-ship owning merchants of Surat belonging to 
various business communities trading to Mokha, Jedda and Basra, 
made a declaration*, duly certified by the Qazi, giving reasons (in 
favour of the East India Company) for not freighting their goods on 
ships belonging to "Mooremen and Indians". One of the reasons 
advanced by these merchants was that the Indian ships left Surat too 
late and the other that Indian ships, which ran aground very easily. 
Torri says that the prevailing customary law of the land was that 
"wrecked ship and its cargo became the property of the authorities 
ruling the country on whose coasts the wreckage has occurred".^ He 
says that the Indian ship owners and Turkish or Arab ruler had 
clandestine understanding, and after the wreck the spoils were 
shared by both. 
Yet Valentia has cited another instance of a wreck of Indian 
ships in 1803 on the coast between Mount Febx and Zaila. Soon 
after the wreck the chief of the coast seized all that was contained in 
1 . In response to a letter of explanation issued by the Court of Directors at 
London to Mr. Hodges on the persuasion of the 'Sublime Porte' following the 
complaint by the Chellabis among the wealthiest ship-owners in India, 
originally from Turkey. The allegation about Indian ships running aground 
and leaving late from Surat seems to be an unfounded allegation. 
2 . Michelgugliembo Torri, "In the Deep Blue Sea: Surat and its merchant Class 
During the D\ archie Era (1759-1800)', The Indian Economic and Social 
History Review (lESHR), July-December, 1982, Nos 3 «fe 4, Vol. XIX, pp 
273-74 
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the ships. But he was kind enough to rescue the crew of the ships 
and extended his hospitality till they finally left for Mokha.' 
An incident of shipwreck in 1806 is placed on record by Ali 
Bey (an Aleppo Traveller), which is alleged to have taken place 
nearby Jedda in the Red Sea. He says an English ship was got struck 
over a rock. The ship was commanded by an English Captain and her 
owner was Petrucci, the English Vice-Consul at Rosetta and a friend 
of the Sheriff of Mecca.^ After the wreckage the Arabs (as Ali Bey 
calls them) got into the ship and took possession of the cargo. The 
governor of Geneba, on the other hand, seized the hull and the 
rigging. The captain's hue and cry for the return of the ship's store 
was of no avail. He was even denied entry into the ship to bring out 
the necessary papers. His request to the Sheriff for a certificate of 
the misfortune that had befallen him in order to justify his position 
as a victim of the wreckage to the owner of the ship went obviously 
unheard.^ Ali Bey narrates that the captain was so much desperate 
1. George, Viscount Valciitia. Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, The Red 
Sea. Abyssinia, and Egypt in the years 1802, 1803. 1804, 1805 and 1806, 
London, (3 Volumes). London, 1809, Vol. II, pp. 376-77. 
2. According to the account the Sheriff of Mecca had a very lucrative trade with 
Asian countries and for this brisk trade the English were very helpful to him. 
He was extraordinarily rapacious and always looked for money from captains 
of ships by unfair means. So far his shippmg in the Red Sea was concerned, 
he always enjoyed priority over other merchants in matter of loading of 
cargoes. See Ali Bey, Travels in Arabia, London, 1816. Vol. 2, p. 121. 
3. It appears as if before the actual wreckage, the Captain had already perceived 
some danger; he went personally to the Sheriff for a pilot and an anchor but 
the Sheriff put him to insult rather than rendering him any help. Ali Bev, 
/'n/yt'/.y. Vol. 2, pp. 121-22 . 
that he made request for a certificate from Ali, who came to his help 
by certifying the catastrophe to the ship after taking the declaration 
of the sailors who had accompanied the captain. 
Yet another aspect, slightly different, emerges from Ali Bey's 
description of another ship-wreck of a dhow around label Hazen, 
also in the Red Sea. It was the dhow our traveller as well was aboard 
it. The wreckage was caused because of a large hole in the keel of 
the vessel near the prow, which had drawn a lot of water.* Having 
been rescued by safety boats the passengers of the ill-fated ship 
wished the captain of another ship putting up anchor nearby to take 
them aboard and on his refusal they approached the captain of yet 
another ship. Ali Bey says that the captain's refusal was due to the 
fact that since there was frequent occurrence of misfortunes on ship 
in that sea (i.e. Red Sea), it was customary not to allow on board 
another ship, passengers or cargo of a wrecked ship, without its 
master's consent. However, as the survival of the ship became 
nearly impossible the captain signalled to the passengers to shift 
themselves to another one, which the latter did accordingly. 
On law of wreckage there is account of Henry Pottinger of the 
year 1810. He says that in his presence in the Darbar of the ruler of 
I. Ali Bey at this juncture describes the disasters that the passengers aboard the 
dhow had to encounter and then subsequently how they were saved from the 
peril. Ali Bey, Travels, Vol. 2, p. 165. 
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Beluchistan a letter of the Imam of Muscat addressed to the Baluch 
ruler was presented by an Arab messenger. The letter took up the 
case of an ill-fated vessel of the Imam, driven away on the coast 
near Someany and wrecked there. However, from the letter it 
appears some trifling goods were recovered from the place of 
occurrence of the wreckage. The Imam in his letter requested the 
ruler that the recorded goods might be delivered to his people. The 
Baluch ruler in very audible tone made proclamation of the return of 
the ship's store. This was just a gesture of goodwill and friendship; 
otherwise there was no compulsion or obligation whatsoever to 
return the ship's store.^ 
The age-old law of wreckage, however, was in no way in the 
interest of modern shipping in Asian waters. It was owing to this 
perhaps that the British in India made a demand upon Mohammad 
AH Pasha to agree to a clause on issue of wreckage in the Red Sea. 
A provisional treaty thus concluded between the British government 
in India and the Pasha of Egypt on 28"^  May 1810 stipulates as 
under: 
"Should any British vessel either by contrary winds or any 
other unforeseen accident he wrecked or be obliged to run into any 
1. Henry Pottingcr,7>rtv't'/v m Hcloochistan ami Sunt. Karachi. l^)86(Rcprint).p 19 
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of the ports in the Red Sea under the Dominion of the Pasha of 
Egypt, and to unload her goods thus loaded to provide for the safety 
of the caravans as far as Cairo". 
A "cowlnama" (written Engagement)^ granted by the Imam of 
Muscat to the East India Company dated the 1'* of Jamad al-awwal 
1213 A.H. (12 October 1798) in its sixth clause stipulated that 
"On the occurrence of any ship-wreck of a vessel or vessels 
appertaining to the English there should certainly be aid and 
comfort afforded on the part of this government, nor shall the 
property be seized".^ 
What the law of the Indian Ocean countries about 
compensation in cases of piracy on high seas was, is brought home 
to us by the position taken by Jahangir's administration in case of 
piracy committed by Captain Hall and his men upon a Chaul-based 
vessel, off Mokha in 1623. There was a great loss of cargo. Among 
the victims there was a party of Turks who clamoured for justice 
from Saif Khan against the English. They demanded compensation 
for their lost property worth 85,000 rials of eight. The Turks 
promised Saif Khan 50% of the claim. Rastell, seeing no chance 
1. Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 366 of the Year 1810, p. 6754. 
2. The "cowlnama" in all consists of seven clauses on various diplomatic issues. 
The documents are preserved at Maharashtra Archives, Bombay. 
3. Secret and Political Department, No. 68 of the Year 1798, f. 5387. 
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of escape, paid 70,000 mahmudis to Saif Khan as bribe on condition 
that the latter would allow him to load indigo, which he, however, 
did not permit. But the English, who were first imprisoned, were 
released. In June the same year the matter was referred to the 
Emperor. The English won over the governor and other potential 
men like Asaf Khan and others at the court. Jahangir exonerated the 
English and remarked that "neither the complainants nor the 
defendants were subjects of his, and the event complained of had 
taken place outside his jurisdiction".^ In other words, had the 
victims been subjects of the Mughal Empire, compensation from the 
English would have been due. 
Danishmand Khan (then the Governor of Surat) confiscated 
the goods of the English merchants worth Rs. 184,000 (or more)^ 
and that of the Dutch merchants worth Rs. 456,000 (and more) to 
compensate Mullah Abdul Ghafur on suspicion that the piracy on the 
latter's ship was the result of an English and Dutch conspiracy. 
Finally, as Lorimer has pointed out, the Mughals bound the 
European powers in 1695 to cooperate with their officials in 
suppression of piracy. But the measure proved futile and the piracy 
1. William Foster (ed), English Factories in India, (1624-1629), Oxford, 1909, 
pp. 33, 58, 59, 102 (see also introduction, VII). 
2. Niccolao Manucci, Mogul India (1653-170S) OR Storia Do Mogor, (tr.) 
William lr\ine, Delhi: Low Price Publications, (4 volumes) Vol. Ill, p. 292. 
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by 1695 was so rife in the Indian Ocean that even the Americans 
found it profitable to construct ships at New York purposely fitted 
for piracy.^ 
That the Mughal authorities felt a certain obligation towards 
the safety of their subjects' shipping is shown by the letters in 
Persian to the Portuguese viceroy, which are preserved in the Lisbon 
archives (photocopies in the Department of History, AMU). 
In 1701, Basalat Khan, the Mughal Faujdar of Tal Kokan-i-
Adil Khani, wrote to the 'Wazarail' (viceroy) of Goa to instruct the 
Captain of Diu to return the boat of a Hindu merchant of Surat 
seized by the captain. Another letter addressed to the 'Wazarail' 
(viceroy) by the Faujdar requests the return of the ship Muhammadi 
Salamati owned by one Sheikh Mohammad, again a merchant of 
Surat. The Portuguese authorities were also asked to see that the 
ship reached Surat safely (under the protection of the East India 
Company since the ship was carrying British Flag). There is yet 
another piece of evidence of a slightly different nature. This 
evidence comes from the demand for compensation for loss of cargo 
of a wrecked ship during depredations by pirates infesting the coast 
of Aden has been made by Haines (of Indian navy) on behalf of the 
I J G Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf. Oman, and Central Arabia Vol 
1 (pt l . \). Calcutta, 1915. p 53 
f.O 
East India Company in January 1838 from the "sultan" of Aden who 
is described as "indolent and almost imbecile man, 50 years of age" 
and resided at Laha. 
The outrage was alleged to have been committed by the pirates 
on the coasts of Aden on passengers and crew of some native craft 
carrying the British flag. The ill-fated ship is believed to have been 
wrecked in the neighbourhood of Aden. However, the Sultan 
undertook to make compensation for the plunder of the vessel and 
was made to sell the port and town to the English. But owing to the 
resistance of his son, the agreement reached between the British 
Government in India and the Sultan was declared null and vide by 
the former which resulted in British hostility and take-over of Aden 
on the 16 January 1838 by the naval steamer, Volege of 28 guns, and 
cruiser of 10 guns, with 300 Europeans and 400 native troops under 
Major Baillie.^ 
Investment of money on ships by Mughal officials for 
speculative motive for extra income was quite common at Surat and 
also in Bengal. But in cases of any untoward incident such as 
shipwreck or disaster like seizer of cargo of ships by European or 
1 Haines (an official in the Indian Navy), Travels, Vide Manshnrat Markaz 
Darasat al-Khalij al Arahi Daiir as-Sijjalat al-Hind wa Mahafiiza ta'Amin . 
(ed ) Abdul Amin and Mustafa al-Najjar, (Baghdad and Basrah Universities). 
1978, pp 141-42. 
2 Ihul 
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pirates of the Indian Ocean, the investor in all probability was the 
loser.' 
Delay in reaching the destination could cause considerable 
loss to the owner of a ship. When in 1643 the 'Discovery' of the 
East India Company owing to the adverse wind was delayed at Surat 
there was a sharp rise in the rate of insurance from 3 to 30% which 
was a sure sign of great loss expected to be incurred by the 
insurers.^ 
A varying body of law dealt with how property of merchants 
who died while on their travels or on board the ship would be 
treated. Ibn Battuta says that one As-Sarsari's brother (native of a 
town ten miles from Baghdad on the way to kufa) was living in 
Cannanore and possessed immense wealth. He died willing his 
property in favour of his small children. As-Sarsari at the time of 
Ibn Battuta's departure was about to leave Cannanore for Baghdad 
v i^th his brother's children and belongings, for says Ibn Battuta, "It 
is the custom of the inhabitants, of India as with those of the people 
of Sudan not to interfere with the property of the dead"."' 
I . Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, Travels in India (translated from the original French 
Edition of 1676), (tr.) V. Ball & (ed.) William Crooke, Delhi: Oriental Book 
Reprint Corporation, 1977, (in 2 volumes). Vol. I, p. 31. 
2. President Fremlen at Swally Marine to the Company, January 17, 1643, 
English Factories in India. 1642-45, p. 92. 
.1. Rehla Ihn Battuta op. cil. (translation), op.cit. p. 185. 
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Ceasar Frederick (1581) tells us that the Portuguese had a 
'House' known as "the school of sancta miseri cordia commissaria" 
in all cities under their jurisdiction.^ These houses were placed 
under the jurisdiction of Portuguese governors, legally authorised to 
issue 'will' or 'Testament' on the payment ('if you give them for 
their pains') which the testate was allowed to retain in his 
possession. A 'Captain' on each voyage was privileged to recover 
the goods of these merchants who died during the voyage. In case of 
any dying intestate, the 'Captain' of justice for Portuguese 
Christians assumed in anticipation his own claim over the property 
of the deceased and by the time the heirs approached the authority 
concerned, the bulk of his belonging would have been consumed and 
very little left for the claimants.* 
In another document from British Records there is an 
interesting case of one 'Cojah Cazar Gregorioa' a subject of Iran, 
who died intestate in a ship. He is said to have been born at 
"Shorret" circa 1730 to Persian parents. In its letter of claim for the 
Estate of Cazar Gregorioa to the government of India, the Persian 
government declares the year of Cojah's death as 1774; he had died 
1. Samuel Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimes (20 volumes), Purchas & Sons, 
(London), 1905, Vol. 10, pp. 141-42. 'Cities' in the present context applies to 
perhaps port cities, the most famous among them were Hormuz, Goa, 
Malacca, Macao and Muscat which were commercially \ery important. 
2. Purchas. op cit . Vol. 10, p. 141. 
as an Iranian subject.* The papers of the intestacy reveal that the 
'Cojah' was engaged in trade during the middle of the IS*** century 
and died on his return voyage from Bengal on the Middleton, which 
got wrecked at 'Tofelgate'. He had his consignments on board the 
ship. He had no relation nor friend and therefore the agent of the 
East India Company at Basra, Henry Moore, had taken charge of his 
Property. 
Ali Bey around 1806 observed that the captain of a richly 
laden ship from Maldive Island anchored at Jedda harbour passed 
away, having made no will. According to customary law the Sheriff 
at once took possession of the ship and its cargo. Afterwards the 
Sherif sent the ship to India in company of his own richly laden 
ship, but both of them were seized by the French and only one of 
them returned and that too only after unloading the confiscated 
cargo of both of them, about which the Sherif lodged protest to 
Napoleon.^ 
Other local navigational customs may also be noted. Barkur 
(Faknar) on Malabar coast during Ibn Battuta's time was a port of 
call and our traveller says that according to the practice of the 
1 . Political Department, Vol. 143 of 1870, ff. 8-20. It is noteworthy that since 
the deceased did not make any will or gift of his property the customary law 
of Iran, therefore, authorised the government to make the claim on behalf of 
the deceased. 
2 . Ali Bey. Travels, op.cit.. Vol. 2, p. 122. 
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country all ships passing through that port had to cast anchor there 
and pay tax.' Ships that evaded payment were chased by the king's 
officials and forcibly brought into the harbour and as punishment 
double the amount of tax was charged. These vessels were liable to 
be detained for any length of time. 
• 
Abdur Razzaq in the IS"' century tells us of a practice that 
assured security to the merchants' goods at Calicut. He says that the 
customs officers made themselves duty-bound to look after the 
merchandise stored in warehouses and kept strict watch over it. Only 
if a transaction was executed a duty of 1/40 was levied on the 
aggregate goods, and if it remained unsold no charge whatsoever 
was made.^ 
By 1800 all those Indian shippers who sailed from Surat were 
made to carry the East India Company's flag and enter 'mochulka\ 
Ships that sailed under other than the British flag were liable to pay 
heavy fine.^ Certain conventions for carrying freight seem to have 
been prevalent in the Indian Ocean. For instance in 1795, for the 
transport of the East India Company's cargo the factor at Mokha had 
1 . Rehla of Ibn Battuta, (translation), op.cit.. pp. 184-85. The actual term used 
for tax in the text is 'haqq-ul handad' 
2 . Ibid., op.cit., p. 185. 
3 . "Journey of Abdur Razzak', India in the 15th Century, op.cit.. p. 14. 
4 . Bombay Castle, 22 October 1802, Secret & Political Department, No. 128 f 
6069. 
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first to apply to the captain {Nakhuda) and only when he agreed the 
freight was loaded.* There was yet another convention in operation 
which made the traders and shippers both enter into an agreement 
before the consignment was loaded.^ The offer of carrying freight to 
Bombay and other Indian ports was made through a general 
announcement by the ship's captain himself. The terms and 
conditions for carrying freight as well were decided by Captain of 
the ship.^ It is to be presumed that similar conditions for shipping 
had prevailed in earlier times as well. 
1 . Mokha, 10 August 1795. XU'kha Factory 1752-1795, No. 76, f. 155 
2 . Mokha. April 1790, Xfokhu hjctorv 1752-95, No. 76. f. 65. 
3 . Mokha. 29 April 1795. I^iJ 
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Chapter - 3 
TIPU SULTAN AND HIS ATTEMPTED 
INTERVENTION IN INDO-ARAB TRADE 
During the 18"" century Tipu Sultan may be considered as 
one of the chief merchants of India.' The novel tradition of state 
economy laid out by Haider Ali was carefully carried on with 
better and improved mechanism by his son and successor. Tipu 
was a planner, strategist and economist in his own right. 
Ever since the commencement of his rule in 1782 Tipu's 
main effort was to make Mysore into a centre of commercial 
attraction and improve the quality of its products so that it could 
compete favourably in international trade. With a view to taking 
Mysore's products to different parts of the world, envoys to 
various countries were entrusted with these commodities to sell 
them to obtain their own costs of maintenance. Diplomatic 
missions were thus converted into commercial enterprises.^ 
One target of Tipu's commercial activities was Oman. At a 
very early stage of Tipu's rule, commercial ties with Oman were 
1. For Haider Ali's commercial bent of mind see Ghoolam Mohumed, Tarikh-i Tipu 
Sultan, Russapuylah, 1849, p. 683. 
2. For one of such many examples, see Mohibbul Hasan. History of Tipu Sultan, 
Calcutta. 1971, p. 131, (hereafter see M. Hasan). 
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established with the opening of a commercial depot [Koihi) at 
Muscat under the chaige of a commercial agent (Darogha) Since 
the beginning of the 18"' century the volume of tiade passing 
through Muscat from and to the Persian Gulf had been rising 
steadily. Oman herself had no less than 15 ships of 400 to 700 
tons each besides 3 brigs in the Port of Muscat alone in the time 
of Sayyid Sultan (1793-1800). The other port of Oman, Sur had at 
least 100 sea-going vessels of various sizes.' 
With the exception of a few items like sandal-wood and 
pepper under the control of Tipu Sultan (not a monopoly, as 
Kirkpatrick and Mark Wilks have asserted) the ordinary 
merchants were not barred from dealing with indigenous products 
of Mysore. As such the Sultan being the chief merchant traded on 
behalf of the state whereas the merchants of Mysore were at 
liberty to carry on their own trade and make investments. The 
same was true about Oman. The Imam owned his own ships and 
carried on trade. However, ordinary merchants of Oman enjoyed 
1 S B Miles. The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf. London Fran Cass & Co 
Ltd. 1966. p 221 
2 William Kirkpatrick, Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan. London. 1911. pp 467-68. see 
also Mark Wiiks. Historical Sketches of the South India (History of Mysore) . 
M>sore. 1830, Vol 2. p 570 
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reasonable freedom to conduct their trade with any country they 
desired. 
Cloth constituted one of the chief items of export of 
Mysore. Cloth-weaving industry was mainly concentrated at 
Bangalore, Waluru, e t c ' At both places quality cloth was 
manufactured and was mainly exported to Oman and other Persian 
Gulf ports. The embassy of Tipu Sultan to Constantinople that 
was dispatched in 1786 and halted at Muscat carried varieties of 
Mysorean cloths and shawls to be sold enroute to defray the 
mission's expenses. These cloths were sold through Maoji Seith 
and Abdullah, the Jew, both brokers at Muscat and neighbouring 
ports.^ 
Evidence on supply of cloth to the Persian Gulf vis-a-vis 
Muscat are numerous. We have evidence of the supply of Indian 
piece goods to Muscat merchants for local consumption in Oman. 
These were supplied by English merchants most probably from 
Madras and Surat. 
1. Francis Buchanan, Journey from Madras Through Mysore, Canara and Malabar, 
(Delhi, 1988), (3 volumes). Vol. 1, pp. 40, 326 et passim It may be noted that there are 
various references relating to varieties of cloths, weaving industry, dyeing and 
spinning in Buchanan's description of Mysore which he wrote immediately after the 
fall of Seringapatnam. He has also given an elaborate account of prices of cloth at 
Bangalore. Ibid., pp. 220-21 
2. M. Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan, op. cit., p. 131. 
3. J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf Oman and Central Arabia, Calcutta. 
1915, Vol. I (pt. lA), op. cit., p. 417. 
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Rice constituted one of the "gruff goods" in Mysore's 
regular consignment to Muscat. In 1775 Imam Ahmad sent an 
envoy to Mysore in an Omani ship called Rahmani to know of the 
cause of prohibition of rice export to Muscat. The cause for non-
shipment for rice was explained by Haider Ali's representative at 
Mangalore (governed at that time by Tipu Sultan) to the Omani 
envoy.* He returned satisfied to Oman. 
Rice continued to be carried to Oman in bulk. Parsons once 
noted 4 ships of Muscat having rice for their cargo from Mysore.^ 
Tipu's own ships besides the ships of ordinary merchants and 
those of the Imam's ships, carried rice as ships' cargo to Oman. 
There seems to have been a great demand for rice in a 
certain years by the Muscat and Kutch factories. In order to meet 
their requirements the asifs of Jamalabad, Wajidabad and 
Malikuttujjar departments were ordered to purchase rice and 
supply it to those factories.^ However Tipu was quite hostile to 
the purchase of rice by the merchants of the Portuguese or the 
English ports. In a communication he strictly ordered his port 
1. The purpose of the Omani delegate to visit Mysore was also in response to the 
in\'itation of Haider AH to put down piracy frequently committed on the Malabar coast 
which had caused interruption in the rice export to Oman. S.B. Miles, op.cit., p. 274. It 
is evident from all availaole sources that Mysore during Haider's time supplied rice to 
many foreign ports besides Muscat. 
2. For Parsons' Travels vide Patricia Risso, Oman and Muscat - An Early Modern 
History, London, 1986, p. 81. 
3. Hukmnamaha-i Tipu Sultan, India Office Librar>', London (photocopy a\'ailable in the 
Department of History, Aligarh Muslim Universi^'), As. 141b-142a. 
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officials of all the sea-ports not to sell rice to merchants from 
Portuguese or the English ports. The English and Portuguese sent 
their merchants in the disguise of Muscat traders with money for 
making rice purchases to Mysore. The Sultan, therefore, informed 
the Imam that he considered only those as genuine Muscat 
merchants who had certificate under seal and signature of the 
superintendents of the Mysore factory at Muscat. Merchants in 
possession of such certificates would alone be entitled to 
purchase rice. For issuance of the certificate merchants did not 
have to pay any money.' Ghulam Mohammed, the amil of 
Bangalore (Incharge of the Muscat factory) had special 
instruction to sell rice only to those merchants who produced 
certificates {chitly) from Mir Kazim.^ 
The amils of Kurial (Mangalore) had special instructions 
that after the sale of rice to the agents of Maoji Seith, the chief 
broker at Muscat, if these agents further desired to purchase rice 
from the inhabitants of the districts under Mangalore they should 
be allowed without any let or hindrance.^ Maoji Seith must have 
been satisfied with the Sultan's order as it is evident from his 
letter to Tipu received through Ghaus Mohammed and Tarkam 
Dass (dated 16 January 1786). Maoji was desirous that Sultan 
1. Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan, op. cit., pp. 241 -42. 
2. /A/fl'.. pp. 282-84. 
3. Ihid., p. 239. 
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would as before, allow his gunwshlaha (after their purchase of 
rice from the state managers) to also purchase their requirements 
of morahs (a weight equal to 80 lbs.) of rice from private parties.' 
Tipu on his part always had an eye on profit. In his letter to Mir 
Kazim (24 April 1786) he instructs him to sell rice at 
advantageous price. As far as the fixation of price of rice Tipu 
did it himself before the opening of the internal market to the 
outside merchants. It is also evident from the foregoing account 
that rice was not the monopoly of the state.^ 
On a later occasion, vide his circular to Imam of Muscat, he 
repeats his decision not to sell a single grain of rice in Mysore to 
any Nazarens, coming from Muscat or to any others except the 
merchants of Muscat having the requisite certificates, perhaps to 
give more force to his previous decision. The Imam was, 
therefore, asked to issue orders to Muscat merchants bound to the 
ports of Mysore, to bring along certificates from Tipu's Vakil at 
Muscat, in order that they may be enabled to purchase and carry 
away (without obstacle) whatever commodities they may require.^ 
1. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, pp. 238-39. 
2. M.H. Gopal, Tipu Sutan's Mysore (an economic study), Bombay, 1971, p. 17; also 
Hiikmnamaha-i Tipu Sultan, op.cit., fls. 139b-140a. To Mir Kazim, Darogaha at 
Muscat, 24 April, 1786, Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, p. 283. 
3. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, op. cit., pp. 457-58. 
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The Mysore factories {Kolhies) of Muscat and Kutch were 
under the charge of the fl.s//.v of Jamalabad and Wajidabad or 
directly under the charge of MalikuHujjar department. These asifs 
were ordered by the Sultan to purchase rice, sandal etc., in 
addition to cinnamon for sale at Muscat and Kutch factories.' 
Elsewhere Tipu prohibits the supply of the indigenous products 
like cinnmon and pepper and asked the men incharge to acquire 
them and supply them to the Sultan. Clearly there were no fixed 
and permanent rules in this regard and the rules varied from time 
to time as the situation demanded. The commodities which Tipu 
wanted to directly control and make profit from their sale are 
indicated in his correspondence with various commercial agents 
at Kothies in other countries. For example Mir Kazim, the 
commercial agent at Muscat, was ordered (17 November 1785) 
not to dispose of the black pepper and sandalwood under his 
custody but to wait till the price rose to a reasonable level.^ 
Similar instructions for the sale of sandalwood, pepper, rice and 
cardamom on advantageous terms appear in another of his letter. 
In yet another letter (19 November 1785) Tipu instructs Mir 
Kazim not to hastily dispose of the cinnamon, sandalwood, black 
pepper and rice imported from Mangalore and Kushalpur 
1. Hukmnamaha-i Tipu Sultan, op. at., fls. 141b-142a. 
2 Hukmnamaha-i Tipu Sultan, op. cit., 142b-143a. 
3. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, op.cit., pp. 185-87. 
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(Khuslilialpur?). He advised him to keep them for sale until the 
price of those commodities had risen satisfactorily.' Again Tipu 
asks Mir Kazim and other commercial agents at Muscat (25 
November 1785) to keep in store the pepper supplied to him 
earlier. Accordingly Mir Kazim had to stop the sale of pepper at 
Muscat. The broker was informed that the stock had been sent to 
Jedda factory, another commercial depot of Tipu Sultan 
established in 1786.^ The stock should be kept ready and as soon 
as the price rose to 25 or 30 pagodas a candy it should be put up 
for sale.^ The Sultan is known to have taken recourse to this kind 
of measures on various occasions."* Sometimes the Sultan himself 
fixed the prices of different commodities. For example on one 
occasion Mir Kazim was directed to sell the sandalwood of first 
sort at 120 pagodas a candy, the second at 100 pagodas a candy 
and the 3"* at 80 pagodas a candy. The latter also carried orders 
not to sell the sandal for less than the specified price even if tHe 
stock had to be kept for a year or two.^ In case of a fall in prices 
of pepper and sandalwood, their sale had to be stopped until the 
price had risen to a reasonable level. Cardamom could be sold at 
1. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, p. 187. 
2. However the details of functioning of the factory at Jedda are lacking. Select Letters of 
Tippoo Sultan, op. cit., p. 189. 
3. Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan, p. 189. 
4. /M^..p. 233. 
5. Ibid, p. 209 
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the current price but in no case at a loss. The rationale behind 
this was that the loss of weight of cardamom as a result of 
keeping for long periods, could be tolerated but the price of a 
commodity could not be allowed to fall.' This was an important 
element in market mechanism evolved and strictly observed by 
the Sultan (Tipu to Mir Kazim. 12 January 1786). 
For profit, trade and friendship Tipu sometimes went out of 
the way to help merchants. On an instance a dhow belonging to 
Rutnjee and Jeevan Dass. both subjects and merchants of Muscat, 
having been wrecked, drifted to the coast of Bytekoal (on the 
coast of Canara), a seaport of Mysore. The Imam of Muscat 
personally wrote to Tipu for the return of the dhow. Tipu in his 
reply (11 November 1785) reiterated that the customary law of 
wreckage followed in Mysore did not permit the return of the ship 
and Its cargo, but because of the cordial relations between the 
Imam and him the dhow has been returned to its owners.^ 
One of the many items Tipu desired to be sent to Mysore 
from the Persian Gulf by his commercial agent was pearls. In a 
letter to Mir Kazim (6 May 1785) Tipu reminds him to purchase 
large and brilliant pearls of the finest kind. But he also asks 
1 Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan, p 231 
2 Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, op cit, pp. 180-81 
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Kaziin to purchase them at low price.' Frequent reminders that his 
commercial agent should purchase quality articles at cheaper cost 
suggest that the Sultan wanted to tiain them all that methods 
applicable in marketing. In another letter Mir Kazim was asked to 
buy and send more pearls to the Sultan.^ Yet in another letter the 
Sultan ordered Mir Kazim to purchase pearls to the amount of 
Rs. 10.000. But again he was reminded that the purchase was to be 
made at low rates.^ 
Besides purchase of pearls, Tipu seems to have conceived 
the idea of developing a pearl industry of his own. Thus in a 
letter he asked Mir Kazim to send ten divers, with advance money 
for their expenses, to Mangalore."* These pearl divers had to be 
sent from Bahrain and Hormuz along with their families.^ On 
receipt of a sealed packet of pearls with a memorandum of the 
purchase price of those pearls the Sultan complains to Mir Kazim 
of the heavy price at which these pearls were purchased.*" Mir 
Kazim in another letter was asked to go to Hormuz for purchase 
of round pearls as there was no need of small ones.' 
1 Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, p 200. 
2 Ihid. p 458 
.^  Ihid.p 233. 
4 Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan . p. 231. 
5 Ihid. pp 282-83, 186-87 
f. Ihicl. p 231. 
7 Jhicl.p 209 
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We have several references in Tipu's correspondence in 
which he asked his officials in Muscat to send him plants as well 
as dry fruits. In a letter addressed to Mir Kazim (6 May 1786) 
Tipu asks him to send young date trees and pistachio plants, 
almonds as well as saffron plants and saffron seeds besides 
silkworm, shipwrights and pearl divers along with men having 
skill in taking care of these plants.' In another communication 
Tipu also reminds Mir Kazim to purchase 30 mans (weight) of 
pistachio nuts, 200 mans of almonds, 15 mans of monukkas 
without stones.^ In another letter he issues instructions to Mir 
Kazim to annually purchase 100 ratls of almonds and 30 ratls of 
pistachio nuts and send them to the amil of Mangalore. 
While ordered to send cultured silk-worms and men to take 
care of them, Mir Kazim was also ordered to procure 1 or 2 mans 
of saffron seed. A similar letter was also sent to the Dallal at 
Muscat.'* Tipu seems to have conceived the idea of establishing 
sericulture in Mysore. In another communication to the 
commercial agent at Muscat, Tipu desired the Dallal's agents 
posted at different places to collect silk worms and send to him 
1. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, p. 458. 
2. Ihid, p. 209. 
3. Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan, op. cit., p. 
4. Ibid., p. Mi 
189. 
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persons acquainted with sericulture.* Likewise Mir Kazim was 
also ordered to send some \oung date trees {khurma-i naunihalan) 
with persons skilled in management of their cultivation. 
In many cases Tipu had personal knowledge of the regions 
where particular plants or drugs could be acquired. For instance 
he writes to Mir Kazim that he knew of the regions where saffron 
was cultivated. In another letter he says it is a native to Persia.^ 
Similarly he had personal knowledge that Kishm Island was the 
place for raring of silk worms and asks Mir Kazim to send some 
of the silk worms and their eggs to Mysore together with 5 or 6 
men acquainted with rearing silk culture.^ 
Other Major items imported by Tipu from the Persian Gulf 
regions were sulphur and rock-salt. Sulphur, the main ingredient 
of gunpowder was mainly imported from Muscat. In one of his 
orders he says every year 600 rath of sulphur of best quality be 
purchased from the Muscat factory for preparation of gunpowder. 
All details regarding the execution of the transaction should be 
brought to the knowledge of the Sultan.^ In another 
1 Select Leners of Tippoo Snllan,pp 282-83 
2 Ihid,\%% 
3 16/£/,p 282-83. 
4 Ihid.p 188 
5 Hukmnamaha-j Tipu Sultan, op at ,f\s 141b-142a, llb-12a 
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communication to his commercial consul (17 November 1785) 
Tipu says that his ship anchored at Muscat should be unloaded in 
two days and the loading of sulphur, lead, and copper should also 
be completed within two days. In case the work exceeded 4 days, 
Mir Kazim would have to bear the extra expenses. He was also 
charged to report to the Sultan the arrival and departure of ships 
of the Sultan to and from Muscat.^ Once the Suitan asked the 
commercial consul at Muscat to purchase sulphur and copper 
cheaply. The moderation in purchase price of commodity had 
always been a matter of special consideration for Tipu. In a letter 
to Mir Kazim (12 January 1786) he asked him to buy sulphur 
when price had come down to a moderate level."* However Mir 
Kazim had to see that a regular supply of sulphur was furnished 
from time to time.'* 
Rock-salt, the use of which was perhaps not known to Tipii, 
surprises him when he comes to know of arrival of its shipment 
instead of sapphires. He asked the commercial agent to explain 
the use of Rock-salt in Mysore with the minutest detail of the 
mineral. This was to be sent to the amil of Mangalore and the 
1 Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan, op. cit., p. 186 
2. Ihid. p. 209. 
3. Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan, p. 231. 
4. //)/c/.. p. 282-83. 
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sample to the Sultan for information.* In another communication 
Tipu thanked Mir Kazim for having sent the sample of rock-salt 
to him.^ Equally in another letter Tipu commends Mir Kazim for 
his skill in lading the Sultan's ships with mineral salt instead of 
sapphires (sang-i nilam) and instructs him to continue sending it. 
Mir Kazim on another occasion (6 May, 1786) was asked to buy a 
large quantity of rock-salt and load on dhows that had carried rice 
to Muscat for sale."* He had further to send the consignment of 
rock-salt from time to time to the ami! of Mangalore together 
with an account of its cost.* 
Import of gold and silver, coined or uncoined, has always 
been a matter of concern to Tipu. Many of his commercial 
communications contain information on dispatch of gold to him. 
In one of his orders he says that uncoined gold and silver as much 
as it is available from Kothies may be purchased.^ 
Horses formed an important item of import from the Gulf to 
Mysore, mainly through the Muscat merchants. The main source 
of supply of horses of good breed to the Deccan states was Persia. 
1. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, p. 284. 
2. /6/c/.,p. 283 
3. /6/£/., pp. 282-83. 
4. Ibid, p. 300 
5. Ihid. 
6. Hiikmnamaha-i Tipu Sultan, op. cit., fls.l7a-18a. 
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The regular supply again seems to have been made largely from 
the Persian Gulf regions. Horse dealers, brought horses for Haider 
Ali, and on the way if any horse lost its life and the dealer having 
cut the tail and ear brought these before him, on the verbal 
assurance of the dealer of the price of the horse, Haider Ali would 
pay half the price from his own treasury.* 
Horses to Tipu were as important as rice to the Omanis. A 
letter of 20 February 1782 by the Sultan to Mir Kazim directs him 
to induce the Muscat merchants to visit Mysore in a large number 
and bring horses in empty dingies for sale and for return cargo 
purchase rice. Simultaneously the consul was also asked to 
persuade the Imam of Muscat to issue orders to the same effect to 
his merchants.^ Tipu seems to have had a special liking for good 
breed of horses and mules of Persian origin. The Sultan in 
another letter to Mir Kazim asks him to dispatch some mules of 
good stock.^ In another letter to Mir Kazim the Sultan desired him 
to send some one to Rustakh and procure five large asses and 
dispatch them to Mysore.'* 
1. Tarikh-i Tipu Sultan, op.cit., p. 683. 
2. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, op. cit., p. 6. 
3. Ibid, p. 458. 
4. /6/c/, pp. 282-83. 
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From Tipu's order issued to the six asifs of the Sarkar-i 
Khodadad we understand that every year 1050 horses were 
purchased officially. The number of horses to be purchased and 
paraded before the Sultan were allocated to various Kachehris: 
Kachehri Zafarabad, 100 horses; Kachehri Faiz Hisar 200 horses; 
Kachehri Farrukhyab Hisar 100 horses, Kachehri Shikohabad 200 
horses and Kachehri Gardoonshikoh 250 horses; Kachehri 
Azimabad 200 horses.' If 1050 horses were officially purchased 
on behalf of the state in one year, the aggregate purchase in the 
entire realm of the sultan must have been higher. 
Tipu tried to encourage trade by making concessions in 
customs. Maoji Seith, the dallal of Muscat was granted remission 
of duty to 4/10 of the total whereas '/a of the total was granted to 
the Imam of Muscat, who was designated as the chief merchant of 
Oman.^ Regarding the remission of Vz of the duty on the Imam's 
ships and dhows at the port of Mysore, there is a letter of Tipu 
Sultan addressed to the Imam. He had issued orders to the 
governors of his ports. The Sultan asked the Imam to continue 
sending ships and dhows with merchandise to the ports of 
1. Hukmnamaha-i Tipu Sultan, op. cit., fls. 140b- 141a. 
2. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, op. cit., pp. 241-42. 
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Mysore.' Regarding remission of duty on Maoji Seith. Tipu 
Sultan instructs the amils of the ports (11 January 1786) to 
demand only 6/JO of the duty which it seems was customary since 
old times.^ Maoji Seith also enjoyed remission of anchorage duty. 
Tipu wrote to the aijiil of the port of Calicut (16 January 1786) to 
remit the customary anchorage duty in favour of 5 dingies of 
Maoji Seith.^ 
The reduction of duty on ships of Oman in Mysore was not 
a one-sided affair. It was reciprocal. While the customs duty in 
general was 10% on goods of all description at the Oman ports, 
the duty on merchants of Mysore was only 6%^ Such customs 
concessions and facilities were given by Tipu to other merchants 
coming from outside the country as well. In January 1787 Tipu in 
his correspondence with some Armenian merchants promises to 
exempt them from duty on goods that they would bring to Mysore 
ports.^ 
The Sultan established a royal board of 9 commissioners of 
trade with 17 foreign and 30 home factories carrying instruction 
of profit-oriented transaction of exports and imports. 
1. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, pp. 241-242. 
2. Ihid.. p. 238. 
3 Ihjd. p 238. 
4. Patricia Risso, op cit.p. 103. 
5. Abdul Qadir, Woqa-i Manazil-i Rum, (ed.) M. Hasan, (Pub. For the Department of 
Histor>'. AMU), Calcutta. 1968. p. 103 (hereafter Woqm Monazil-i Rum). 
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Commodities like tobacco, sandalwood, pepper and precious 
metals were declared state monopoly. Wilks also endorses the 
view that the regulations were meant to benefit people at large 
and motivate them of the participation in trade and commerce of 
the country. 
On deposits Mark Wilks says if the share of depositors was 
up to the amount of 500 rupees he received 50% at the end of the 
year and if 500-5000 rupees his annual profit was 25% and that 
above 5000, 12%. Depositors were at liberty to withdraw on 
demand any part of the deposit together with their up-to-date 
interest.* Tipu thus collected funds for financing his coastal and 
the Gulf trade. It has been stated, 
"That only two or three years previously to the 
extinction of his power, he had conceived the idea of 
creating a very formidable naval force. It may, indeed 
be reasonably doubted, whether either the resources of 
his country, or his genius were equal to the realization 
of so bold a plan, but it is as well, perhaps, that he 
1 Mark Wilks, «p.c7/,p 570. 
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was not allowed time for the experiment" . 
As to the construction of ships of ordinary merchants he 
issued order to the asifs of Kachehri Jamalabad, Wajidabad and 
Majidabad that the merchants of Kachehri Jamalabad should 
construct 11 sail of three-masted and two-masted ships and 
merchants oi Kachehri Wajidabad and Majidabad 10 sail of three-
masted and two-masted ships each. These ships they had to 
construct at their own cost. He also guaranteed them the supply of 
cargo for their ships wherever they desired. But for all practical 
purpose for transportation of cargo bigger ships should be used in 
trade. They should not trade in smaller ships. Asifs of the three 
Kachehris were asked to obtain agreement from the merchants of 
those Kachehris. The merchants were given option to get the 
ships ready within one year. Till then they could trade in ships of 
any size.^ 
On one occasion Tipu in his communication to Mir Kazim at 
Muscat ordered him to send 10 shipwrights familiar with the 
construction of dhows together with 100 Khallasis.^ After the 
arrival of these shipwrights Tipu expresses satisfaction at their 
skill in construction of dhows and dingies. He again asked the 
commercial agent to further recruit 4 or 5 shipwrights and send 
1. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, op. cit., p. 234. 
2. Huhnnamaha-i Tipu Sultan, op. cit., fls.l39b-140a. 
?>. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, op. cit., p. 234. 
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them to Mangalore.' Once he issued order to his official. 
Mahinood Ali Khan, on the problem of sheathing (Coppei ing) 
ships and asked him to consult shipwrights in the matter of 
sheathing and enhancement of durability of ships. Tipu's ships of 
war including cargo and pilgrim ships must have been many. 
M.H. Gopal is of the view that for trading purpose Tipu's 
government had its own ships."* Mohibbul Hasan is of the view, 
however, that the Mysore's ships were technologically ill-
constructed and therefore inferior to European ships. This 
impression of his emanates from a shipwreck in the Shatt-al 
Arab.** 
The Bombay shipyard that had been dependent for its timber 
on the hinterland of the western coast now obtained easy access 
for its supply to the forests of Malabar and Mysore after the fall 
of Tipu Sultan. This placed the British at advantage over hSr 
rival, France. For construction of better ships for the Royal Navy 
the services of Wadia family was made use of.^  
1. Select letters ofTippoo Sultan, pp. 282-83. 
2. Ihd.'p 356 
3. Waqa-J Manazil-i Rum, op at .p. 11. 
4 M H Gopal. up. at., p 20 
5 Waqa-t Manozil-i Rum, op at. Introduction. 
6. Ihid 
7. Asi\a Siddiqi. 'The Business World of Jamsctji Jejeebhov". lESHR, Vol XIX (3 & 4). 
Jan.-Dec. 1982, p. 302. 
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Wilks seems to suggest that Tipu Sultan was quite ignorant 
of commercial and political economy and therefore in 1784 he 
ordered the total eradication of all the pepper vines of the marine 
districts and reserved those of inland growth to trade with the 
true believers from Arabia.' Wilks says that it was not possible 
for him to understand whether prohibition of growing red pepper 
was in order to promote black pepper or due to some other 
motive. 
Sultan, according to Mark Wilks, was convinced that since 
England's power was founded on commercial prosperity and, 
therefore, he too wanted to enhance his power on the same basis.^ 
The relations of Tipu with Oman were based primarily on 
reciprocal trade and friendship. In one of his letters to Mir 
Kazim, Tipu says that the former's deputation at Muscat had the 
sole purpose of buying and selling and he was always to look to 
the commercial advantage of the Sultan. However he could 
indulge in business matters on behalf of Mysore if it was in the 
interest of the state, eventhough not sanctioned by the Sultan.^ 
1. Mark Wilks, op. cit., p. 569. 
2. Ihid. p. 570. 
.1. Ihid. 
4. Select Letters ofTippoo Sultan, op. cit., p. 233. 
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As to funding the trade by local raising of credit, there is no 
frequent mention of bill of exchange in Tipu's commercial 
transaction but the evidence suggests the practice was not 
uncommon either. In a transaction of 160 bales of cloth sold at 
13.000 qurs-i rumi in the possession of Nurullah, the chief of the 
embassy to Constantinople sent in 1786, Abdullah, the purchaser 
of the cloth at Basra, 16 November 1786 issued a bill of exchange 
of the said amount drawn on a banker at Baghdad. 
Simultaneously we hear of receipt of 20,000 hun-i haidari by the 
envoys of Tipu Sultan bound to Constantinople. This money was 
paid to them by Prem and Sewa, both the agents of Maoji Saith at 
Basra on account of the goods which he had purchased at 
Muscat.^ 
Tipu's commercial interests extended beyond Oman to 
Basra. Basra, a strategic commercial port, situated near the 
confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates. In 1786 it was 
garrisoned with 11 Turkish ships of war and two small ones 
beside some trading vessels operating in the Persian Gulf.^ Tipu 
seems to have visualized its commercial importance much earlier. 
Next to Muscat the port which could be of a great value and could 
control the flow of trade was Basra where commercial depot 
1 Waqa-i Manazil-j Rum op at. pp. 41-42. 
2 lhid.-pA\. 
."? IVoqa-i Manazil-i Rum. op at., p 53. 
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could be established for transaction of Mysorean products. Tipu. 
therefore, desired to obtain possession of the port of Basra in 
farm. With this view in mind the Sultan issued instruction to the 
chief members of the embassy in 1786 to make every inquiry of 
the port and possibility of attaining consent of the Turkish 
governor and his inclination to farm out the port.' But nothing 
came of attempt. Basra's strategic importance lies in the fact that 
it served as an entreport and distributing centre to Turkish Iraq 
especially Baghdad vis-a-vis Levant and Europe by the way of 
Aleppo and Asia Minor and in the north to the Caspian, Iranian 
and Armenian regions.^ 
Goods of Mysore which had already attracted the attention 
of merchants of different regions were also popular at Basra. 
Members of Tipu's embassy proceeding to Constantinople in 1786 
during their brief sojourn found ready customers to dispose some 
of their goods which they carried to meet out their expenses.^ 
1 . Se/lecl Letters ofTippoo Sultan, op. cit., pp. 264-66. 
2 . Lorimer, op.cit., 1(1B), p. 166. 
3 . Waqa-i Manazil-i Rum, p. 41; also History of Tipu Sultan, p. 134. 
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Chapter - 4 
CONDITIONS OF TRADE IN THE RED SEA AND THE GULF 
[A] Bills of Exchange, Draft and Currency Rates in 
the Red Sea 
Considerable flow of treasure in India from the Red Sea 
continued even during the 18*** and 19"* centuries. The flow was 
either in form of silver bullion or liquid assets sent to India as 
remittances through bills of exchange, also known as hundis. 
The hundi system as a means of money remittance to India from 
abroad during the early medieval period must have been 
prevalent as evidence tends to suggest the presence of Indian 
sarrafs and money changers at various commercial centres like 
Mokha, Constantinople and Malacca. For our period we have 
various records of the English East India Company which 
contain much information on hundis particularly at Mokha. 
To begin with we have evidence from 1752. The Mokha 
factor says of having signed twenty sets of "Bills of Exchange" 
(Friday 7 August 1752).* His definition of a set is "two bills 
I. Mokha. 7 .\iigiist 1752. Mokha hactory. No. 75. pp (i^)-71. 
9(1 
each". The total bills were of 20 sets and amounted to Rs. 
47,300. The bills were drawn on the Chief and Council at Surat 
payable at thirty days sight after stated dates. The rate of 
exchange on that day at Mokha was Rs. 200 to S.P. $100 
(Spanish Dollars). The names of persons from whom the 
amount was procured and those in whose favour the bills were 
drawn are given in the attached table (on pp. 94 & 96). 
A letter of 10 September 1800 addressed to the Secretary 
of State by the Resident at Baghdad, Harford Jones, mentions 
that the Pasha of Baghdad on the Vazir's solicitation sent the 
Resident a sum of Rs. 25,000 in bills of exchange drawn on 
Damascus and Aleppo.' However no further details are 
provided. We have a substance of a letter (9 May 1832) from 
Meeya Kurreem Bhaee Ibrahimjee, acting native agent at 
Mokha addressed to R. Money, acting Persian Secretary to 
Government. The letter refers to having previously sent a bill 
issued on 27 April 1832 drawn on the Governor in Council, 
payable I to 30 days sight of an amount of 1500 German 
Crowns. On that particular date the exchange rate was Rs. 215 
to 100 Crowns. The total amount remitted in favour of Meeya 
Chandabhaee Allee Bhai was Rs. 32,250.^ The same native 
1. Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 101 of 1800. pp. 6636, 6648 
2 Political Department. Vol 57/500 of 1831/32/33 (Mokha, Makalia, Sanaa 
& Syria), pp 1-2 
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agent in another letter of 9 August 1832 to the Acting Persian 
Secretary speaks of having sent a "hoondi" of 10,000 German 
Crowns issued on 17 July 1832 in favour of Chandabhaee. The 
bill was drawn on the Governor at Bombay.* Abdool Rasool, a 
native agent of the East India Company at Mokha and also a 
merchant issued bill drawn on the Bombay Government in 
favour of one Hajee Mahmud Ali who had also advanced the 
former a sum of Rs. 4956, 4 (as?) in 1840. But the Bombay 
Government refused to honour the bill saying that the said 
native agent had no authority to draw bills on the Bombay 
Government. Abdool Rasool says by way of complaint that the 
agent of Hajee Mahomed Ali Saffer now charges him interest 
on the amount for time on account of the non-payment of the 
bill. Abdool Rasool further says that he was not made aware of 
the Government Regulations.^ But in another dispatch dated 23 
November 1840, addressed to the Governor, Abdool Rasool, the 
Government Agent at Mokha, conveys to the Governor of 
having received from the Vakeel of Hajee Mahomed Ali Saffer 
the sum of Rs. 2284 German Crowns (Furansa Rials) at the rate 
of exchange of Rs. 217 to 100 per Furansa rials, making in all 
Rs. 4956'/4. Abdool Rasool therefore requests the Governor to 
I. Political Department, vol.57/500 of 1831/32/33, op.cit., p. 5; also ibid 
(3 Sep.. 1833), p.45. 
2 . Political anil Secret Department Diary, Vol. 1260 of 1841-42. 
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pay the same to Hajee Mahomed Ali Saffer in Bombay 3 1 days 
after sight. The bill was drawn in duplicate.* 
Exchange rate constantly varied in the money market. For 
the bills of exchange drawn on the Governor in Council 
(Bombay) the German Crowns began to be exchanged for 
rupees. In 1831 German Crowns 15000 exchanged to Rs. 32,250 
and the rate of exchange was 100 Crowns for 215 rupees.^ This 
was the rupee-crown rate at Mokha market in May 1832. Then 
in November 1840 the rate was Rs. 217 for 100 German rial 
("per Furansa Rial") which probably may mean 100 German 
Crowns.^ At Jedda, in November 1868 the rupee was quoted at 
2 shillings. The pound according to the current exchange rate 
equalled l37'/2 piastres and the rupees 2'/2 piastres only.^ At 
Baghdad the indigenous currency was Kerases (Kerans?). H.C. 
Rawlinson writing from Baghdad dated 31 May 1849 says the 
exchange rate between kerans and the Company's rupees was 
209:100.* 
1. Translation of a bill of exchange drawn by Abdool Rasool, British agent at 
Mokha on the Governor at Bombay, 28 October and received 23 November 
1840, Political and Secret Department Diary, Vol. 1260 of 1841-42. 
2. Political Department, Vol. 57/500 of years 1831/32/33, pp. 1-2. 
3. Political and Secret Department Diary, Vol. 1260 of 1841 & 42, pp.24-25 
4 Political Department, Vol 32 of 1869. p. 47. 
5 Ihul. Vol 192/2360 of 1S49. p 293 
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The exchange of silver (bullion) with Spanish Dollars 
(current Dollars) was not uncommon sight during the 18 
century. Mokha Factor writing to the President and Governor at 
Bombay says of having exchanged 28464 ounces of the 
Company's silver for a similar weight of current dollars on the 
same terms as mentioned in previous certificates. 
Table 
Name of Changer 
Mokha Factor 
Mokha Factor 
Mokha Factor 
Mokha Factor 
Note: T 
Source: Mokha Fact 
Exchanged with 
Iwah, broker to Richard 
Bouchier 
Mahmudboy Jafferboy 
Esubhoy Aloojee 
Mootaboy Rasboy 
he list continues till the total weight 
or 1752, No. 75. pp. 52-55 
Quantity of Silver (oz) 
1433 
45337 
4447'/2 
44471/2 
is 28464 oz 
The borker, Iwah again appears (Sunday, 12 July 1752) 
proposing to the Mokha Factor to exchange silver for Spanish 
Dollars $ 1600. Finley agreed thereto and exchanged 14232 oz. 
for two certificates to be transmitted to Bombay. Since two of 
the ships of Esabhoy Aloojee and Moosaboy Rasboy had fixed 
their sailing schedule to Bombay, this induced three merchants 
namely Mahmudboy Jafferboy, to exchange silver for dollars. 
Mahmud Jafferboy exchanged 5337 oz. of silver for $6000 the 
Mokha. Sunday 12 July 1752. Mokha Factory 1752, No. 75. pp. 52-55. 
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others 4447'/2 oz. for $5000 each. The factors strongly hoped 
that their entire stock would be exhausted. The ships Dadabhoy 
and Speedwell had both put silver as treasure freight. Iwah was 
directed to acquaint the merchants and to convey to them that 
the silver purchased by them would be received at the same 
rate. The schedule date of sailing of the ship was August 1752. 
The Stretham 's freight according to the above arrangement, 
therefore, would be reduced as little as possible by those two 
ships sailing at earlier date, owing to the Mokha factor's offer 
aforesaid.' 
The flow of a large amount of treasure to Surat and 
Bombay was a continuous process. Its variation however was 
subject to the circumstance. During 1804-05 there was 
considerable flow of treasure from Mokha and Jedda. The 
Wahabi depredation during this period had become 
unmanageable and therefore the Indian merchants began to 
transfer their liquid assets to Bombay.^ 
The returns for Indian goods were made in dollars and 
sequins with which the Indian fleet returned to India. This 
1. Mokha, Sunday 12 July 1752, Mokha Factory, No. 75. pp. 52-55. 
2 . Report on the External Commerce of Bombay for the \car 1804/05. 
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sometimes caused an acute scarcity of silver in the Egyptian 
market.' There seems to have been considerable trade between 
Bombay Presidency and the Red Sea between 1816-18 as shown 
by the flow of amount of treasure to Bombay and Surat in the 
statement of Bombay Customs House of 25 June 1818.^ 
SETS OF BILLS OF EXCHNAGE 
DRAWN IN FAVOUR OF AMOUNT RECEIVED OF AMOUNT (Rs.) 
Xeriph Ally; 
Abdel Rahim Meah 
Jamaluddin Abdul Cadir Esub 
Jivandass Govindjee 
Jivandass Govindjee 
Venmo Uidass Gerderass 
Measaudella Mahmud; 
Bochajee Tiebyjee 
Luttioboy Hitherboy 
Hiaboy Nungboy 
Ibrahim Hossein 
Malickjee Doosaboy 
Togboy Hossenboy 
Jafferboy Shaikhboy 
Mahomud Cassem 
Mereboy Todgboy 
Shaikh Ally Buckus Shaikh, 
Ally 
Total Sets 19 
Tiebcaun Sulimanjee 
Abdel Rahim 
Sulaiman Sally 
Luckmechund Savichund; 
Luckmechund Veachund 
Verchund Bowan 
Rozdar Verjee 
Rozdar Verjee 
Hiaboy Conjee 
Rahimboy Chanderboy 
Ibrahim leva 
Haq Hussenjee Meleckjee 
Mootaboy Togboy 
Currimboy Nureboy 
Shaikh Adam Hossein 
Cuttabboy Addumboy 
Mootaboy Tieb 
Carried over 
Brought over 
Total 
Rs. 4,4300 
Rs. 4,4300 
Rs. 47,000 
Chundaboy Sulimanjee 
900 
800 
1000 
1000 
1000 
1500 
2500 
1500 
3000 
3000 
500O 
5000 
1000 
1000 
2000 
3000 
Note: The list continues till the total amounts to Rs. 47,3000 
Source: Mokha 7 August, 1752, Mokha Factory 1752, pp. 69-71 
1. John Lewis Burkhardt. Travels in Arabia, London, 1829 (2Vols.) Vol.1 
pp.32-33. 
2. Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 307 of 1818, p. 
above statement see the table given in chapter V(A) entitled, 
Ali and the Trade with India", p. 151. 
719. For the 
Mohammaad 
'J6 
(B) PORT CUSTOMS IN THE RED SEA (1800-
1830) 
Customs on all imports and exports was the major source 
of income for the Imam of Sanaa, a tributary of the Ottomans. 
The data available from the 18"' and the early 19**' centuries on 
the nature and mode of customs charged at various ports of the 
Red Sea are of some relevance in studying the conduct of 
India's trade with the Arab world. 
During IS'** century the chief source of the income of the 
Imam of Yemen was Mokha customs. The customs varied in 
rates. In 1730 the Europeans paid a uniform duty of 3% on all 
descriptions of goods whereas the Muslim and Hindu merchants 
were subjected to customs payment ranging from 5 to 7.5%.* 
The Imam of Sanaa granted an exclusive privilege in 
1737 to the East India Company to buy 600 bales of coffee as 
duty-free against an annual payment of goods worth Rs. 400 to 
the Daulah of Mokha^ which the Company further strove to cut 
down to a sum of Rs. 300 in 1793.^ 
The Memorandum of customs paid at Mokha on imports in 
1810 clearly shows that there was no uniformity in the customs 
1. K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India 
Company, 1660-1760. Cambridge, 1978, p. 376. 
2 . Mokha, 23 April 1793.Mokha Factory. 1752-1795. No 76. p. 13. 
3 . Mokha, 15 June 1793. Ihid.. p. 87. 
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rates payable by merchants of different origins. For instance the 
English East India Company and other British merchants still 
paid at the rate of 3% advalorum on all kinds of goods. 
All Beg, a traveller of Aleppo, on his visit to the Red Sea 
in 1807, observed that the Sherif of Mecca, Sherif Ghalif, 
himself a merchant and shipowner, increased the rate of 
customs at Jedda resulting in resistance from the merchants.' 
Sometimes customs levied on East India Company or other 
British subjects in the Red Sea ports under the Egyptian rulers 
and within the control of the Sherif of Mecca led to retaliation 
from the East India Company. This is borne out by the evidence 
contained in the minute of the proceeding of the East India 
Company of 11 May 1826: 
"Instances have occurred where the Sherif of Judda has 
exacted heavy duties on the company's woolens and we have 
retaliated by directing the same duties to be levied on the Judda 
vessels trading to Bombay and Surat"^. 
The variation in customs rates often depended on the 
quality of goods or the nationality of the men involved. 
1 . AH Bev. Travels in Morocco, Tripoli, Cyprus, Egypt, Arabia, Syria and 
Turkey (Between the years 1803 and 1807) (in 2 vols.), London, 1816, Vol 
2. p. I21. 
2 . Mokha Residency, Minutes by W. Warden, Political Department, Vol. 238 
of 1826, pp. 68-69. The Minute further stipulates that should the charges at 
Jedda be at all extravagant and in case the Sherif of Mecca refuses to grant 
concessions to the Company's cruizers he could be brought to the 
observance of a reasonable conciliatory conduct, by refusing all 
indulgences to the shipping from the port resorting to a British one. Ihid. 
Customs at 5% on Surat piece goods were levied on imports at 
Mokha by the East India Company or by British merchants. The 
customs were paid by the purchaser not by the importer. On 
the other hand, Musalman natives paid 7'/2% customs on piece 
goods at Mokha whereas Hindu merchants had to pay at the rate 
of 8y4%. The medium of payment was either Spanish Dollars or 
German Crown, "With the Exchange between the Dollars and 
Crown added"^ 
The situation at Jedda was different from that of Mokha. 
On piece goods, for instance, the native Arab merchants were 
charged at the rate of 16% advalorum. Customs on items like 
drugs, cotton, sugar candy and soft sugar and those articles 
calculated by weight had to be paid at the rate of 11% 
advalorum. But the East India Company and other European 
merchants paid only 8% advalorum on all description of 
goods."* The commercial treaty between the British Government 
in India and Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt in 1810 in clause 8 
says that any English merchant or for that matter any English 
subjects passing through Egypt or on their way from India to 
Europe or vice-versa along with his baggage or travel 
1 . Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 366 of the year 1810, p 6807 
2 . Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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equipages (which had its particular definition by the Customs 
House) will not be subject to customs duty. The Pasha himself 
gave his assurance on this issue.' The 14"* Clause of the treaty 
stipulates that Indian raw material or Indian manufactured 
goods that came from India and were imported into Egypt were 
subject to payment of a duty of 3% advalorum either in "kind 
or coin", depending on convenience of the receiver. The 
customs duty was to be paid on arrival of goods at Cairo. 
However, the customs incharge under the employment of 
Mohammad Ali was empowered to check goods that had been 
unloaded from British ships or belonged to British subjects. 
Those ships, as a rule, were expected to carry exact note or 
invoice of goods. But if the goods thus carried sustained any 
damage the Egyptian Government was liable for payment of 
such damage (Clause 15).^ In Clause 16 of the treaty, the Pasha 
agreed to grant British subjects more concessions than the 
native merchants. The clause stipulates that goods originally 
imported from Yemen or Abyssinia by English subjects would 
be charged 15% less than the native merchants. This meant that 
British subjects had to pay a mere 3% as they were charged 
1. Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 366 of the year 1810, p. 6758. 
2. Ihid., p. 6762. 
3. Ihid.. p. 6762 
KM) 
earlier.* It would also seem that the final decision was left in 
the hand of the East India Company. On the other hands those 
goods of Egyptian origin which were consigned in British ships 
or otherwise imported to India on account of British subjects 
had to pay in reciprocal terms a customs of 3% advalorum. 
The is"* cl ause of the treaty of 1810 takes note of goods 
the British merchants exported from India, Abyssinia or the 
states of Yemen to Europe or Turkey via Alexandria or 
Damietta. The duty was payable on the re-exports of the items. 
On the other hand a "Terchit receipt" had to be obtained for the 
goods being exported to Turkey, "that no further Duty may be 
exacted which is conformable to our capitulations"^. 
Capitulations (the 19'*" Clause) and other usages stressed 
that European articles of trade would pay 3% whether meant for 
consumption within Egypt or for re-export. Similarly the export 
quality of vine of "Indies" would pay 3% advalorum.^ 
Clause 20 of the treaty lays down certain conditions on 
the shippings of the subjects of the sublime Porte and the 
1. IhiJ, p. 6763-4. 
2. Secret and Political Department Diary., No. 366 of the vear 1810. p. 6765. 
> IhiJ., op cit.. p. 6766 
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natives of Egypt. These shippers could not carry on trade with 
India in British ships without the proper approval of the 
relevant authority of the East India Company in India. As such 
the merchants had to fully abide by the rates of duties imposed 
on foreigners by the East India Company. The treaty also 
stipulated that ships under Turkish colours and with a Turkish 
crew shall be at liberty to carry on traffic with the subjects of 
the "Indies" paying duties at the rates of the Company.^ The 
treaty also acceded to the demand that Mohammad Ali be 
allowed to receive duty-free products of India, valued up to Rs. 
1,000,000.^ 
Burkhardt (1814) observed that after establishing himself 
as the ruler of Egypt Mohammad Ali assumed the title of 
"W^a/y or governor of Jedda, Suakin and Habesh as well and 
had customs officers appointed at the customs houses of those 
ports. Earlier those officers were subordinate to the Sherif of 
Mecca.^ 
Before Mohammed Ali's appearance on the scene, Jedda 
was under the jurisdiction of the Shenf of Mecca and its 
1 Secret and Political Deparfment Diary, No 366 of the >ear 1810, p 6766. 
2 Ihid. p 6766-67 In faith the treaty was signed and sealed Cairo 28 May 
1810 b\ John Benzoni, Assistant to the British Mission in Arabia 
3 Burkhardt. op cit , Vol 1, pp 87-88 
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customs constituted main source of his income. But 
theoretically the town was under the jurisdiction of a Turkish 
Pasha. Initially, the Sherif's share of the income of Jedda was 
'/3, which was subsequently enhanced to V2. But gradually the 
Sherif assumed jurisdiction over Jedda and the Pasha was 
consequently reduced to the position of dependence on the 
Sherif. This was a clear manifestation of the weakness of the 
Turks.' 
The customs at Jedda were known as ''ashour" and 
accordingly levied at the rate of 10% on all goods of import. 
Malpractices sometime led to over-valuation and sometime 
under-valuation.^ Customs on coffee, for instance, in the period 
of the Sherif vidis at $5 the quintal which could be computed at 
15-20% while spices paid at lower rates. The customs levy on 
Indian piece goods was at higher rate, besides there being many 
abuses in the mode of collection of customs.^ 
The Wahabis had become so powerful by this time that 
the Sherif could no longer force them to pay customs. In the 
face of the terror unleashed by them, the Indian merchants felt 
their property insecure and began to transfer their treasure to 
1 Burkhanlt. Vol I, pp. 88-89 
2. Burkhanlt. op cit.. Vol I. pp 88-89. 
^ Ihul. Vol 1. pp 93-94 
un 
India. In spite of these conditions, which must have adversely 
affected realization of the customs, the aggregate figure of 
customs collection in 1814 was $400,000 which was equal to 
8,000 purses or 4 million piastres.^ Thus, according to 
Burkhardt's estimate, it gave an annual importation of about 4 
millions of dollars, "a sum certainly below rather than above 
the truth".^ Customs were also levied on domestic produce 
entering the town from the interior of the country."* 
The proceeds of customs of Jedda was shared between the 
Sherif of Mecca and the Pasha of Jedda. Later on it was 
entirely appropriated by the Sherifs. But at the turn of the 19*'' 
century Mohammad Ali asserted his authority and took over the 
entire administration and utilized the amount for his own 
purpose."* In the given conditions it is quite possible that Indian 
goods were over-charged at Jedda.* 
In a second treaty, formally ratified with the merchants of 
Jedda, Mohammad Ali first demanded payment of joint-customs 
by ships, both of Suez and Jedda at the customs house of Suez. 
The rate of customs was initially fixed at 12% but was later 
1. Biirkhanlt. Vol. I, pp. 93-94. 
2. Ihid,p.94. 
.1. /A/£/.,p. 95. 
4. Biirkharclli. op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 435-36. 
5. Ibid., op.Lit., pp. 93-94 
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reduced to 9% upon all imports into Suez from India, which 
was 6% more than the usual customs charge levied on European 
merchants in the ports of the Turkish sultan. It was expected 
that this arrangement would lead to the opening up of an active 
trade. 
Our evidence clearly indicate that the Imam of Sanaa was 
keenly interested in maintaining friendship with the English. 
The officials of the East India Company, on the other hand, 
were aware that the financial position of the Imam was not 
sound. Basing his estimate on statement of Niebhour, Robert 
Finlay, an assistant surgeon in the service of the East India 
Company, concludes that the total income of the Imam was 
500,000 crowns per month. But according to his own estimate, 
"the figure did not exceed that sum annually". He further says 
that after an examination of statements of different persons, he 
found the estimate of revenues contradictory and variant.* 
Therefore, the estimate that he has advanced is based on his 
personal calculation. Irregularities in form of bargain and 
bribes in collection of customs also precluded opportunities of 
enhancing his income. 
1. Journal of Journey to Sanaa from Mokha by Assistant Surgeon Robert 
Finlay in the Months of August, Septen^ber and October, 1823". Political 
Department. lll\()() of IS2(). (pp. 1-36), p.32. 
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The income derived by the Government of Sanaa from 
manufacturers during 2"** decade of the 19"' century was very 
small. The Jews and banyas were the main traders in gold and 
silver. The Imam struck no coin but a '"comasee" 200 to a 
German Crown and a ""hisf', 5 to a ""comasee". These coins 
were made by the Jews. Manufacture of coarse woollen cloth 
was basically for carpetting but sometimes it was worn by the 
poorer classes as well. The only resource worth mention was 
the coffee whose export value was very high. Raisin, walnuts, 
almonds, aloes and Sanaa leaf were also exported in small 
quantities.* 
We have the translation of a grant (in Arabic) from the 
Imam of Sanaa addressed to captain Bruce, Government agent, 
received at Mokha, 14 January 1821. The Imam agrees in 
principle to all the demands made through his vakeel, FathuUah 
El Mohee. The duty was fixed at 2 2/4 in lieu of VA, the same 
as charged from the French (written in the month of Rabiussani 
1236 A.H. or January 1821).^ 
1 Political Department, Vol. 22/168 of 1824, p. 130. 
2 Translation of a letter from Imam of Sanaa to Captain Bruce, Government 
Agent Received 14 January 1821. with seal and signature of the Imam, 
Political Department. Vol 14/34 of 1820-21, p. 220 
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The Grant stated that: "It is hereby agreed and directed 
that the British duties shall hereafter be in lieu of 31/2% to 2'/4% 
to the English and all their merchants on Exports and that the 
Imports shall be the same 2'/4%".* 
We have another copy of a literal translation from the 
Arabic concerning the 7'*' article of the treaty of Mokha. 
In a direction from the Bombay Castle to the Deputy 
Secretary and transfer incharge of the office of country 
correspondence on other points of argument was made for the 
reply to the letter from the Daulah of Mokha to the Governor at 
Bombay. In response to the letter of the Daulah some follow up 
action and explanations were undertaken by Captain Bruce 
during his visit there on the 9 January 1821. But in spite of all 
the exercise the terms of the Treaty remained ambiguous. The 
Governor in Council readily consents to give the Imam the 
benefit of the most favourable construction by admitting that 
the reduction of duty to IV* in imports and exports applies only 
to English merchants. This communication is dated 28 June 
1821.^ 
1. Political Department, Vol. 14/34 of 1820-21, p. 221. 
2 Political Department, Vol. 14/34 of 1820-21, p. 392. 
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A copy of the letter of Governor of Bombay, Mountstuart 
Elphinstone to the Daiilah of Mokha dated 29 June 1821 is 
available. It says inter alia: 
"I have had the pleasure to receive your letter informing 
me that in answer to the claim of the people of Suart to pay 2VA 
per cent duty the same as is stipulated to be paid by English 
merchants, you told them that the duty in reference to them 
remained unaltered and that no mention was made of them in 
the article reducing the duty to 2VA per cent. 
In reply I have to acquaint you that not withstanding it 
was my intention to have stipulated for the reduction of duties 
in from of the native merchants trading to Mokha under the 
protection of the British flag, equally with the English, as 
explained by Captain Bruce to you on the visit to you on the 
9'*', January yet the terms of the treaty are ambiguous, 1 readily 
can consult to give the Imam the benefit of the most favourable 
construction by admitting that the reduction of duty to 2% per 
cent imports and exports applies exclusively to English 
merchants".' 
Further, the chief secretary to the Government, Bombay 
Castle, writing to John Elphinstone, chief at Surat on 28 June 
1821 (No. 820 of 1821) says that: 
1 Political Department, Vol. 14/34 of 1820-21, p. 393. 
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"I am directed to communicate to you for the information 
of the traders from Surat to Mocha that as the terms of the 
Treaty are ambiguous the Governor in council has afforded to 
the Imam the benefit of the most favourable construction by 
admitting that the reduction of duty to 2% per cent on imports 
and exports applies exclusively to English merchants". 
On a careful examination of the evidence available in this 
regard it would appear that the English themselves were 
perhaps not very clear about the statement made by the Imam 's 
vakeel. In practice, however, the duty remained 2/4% on all 
imports and exports of the Company's goods as well as the 
merchandise of the traders operating under the English Flag as 
contained in article 7. Other articles of the Treaty of Mokha are 
needed to be carefully considered. The first article empowers 
the English Resident at Mokha to retain 30 soldiers, same as 
the Residents at Basra, Baghdad and Bushire. The next article 
binds the Imam to respect and honour the dignity of the English 
Resident {vakeel). The third article concerns the arrangements 
upon death of Englishmen. As regards the English merchants' 
ships, they used to pay 400 rials as anchorage but in terms of 
this Treaty, the duty was abolished forthwith and these vessels 
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were put at par with those of the Government vessels (i.e. the 
English East India Company's) and the war ships (i.e. men of 
war of Royal Navy). They were to enjoy this privilege even if 
their cargo was brought on shore. This was discussed and 
settled without reference to Sanaa on the condition that 
hostilities should cease and that the entrance to the port should 
not be closed during the season. Article 6 takes into 
consideration the shippings of the merchants carrying trade 
under the British flag. According to it all merchants who are 
dependent on the English government for protection and carry 
on trade under their flag, may continue to transact their trade at 
Mokha, especially the Muslim merchants of Surat. In case of 
any dispute arising among them, the decision should be made in 
accordance with the Mohammedan law. 
This article also stipulates that in case any dispute 
between the people, the English Resident, and the subjects of 
the Imam belonging to the port of Mokha, the Resident may 
depute a representative to the court of the Hakim of Mokha to 
observe the proceedings. If a native of the country is found to 
be in the wrong, the Hakim of Mokha would furnish him, but in 
case the wrong has been committed by an English soldier, then 
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the punishment will be meted out to the guilty by the Resident.' 
This article was referred to the Imam for his consideration. 
Article 7 concerns customs affairs at Mokha. The rates 
for both imports and exports at the port of Mokha for the 
English Government i.e. the English East India Company and 
the English merchants were to be the same, i.e. 2V*%} It was 
dated Rabiussani 1236 A.H. (1821A.D.)^ and signed by William 
Bruce, the Government agent, 15 January 1821 with seal of 
Ameer Fathullah Mehdi (vakeel); and others. 
Another document reveals that there was still some flaw 
in the arrangement which needed to be corrected. It perhaps 
refers to the omission of the paragraph in the 6"" article of the 
Treaty of January 1821.'* 
The Imam of Sanaa writing a letter to Mountstuart 
Elphinstone in July 1821 A.D./Shaban 1236 A.H. expresses 
satisfaction over the conclusion of the treaty. At the same time 
he explains about certain "departure" from the terms of the 
agreement. The Imam sent his representative, Haji Mohammad 
1 Political Department, Vol. 14/34 of li20-2l, op at. p 393 
2 Ihicl 
3 IhicJ 
4 rohlital Department, Vol 14/34 of 1820-21, p 436 
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Wallee Saffar to explain his view point with the hope that the 
Governor would pay due attention to him. As a mark of 
friendship a gift of two Arab horses was also dispatched for the 
Governor.' 
The statement of the envoy from Mokha reveals that the 
merchants trading with the ports of the Imam were required to 
make certain contributions annually to meet the exigencies of 
the state. This was an old custom. The money thus collected in 
advance was deducted from the customs levied on the merchant. 
This was agreed upon between the Musalman and banya 
merchants and the Sanaa Government. No objection was ever 
raised against the practice. But now, Bheemjee, a broker to the 
company, refused to agree to the Government of Mokha's 
demand. The Government was forced to take some harsh 
measure against the defaulter. Unfortunately, Robinson took it 
upon himself to defend him which resulted in an exchange of 
harsh words. The envoy expressed apprehension that it may 
lead to serious misunderstanding between the two states. 
Bheemjee also acted as broker to all visiting shippers at 
Mokha, refused to pay the brokerage tax due from him saying 
1. Translation of a letter from Imam Mehdee of Sanaa to Mountstuart, the month of 
Shahan 1236 Hijra. (July 1821), Political Department, Vol. 14/34 of 1820-21, pp. 
454-5 S. 
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he was the servant of the English Government. Americans 
purchased coffee through Bheemjee. For this they had to pay 
one dollar a Frazil. Bheemjee again declined to pay brokerage 
tax on coffee. He would also not allow the Imam's agent to 
directly sell it to the Americans. Bheemjee had large assets and 
extensive dealings in the Mokha territories. The Imam, 
extremely annoyed with his behaviour, desired through his 
envoy to get him replaced.' In protest against the charges and 
the recommendation, Dongesey ladowjee, the chief manager of 
Nanjee Seaskaran at Bombay (Bombay, 10 October 1821) 
addressed a petition to Elphinstone, President and Governor in 
the Council. In this petition he denounced all the charges 
against the firm of Seaskaran stemmed from ill-intention and 
deliberate attempts made at the persuasion of others to malign 
the character of Nanjee Seaskaran, who enjoys protection of 
the President and Governor in Council. ladowjee therefore 
prayed that no action should be taken against Bheemjee because 
of his usefulness for the Company as he not only acts as broker 
on its behalf but also runs a Broker's House for the use of the 
East India Company.^ 
1 Political Department, Vol. 14/34 of 1820-21, p. 463-65. 
2 rolitical Department, Vol 14/34 of 1820-21, p. 463 
in 
The petition of the chief manager was followed by 
another petition of Seaskaran Heerji, the broker to the English 
East India Company at Mokha, to Mountstuart Elphisteone, 
Governor of Bombay dated 21 July 1822. In this petition he 
justifies non-payment of the requisites of the Imam on the 
ground that the Sanaa Government owed a sum of $30,000 to 
Bheemji upto 1820. He was, therefore, not required to advance 
any cash on account of customs^ He further argues that the 
practice prevailing in Sanaa is that the brokers and other banya 
merchants pay the customs demanded from them by the ruler of 
Sanaa after deducting duty on their own demands. The Sanaa 
authorities could not borrow from Muslim merchants nor could 
they be subjected to any substantial demand. They were also 
not in a position to make significant advances to the Sanaa 
Government. Whereas the demand upon Seaskaran was more 
than on other individuals. The amount of customs liable to be 
paid by the broker was so small that there could hardly be any 
adjustment against them. 
It would seem that the Sanaa authorities demanded from 
him more than was due. Consequently he was weary of 
1. Seaskaran Heerji, the English East India Company's broker at Mokha to 
Mount-Stuart Elphinstonc. Governor of Bombay, 21 July 1822, Political 
Department. 22/84 of 1822. 
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advancing any cash. The matter was amicably settled. The 
Diwan gave a written statement that $28,300 was due to the 
Imam and it would have to be paid during the monsoon of 1820. 
The sum will be liquidated against the customs payable by the 
broker. Afterward the broker would advance only an annual 
loan of $4,000 to the Sanaa Government. Seaskaran further 
says that the amount of the customs liable on him was $700 and 
was likely to be paid by the Americans.* The matter was 
reported to the Resident and as desired by him, it was paid by 
the broker. Seaskaran also having received reports of $20,000 
on account of the demands of last year and the present year 
which would be shown on adjustment account.^ 
A commercial treaty concluded between Hutchinson, the 
British Resident at Aden and the Sultan of Aden (Lohaj in 
1822) stipulates fixation of uniform customs rate of 2/4% on all 
imports and exports on all British subjects, European or 
Indian.^ The British ships were exempted from payment of 
anchorage duty as well."* Commercially Aden had declined and 
1 From the information available it is evident that the Americans had been 
frequenting the Red Sea since last 25 or 26 years. Soon after the arrival of 
their ships they reported to the Residency office and inquired of the 
particulars of customs Political Department, 22/84 of 1822, pp 1 0 4 - 8 
2 Ihid , p 108 
3 Political Department. Vol 22/84 of 1822, p. 79. 
4 IhiJ . The treaty also stipulates of exemption of duty on merchandise 
brought for re-exportation 
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in 1830 a uniform customs rate of 2V2% on all imports and 
exports was fixed with a further addition of nominal harbour 
dues.' Besides this, the Imam (Sultan?) also levied a tax on 
pilgrims and thereby made an annual income of $ 12,00,000 as 
is borne out by the petition of Maodass Ransordass to Charles 
Colville, acting Governor in Council dated 4 April 1821.^ 
Makalla, another port of the Red Sea under the 
jurisdiction of Mohammad Ali Pasha, Governor of Egypt, 
charged a uniform rate of 10% as customs in 1834. On the other 
hand, the adjacent ports also continued with a rate of 10%. 
Mohammad Ali who himself was an active participant in 
shipping and also owned several ships of his own, lowered the 
duty at Makalla from 10% to 5%."* As a result ships bound for 
other ports began to anchor at Makalla. 
Wellsted has provided a comparative assessment of the 
customs charged at Yembo and Jedda. He says that both the 
Red Sea ports derive their revenue from the customs fixed at 
10%. He is critical of the irregularities prevailing in customs 
collection. Customs charges were fixed by over-rating and 
1 J R Wellested, Travels m Arabia, London, 1829, (2 Vols ), Vol 2, p 397 
2 Political Department, Vol 23/33 of the Year (182 T'). pp 70-71 
3 J R Wcllcstcd, Vol 2. op tU . p 397 
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under-rating the cost of the articles. No customs was charged at 
Yembo if goods from Jedda were imported to that port under 
the certificate of customs payment by the Customs Master of 
Jedda.' 
British hegemony seems to have reached its culmination 
during 1850s in the Red Sea. Following the conclusion of a 
treaty between the British and the Turkish Government in 1856, 
the Court of Directors expressed satisfaction on learning that 
the terms of the treaty were effectively put into practice. 
According to the Treaty, the British commerce of the Red Sea 
was now exempted from all charges except the regular customs 
duties.^ 
Indian trade of the Red Sea was subject to various import 
and export duties. Details of such duties levied on ports of the 
Red Sea during the 1850s are available. For instance there was 
''Sambookia", a tax levied on landing of merchandise boat. It 
was levied on Indian merchants in Yemen as well as Jedda. 
Later on it was repealed by Namick Pasha through an order to 
the Governor of Yemen.^ Now the merchants were subject to 
1. JR. Wellsted, Travels in Arabia, (2 vols.), London, 1892, vol. 2, pp. 215-16. 
2. Secretary to Government to the Acting Vice-Consul, Bombay Castle, 7 
April 1856, Political Department, Vol. 34 of 1856/57, p. 79. 
3. British Consulate, Jedda, 28 October, 1857, Stephen Page, Acting Vice-
Consul and .\cting Agent at Jedda to Anderson, Secretary to Government. 
Political Department, Vol. 34 of 1856-57, pp. 153-156 
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only one kind of tax known as "Majaba" but it was also 
included into the Treaty of Commerce of 1854.* The English 
seem to have believed that Namick Pasha expected only just 
and reasonable amount of customs from the English commerce. 
Moreover extortion on English goods and "fiscal abasses" 
(fiscal abuses?) such as "Ittasibiah" were abolished by the 
order of the Sublime Porte in 1855.^ Certain abuses also seem 
to have been practised in Yemen. Authorities of Yemen, for 
example, levied such cesses as $0.50 a bale as town dues; $1.50 
a camel load of tobacco as transit dues and $1.00 a bale of 
goods as boat hire. The East India Company's agent at Jedda 
strongly felt that such petty cesses needed to be withdrawn. In 
a dispatch to the British ambassador at Constantinople, the 
company's agent at Jedda made a request to persuade the 
Bombay authorities to help remove these anomalies.^ But the 
reports of office of commissioner of customs clearly indicate 
that the cesses levied on import goods on the Ports of Mokha, 
Hodaida, Jedda were exactly on the same pattern as levied by 
the English at Bombay on goods from those ports. Further more 
there was no complaint regarding these anomalies by the 
1. Political Department,vol.. 34 of 1856-57. pp. 153-56. op.cit. 
2. Political Department, Vol. 34 of 1856-57, p. 131. 
3. Office of Commissioner of Customs, Salt & Opium, 18 May 1856 to the 
Secrctarv to Government, Bombay, Political Department^ Vol. 34 of 1856-
57. pp 3? 7-38. 
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merchants of Bombay and Surat.* The Bombay Government 
however, found no substance in the complaint of the agent and 
therefore the matter was dropped.^ However, goods arriving at 
Jedda with the exception of those from India, were 
accompanied with '''Raftias'" or Government Permits; the duties 
having been paid in some of the ports lower down the sea, and 
therefore no further duty was levied at Jedda.^ Similarly no 
duty was charged on the merchandise transhipped at Mokha. 
The "'Raftias" or "TeskereT (perhaps exit duty) on arrival at 
Jedda being refused and the merchants ordered to recover the 
former duties from the Government of Yemen since Mokha and 
Hodaida were under the Pashalik of Yemen, and so under the 
Turkish Government. There was vizirial order from 
Constantinople to customs authorities that duty on all goods 
arriving from Tecca (under the Viceroy of Egypt) at Suakin for 
which merchants had the requisite raftias, was to be refunded. 
Apprehension was expressed by the agent at Jedda that second 
attempt might be made to levy duties on goods for which 
customs have already been charged in Yemen at the ports of 
Hodaida and Mokha. The illegal exactions in the Yemen were 
1. Bombay, 1 May 1856, Office of Commissioner of Customs, Salt and 
Opium, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Vol. 34 of 
1856-57, pp.337-38. 
2. Ihid.. op. c;7.,Vol. 34 of 1856-57, pp. 337-38. 
3. Statements of the imports and exports at the port of Jedda during the year 
1855 as also the return of British trade in vessels under the British flag 
during the same period from the authorities of Jedda port. Political 
Department. Vol. 34 of 1856-57. pp. 107-08. 
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those of ''majaba", and "'sombokia". ''Majaba", levied 
exclusively for the Sublime Porte, affected every trader.* 
Appointment to Daulahship was based on payment of a 
certain amount of money to the Imam of Sanaa. The Daulah 
had under him subordinate officers as assistants. These 
assistants were ''Bash Katib", Qazi, and in case of a seaport 
town an Inspector of shipping known as ''Amir Bahr". 
Appointments to these officers also were made on payment of 
sums of money.^ 
A close scrutiny of the evidence would suggest that the 
management of ports and collection of duties was marked by 
many malpractices. The assistant surgeon, Robert Finlay, in the 
service of the East India Company noted that there was no 
regularity in collecting the duties. Often there was bargain on 
payment of duties and bribe and it was so prevalent that it was 
used, "to let more pass than he pays duty for".^ 
1. Stephen Page at Jedda to British Ambassador at Constantinople, 10 July 1857, 
Political Department, Vol. 34 of 1856-57, pp. 351-56. Both the terms, 'Raftias' 
and 'Teskeret' appear to be synonymous; while the first one has its Persian origin, 
the second one has its Arabic origin. Both the terms may apply to export permit as 
well. The temi Tazkirat during the medievjil times has been used in the sense of 
travel document. For detail see Bayazid Beyat, Tazkirai-i Humayiin-w-Akbar, (ed.) 
H. Husain, Calcutta, 1941. p.355. 
2. Journal of Journey to Sanaa from Mokha by Assistant Surgeon Robert Finlay in the 
month of August, September and October 1823, Political Department^ Vol. 22/166 
of 1824 (pp 1-36). p 32 
.1. Ihid. 
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EXTORTION 
Complaints against extortion of money by the customs 
authorities of the ports of Yemen are frequent. One form of 
extortion was to extract money on promise to allow "credit" 
(concessions) in customs. This fact was brought out in the 
petition of Seaskaran Heerji submitted to the chief Secretary to 
the Government. He complains of extortion of money by the 
Daulah of Mokha, with a promise to allow him a credit in the 
customs. Daulah's excesses had reached such an extent that he 
put a chain around the neck of Seaskaran in spite of the fact 
that he was the Company's broker. The Daulah also extorted 
money by exacting fine on the petitioner's men who were on 
their way to Mokha on business. Seaskaran expresses 
apprehension of further harm to his cargo sent in several 
vessels from Bombay, Cutch, Porebunder, Veravul and 
Mangalore to Mokha. While seeking protection for his cargo 
and vessels by the officers of the East India Company he also 
requests the Secretary to the Government to instruct the 
authority of the Company at Mokha for reimbursement of the 
extortion money from the Daulah and measures against further 
molestation.' 
1. Petition to Francis Warden. Chief Secretary to Government by Seaskaran 
Heerjee, the East India Company's broker at Mokha. Bombav, 23 August 
1820, Political Departmau. Vol. 28/33 of 1820-21. 
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Complaints of extortion contain much information 
regarding the treatment of merchants and the mode of customs. 
Writing to the Secretary to the Government the Resident at 
Mokha says that he was under the impression that the Indian 
subjects would be brought at par with the Arab traders for the 
purpose of customs duties. In this connection, he refers to the 
articles of the treaty concluded between Captain Bruce on the 
English East India Company 's behalf and the Imam of Sanaa on 
payment of customs. But in practice the situation was different; 
while Arabs paid 15% the Indians had to pay more.* By 1827 
the financial condition of the Mokha Government had 
deteriorated. Consequently it decided to meet the expenses by 
raising a compulsory loan on the merchants and leaving them to 
be repaid through customs. This practice was quite common. 
But the Resident was determined not to allow such a levy on 
merchants under the Company's protection.^ He suggested that 
if prompt steps were not taken against such conduct in future, 
there would be no end of the matter.^ M.E. Bagnold writing to 
Davidas Runsordas, a merchant of Bombay, says the Daulah at 
1. Political Department, Vol. 23/278 of 1827, p. 235. What Captain Bruce 
says is that the Arab merchants exercised considerable influence in the Red 
Sea and there was measure m continuation to oust the other traders as well, 
particularly the European traders from the Red Sea. The influence of Arab 
merchants increased with the passage of time. 
2 Ihul. 
3 Ihul 
\11 
Aden had obtained forced loans from all the banyas, treated 
them with great cruelty and even put one of them to death. 
Davidass Runsordass also had agents in the Red Sea for his 
business. Merchants were ill-treated at Lohaj as Bagnold has 
reported and the claims of Davidass Runsordass could not be 
satisfied owing to the non-payment of the Sanaa Govemment. 
Forcible exaction of 2500 Rials is reported in a letter from 
Shaikh Tyab Ibrahimji, native agent at Mokha to Watson, the 
Persian Secretary, dated 21 February (received 2 April) 1833. 
The exaction (avania?)^ was made from Meeya Kurreem Bhaee 
Ibrahimjee by two Turks, namely Juneen Agha and Mohomed 
Bilmas and their Vakil, Syeed Mohomed Bar. The demand for 
refund had been made but it was yet to be paid.^ Again there is 
reported exaction of 3000 Rials from merchants of Mokha by 
the Turks. This is contained in the translation of the accounts 
of events which took place at Mokha and other places. It is 
dated February 1833. In this Juneen Agha is reported to have 
been instigated by Syeed Mohomed Bar. Merchants were 
plundered and 2500 Rials were exacted from Meeya Kurreem 
1. Mokha. 30 August 1826, Ihid.p.342. 
2. Avanias and extortions from merchants by the Turkish marauders by no 
means were new during the 19th century. It was practiced even during the 
18th century and merchants were made to pay the money. See Hamilton 
Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West. Oxford, 1957, Vol. 
I, p.303 
Political Department, Vol. 57/500 of 1831/32/33 
12.1 
Bhaee. However, on this occasion he was given a receipt with 
the seal of Agha Mahomed Bilmas affixed to it.' Again there 
was extortion of 1500 Rials from the merchants by Mahomed 
Bilmas, on 22 February 1833. Much pressure was applied to 
collect extortion money. A merchant of Muscat, Khalaf Ilmas, 
was imprisoned on his refusal to pay the extortion money. One 
Syed Abdullah Akeel was sent to jail for the same reason. 
Pressure continued to be applied on these persons even after 
ten-day imprisonment. Even then they refused compliance. 
Consequently one eye of each was taken out. This 
harassment ultimately led Syed Abdullah to pay 500 Rials but 
had nothing to meet the demand. Finally, he was ordered to be 
killed, other merchants took pity on his condition, collected 
from among themselves 1000 Rials and gave them to Bilmas 
and got the victim released. The Turkish marauders, being 
independent terrorised the inhabitants in many ways.^ 
Ibrahimjee, the native agent at Mokha further says that Bilmas 
took 2500 Rials from Skaikh Tayab Ibrahimjee by floating a 
false report that he was going to Jedda and Mecca. He promised 
repayments of all extortions, present and future, to all the 
1 Polilicol Department, vol . 57/500 of 1831/32/33. 
2 Politwal Department, Vol 57/500 of 1831/32/33 
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merchants. Syeed Mahomed Bar stood surity for the payment on 
behalf of Bilmas who had extorted Shaikh Tyeb Ibrahimjee.* 
But the marauders constantly posed a threat to the merchants 
and refused to pay back the amount of 2500 Rials that they had 
exacted from Shaikh Tyeb Ibrahimjee. Syeed Mahomed, 
however, stuck to his promise of paying the Surat merchants 
the exacted amount at the opening of the season (April). The 
native agent deplored the great oppression and dreadful 
harassment carried on at Mokha. The Turkish marauders acted 
treacherously on the directions by Mahomed Bilmas.^ The 
native agent at Mokha informs the Persian Secretary dated I 
April (received June 1833) of the plight of the merchants at 
Mokha. The letter was tabled for discussion on which the 
minute was drawn by the President in council at Bombay dated 
9 July 1832. It contains the decision that before the opening of 
the fair season (i.e. trading season at Mokha) the state of 
insecurity of that part of Arabia (i.e. Mokha and the adjacent 
ports) should be known to the traders at Bombay and Surat.^ 
1 Political Department, vo\ 57/500 of 183 1/32/33 
2 Ihid. 
Political Department, Vol 5^ 500 ot I S31 32 33. 
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[C] Indian Shipping at Basra and the incident of 1820 
Situated at the confluence of the twin rivers of Tigris and 
Euphrates on the Shatt-al-Arab and an outlet for Iraq, Basra is 
a principal port of the Persian Gulf. In 1786 Basra was 
protected with 11 Turkish ships of war and two small ones.* 
The dispatch of a pinnace to Basra in 1635 marked the 
first contacts of the East India Company (hereafter EIC) to 
Turkish Arabia. In anticipation of its regular trade with Turkish 
Arabia/Turkish Iraq EIC first sent experimental cargo to Basra 
in 1640, then the principal port of the Persian Gulf region. The 
EIC then opened its factory at Basra in 1643 and with the 
outbreak of hostilities between the Dutch and the Persians in 
1645 the Company removed its property at Bandar Abbas to 
Basra. For some reason the Company withdrew its Basra 
factory in 1657 and a permanent factory, subordinate to Bandar 
Abbas, was opened only in or about 1723-4. The Company's 
Gulf trade during all this period seems to have been carried on 
from Bandar Abbas and Surat.^ 
1. Abdul Qadir, Waqa-i Manazil-i Rum (ed.) Mohibbui Hasan, Calcutta, 
1968, p. 53. The Bank from Basra to Lebanon in the east known as Shatt-
al-Arab, grew finest dates in the world. The plantations stretched some 50 
kms. in length upon both sides of the old bed of the Euphrates above and 
below Hillah. 
2 . Factory Records, Persia and Persian Gulf (Typed), G29, India Office 
Library and Records, London. 
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In two different Capitulations between the British 
Ambassador and the Turkish Sultan in 1661 and 1675 the 
British were assured commercial rights and trade concessions 
in Turkish dominions besides concessions in customs duty and 
right to "consulage" over which difference arose from time to 
time between the Resident and the customs authorities at Basra. 
The "consulage", however, was apportioned out between the 
Company's servants at Basra and the government of Bombay. 
Of this "consulage" called customs, 50% had to be credited 
directly to the Company from 1784. The 1730s and 1740s was 
difficult time for EIC's servants at Basra as Nadir Shah took 
them tb task for their assistance in the city's defence during the 
conflicts between the Turks and the Persians. Similarly in 1743 
their neutrality led to the factors' imprisonment by the Turks. 
Relations of the Residency's servants with the Mutasallim of 
Basra were sometimes cordial and sometimes cool and it was 
this discord that ultimately led to the Basra episode of 1820. 
The East India Company's Records of the Persian Gulf 
speak of cordial relations between the Residency and the tribes 
of the Persian Gulf. Mail services for the Company was 
maintained by some of these tribes to Bombay and Aleppo on 
behalf of EIC. Under the circumstances if any trouble arose, 
joint Anglo-Turkish campaigns were undertaken to put down 
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the recalcitrant tribes. Such measures against them were taken 
between 1762 and 1768. Occasional differences between the 
Pasha and the Residency posed problems for the latter and to 
defuse such problems the Resident had to go to Baghdad in 
order to meet the Pasha. In 1758 Khojah Raphel, an Armenian 
merchant represented the Resident. From 1781 Khojah Marcar 
represented the Company's interest at Baghdad and his 
appointment was recognized by the Court of Directors and he 
was granted a salary. In 1798 he was succeeded by another 
Armenian named Khojah Petrus. In 1798 a political residency 
was established at Baghdad.^ 
The East India Company lost its Basra trade during 
1773-9 on account of an outbreak of plague and the occupation 
of the town by the Persians. In 1793 under Samuel Manesty the 
Residency was moved to Kuwait. The Company's position of 
the Persian Gulf trade thus has been described by Al-Qasimi as 
under: 
"On the whole, the trade in the Arabian Gulf during 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century was shared 
by the East India Company, with its establishments 
I. It is interesting to note that the Agency during the 18"* century enjoyed 
privilege over the Residency but the reversal of the posts from commercial 
to political enhanced the Residency's prestige over the Agency. Factory 
Records: Persia and Persian Gulf, G29, Op.cit. 
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of Basra and Bushire Residencies, and the Agency 
at Muscat, and Persian, Armenian, but mostly Arab 
and Indian, merchants and shipowners. Merchandise 
was carried between India and the Gulf by very few 
vessels belonging to the East India Company, and 
by more vessels belonging to the Arabs. However, 
the increasing share of the East India Company was 
at the expense of both the Indians and the Arabs"*. 
Following the suspension of Manesty and Harford Johnes, 
the joint factor, Nathaniel Crow, a new Resident to Basra, was 
sent with the joint deliberation and consent of the Government 
of Bombay and the Governor General of India, but in the 
meantime the Pasha agreed to Manesty's terms for the return of 
the Residency to Basra which was accordingly done in 1795. 
During the sojourn of the celebrated Indian traveller Abu 
Taleb "Londoni" in 1803 at Basra, the Mutasallim of Basra was 
Abdullah Agha and the British consulate functioned for the 
purposes of EIC and to protect merchants who sent their cargo 
under the Company's protection. With the exception of some 
differences the relations of Samuel Manesty, the Resident at 
1 Mohammad Al-Qasimi, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, London, 
1986, p. 25. For another modern study of the Persian Gulf trade, see 
Paricia Risso, Oman and Muscat. An Early Modern History, London, 1986. 
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Makul, were cordial with the Pasha of Baghdad and the 
Mutasallim of Basra. 
Changes in the political situation of the Arab provinces 
of Turkish Arabia seem to have taken an abrupt turn with 
Muhammad Ali's coming to power in Egypt in 1805. The 
penetration of Capitalism into the non-capitalist market with 
the supply of manufactured goods to Asian markets changed the 
entire outlook of the Middle Eastern markets. The concept of 
free trade, purely a western idea to the traditional world of 
Asia, was alien to the Asian rulers and the middle class. But 
the Ottoman Sultan had to agree to all the demands of the 
English that they made in the Treaty of Dardanelles, concluded 
on 5 January 1809 (the treaty contains in all 76 clauses). The 
above treaty marked the conclusion of peace between the 
English and the Porte on one side and the Porte and Russia on 
the other.^ The Treaty of Dardanelles allowed the English to 
establish consulates in the ports of Aleppo, Alexandria, Tripoli, 
1. Abu Talib Khan, Travels of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan, (tr.) Charles Stewart, 
Delhi, 1972, p. 319. Makul, where the EIC had a small factory, was a little 
distant from Basra. Manesty, above all his official position and sensitive 
disposition, had very close acquaintance with Aga Mohammed Abdal 
Nubby. the leading merchant of Basra, Ibid., pp. 317-18. 
2. Factory Records: Persia and Persian Gulf, op. cit.. G. 29. 
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Barbary, Tunis, Tripoli in Syria and Scio, Smyrna and Egypt.* 
Mohammad Ali like the Turkish monarch also had to agree to 
various terms of a treaty which he signed with the East India 
Company in 1810.^ 
There was no love lost between the British and Abdullah 
Pasha at Baghdad till the year 1810. But the Company's trade 
since the end of the 18*** century seems to have been at a low 
ebb partly because of the internal troubles in Persia and the 
Turkish Arabia and partly owing to decline of profit as a result 
of competition between the costly English woolen and the 
cheaper French goods. French ambitions in the Middle East and 
the Company's continued interest in the Persian Gulf took new 
political turn. But the 1810 witnessed the final cessation of the 
French threat in the Middle East. Upon Manesty's dismissal as 
Resident at Baghdad both the Residencies of Basra and 
Baghdad were brought under Claudius James Rich, the Baghdad 
Resident. The new Resident's relations with Abdullah Pasha 
between 1810 and 1813 were quite cordial. As a gesture of 
friendship the Pasha in 1812 (May or June) issued decrees 
1 . Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 372 of the year 1811, 
Maharashtra Archive, Bombay. 
2. Ihid. 
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ordering the Mutasallim of Basra to surrender the British 
renegades and to desist from enslavement of British Indian 
subjects. With the takeover of the Pashaliq of Baghdad by 
Daud Pasha (1813?) the relationship between James Rich and 
the new Pasha remained cordial for sometime. Exchange of 
new complimentary letters between Daud Pasha and Evan 
Napear, the Governor of Bombay, took place through the 
Resident. Rich worked as Resident at Baghdad whereas his 
assistant remained at Basra when in 1812 the designation of the 
Residency was changed to "Political Agency in Turkish 
Arabia", empowering the Resident to stay at his leisure either 
at Baghdad or at Basra with a European Assistant to act on his 
behalf during his absence at either place.* 
By the middle of 1819 the relations between Daud and 
Rich seem to have changed. In an attack on a mounted 
messenger of the Political Agency the culprits were suspected 
to be Pasha's men. But this apart. Captain Taylor, the Political 
Assistant, had strict order from the Government of Bombay to 
observe neutrality in the conflict between the Turks and the 
Najdi Arabs at Basra , except to afford help to British Indian 
1. J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Centarl Arabia, 
Vol. I(IB), Calcutta, 1915. pp. 1323-24. 
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subjects. Orders were also given to Captain Taylor to shift the 
Political Agency from Basra to Bushihr or to the island of 
Qishm in case of danger.* As 1820 drew near allegations of 
Pasha's show of near disregard for European treaty rights and 
his violation of various terms of trade were made by the 
political Agent. In 1820 the Resident at Baghdad directed his 
assistant at Basra, to strike the factory flag in view of the 
seizure of goods of the Company's merchant Svoboda at the 
Basra Customs House. Svoboda, according to Lorimer, was a 
European merchant who since long had traded at Baghdad.^ But 
ElC's other documents carefully corroborated show that the 
person under consideration is 'Anton Savoboda' and was in the 
employment of the Company."* The quarrel arose between 
Savoboda and the Pasha of Baghdad over the payment of 
double duty on his goods—once in Aleppo and on arrival at 
Baghdad. He further alleged in his statement to the Political 
Agent dated 6 December 1821 that the Pasha had asked him to 
leave the country under threats and ultimately he was 
constrained to bind himself by promising the latter to pay the 
duty at Baghdad and not at Aleppo^. 
1. Gazetteer of Ihe Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia. Vol. I (IB), pp. 
1323-24. 
2. Ibid.p. 1325. 
3. Political Department 871 of 1822, p. 50. Ibid., pp. 73-75. 
4. ;/)/t/., pp. 50, 73-75. 
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In continuation, as Lorimer says, Captain Taylor had 
further instruction from Rich in November 1820 to suspend all 
communication with the Basra Government and to prohibit 
commercial and other intercourse between vessels under British 
colours and the natives of the country. Following seizure of 
goods of Savoboda, Captain Taylor responded by withdrawing 
his staff from Basra to Muhammareh.* The differences between 
Rich and the Pasha at Baghdad further intensified and Rich 
withdrew in 1821. 
The main sufferers from the quarrel between the Political 
Agent, Claudius Rich, and the Governor, Daud Pasha were the 
Indian shippers at Basra. It is by and large evident from the 
two documents submitted as petition to Mount Stuart 
Elphinstone, Governor in Council at Bombay, by two prominent 
merchants of Bombay, Nurseydass Purshotamdass on 19 May 
1821 and Shaikh Aboo Bucker 30 May 1821. Both these 
merchants were shipowners and had lucrative trade with Basra 
and other ports of the Persian Gulf. The nature of both the 
documents relating to the Basra incidents pertain to the effects 
of the gunboat policy of EIC in the Gulf. 
1. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, op. cit.. Vol. 1 (IB), p. 1325. 
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Nurseydass Purshotamdass in his petition to the Governor 
in Council at Bombay declares himself as the owner of the 
vessel Elizabeth. The cargo consisted articles to the value of 
more than Rs. 34,000. These articles according to the general 
manifest were as under:* 
Quantity 
2616 
509 
325 
10 
3 
1 
1 
14 
|25 
Packages 
Bags 
bars 
tubs 
chests 
bundles 
bundle 
chest 
boxes 
Itubs 
Item 
rice 
iron 
sugar candy 
cassia 
piece goods 
broad cloth 
augarwood 
sugar 
steel 
The ship sailed from Bombay for Basra on 9 July 1820 
and arrived there on 7 November 1820, presumably after 
visiting other ports of the Arabian Gulf as well. The captain of 
the ship was an Englishman, Joseph Keys. Having arrived at 
Basra he made arrangements to purchase dates for the return 
cargo to the values of 2000 German Crowns which he converted 
into aine Piastres, the currency current at Basra. For that 
purpose he threw away the Ship's ballast and prepared to take 
on board about 80 Curras of dates. Before any of the return 
cargo was shipped, ElC's official at Basra (name not 
1. Political Department of 1820-21. Vol. 28/33, p. 86. 
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mentioned) put an embargo on the Indian shippers. There were 
to be no trade relations with any subjects of Turkey and the 
ship had to leave the Basra Port with immediate effect on a 
short notice. Complaint of the loss thereby incurred was made 
by Joseph Keys to the Resident of Basra, Captain Taylor. 
Joseph Keys' request to allow him to purchase the dates at 
Basra was turned down by the Assistant Political Agent.* 
Instead, he was asked to take on ballast from a distant place, 
which the ship's crew had to do with much difficulty. The 
captain of Elizabeth, however, failed to get permission to 
unload the goods on board the ship, which were destined for 
Basra. The captain then applied to sail for Bushire but was 
refused permission. He was informed through the commander 
of EIC's Cruiser Aurora that he would not be allowed to quit 
the anchorage. On this order Captain Joseph Keys sought 
permission to purchase dates at Basra in exchange, the payment 
to be made in Piastres. The permission was granted after much 
difficulty. 
1. It is quite evident that EIC discouraged Indian merchants from trading at 
Basra but the possibility as well cannot be ruled out that the motive of EIC 
was to have exclusive monopoly of the trade of Arabia, particularly in the 
situation when the competition had begun intensifying. 
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The petitioner, Nurseydass Purshotamdass, presented 
claims of compensation for loss involved in the absence of 
return cargo and non-sale of the petitioner's goods, he 
sustained a loss, he claimed, of upward of Rs. 6,000.* The 
petitioner appealed to the Governor in council at Bombay for 
indemnification for the loss sustained in consequence of the 
orders of the Resident or office of the Company at Basra.^ 
Details of Elizabeth's cargo that remained unsold:^ 
No 
1 
13 
1 
Packages 
bundle 
boxes 
small bundle 
Quantity 
3 pieces broad cloth 
China soft sugar 
silk piece goods containing 20 
pieces 
The other petition submitted to the Governor in Council 
at Bombay was that of Shaikh Aboo Bucker Abdullah, merchant 
and a Mohammedan inhabitant of Bombay and dates to 30 May 
1820. He was the owner of the ship Fazel Karim. The ship left 
Bombay for Basra on 22 November 1820. The cargo consisted 
of several articles and freight goods and carried the property of 
the petitioner worth Rs. 2,000. The vessel, on account of 
prolonged detention by EIC's men at Basra, could not deliver 
1. Political Department of 1820-21. vol. 28/33, p. 83. 
2. Ibid., p. 84. 
3. Ibid. 
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the cargo, owing to which the owner incurred heavy expenses 
and demurrage and lost profit on return cargo.' 
Aboo Bucker in his petition asserts that he expected the 
return of Fazel Karim at the scheduled time so that he could 
transport and load the dates the ship was to bring from Basra 
on another ship Futta Alvadowd and make her departure for 
Siam in time. The delay caused to Fazel Karim and Futta 
Alvadowd there was a loss of Rs. 7,625. The petitioner, 
therefore, was constrained to purchase dates at the enhanced 
rate of Rs. 27 a Candy while the dates Fazel Karim brought 
from Basra after a considerable delay could only be sold at the 
rate of Rs. 13 a Candy in the Bombay market. By this 
difference in price the petitioner lost a sum of Rs. 5670 and as 
a consequence of detention of the Fazel Karim another sum of 
Rs. 22,655. 
Aboo Bucker, therefore, prays in the petition submitted 
on 30 May 1821 for compensation against the losses that he had 
suffered wholly in consequence of the detention of his cargo 
ships by the Company's servants at Basra.^ The petitioner in 
addition furnishes other information to support his claim of 
1. Political Department of 1820-21, vol. 28/33, op. cit. p. 11. 
2. Political Department of 1820-2L pp. 118-19 
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losses. He supplies the letter of Daniel Kitchner, the captain of 
the ship addressed to R. Taylor, the assistant Political Agent at 
Basra. The letter was written aboard the ship Fazel Karim dated 
19 January 1821, off the Haffer Creek. He informs the assistant 
political agent of the detention and manifest of cargo aboard 
the ship. He further alleged on behalf of the ship's owner that 
no official intimation of embargo was given at the Port of 
Basra prior to the departure of the ship from Bushire, and in 
consequence of the detention the expenses incurred on the ship 
amounted to Rs.l30 a day (a dirm?). Daniel Kitchner further 
stated that his main interest was to deliver the freight on board 
his ship for which bills of lading had been signed for 
consignment to Basra.* On 29 January 1820, after a delay of 9 
days, he received a letter from Captain Macllard, the 
Commander of EIC's Cruizer Aurora, prohibiting Fazel Karim 
from proceeding further. Macllard in his letter reminded 
Kitchner of the latter's silence over his verbal communication 
to him. 
Many more facts can be culled from the contents of the 
declaration of protest that Daniel Kitchner made in accordance 
1. Political Department of IS20-21. vol. 28/33, pp. 118-19. 
with the public instrument of Protest on 22 May 1821 by 
personally appearing before Frederick Ayrton, a Notary Public, 
at Bombay. Kitchner declares himself as master of the ship 
Fazel Karim, burthen between 348 tons or 300, anchored in the 
Bombay harbour and belonging to the port of Bombay. The ship 
had set sail on 22 November 1820 from the Bombay port on a 
voyage to Basra in the Persian Gulf and arrived off 
Mohammareh on the River Euphrates on 19 January 1821. As 
the ship was proceeding up the Euphrates it was detained by 
John Macllard and brought to anchor. This was done under the 
proclamation of the British Resident. The appearant (Daniel 
Kitchner) further declared that he was informed by John 
Macllard that embargo had been laid on all vessels sailing 
under British flag to the port of Basra. 
The crew of Fazel Karim were further directed not to 
have any communication with the natives of Basra or places to 
the northward of the anchorage of the vessel. However, Daniel 
Kitchner, insisted on transmitting on 21 January 1821 a letter 
to R. Taylor, the Company's assistant political agent at Basra 
protesting against the detention. With indignation Kitchner 
says that the behaviour of Macllard and his men aboard the 
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Company's Cruizer Aurora was irresponsible and they acted at 
the instigation of the assistant Political Agent at Basra and 
brought so much loss to the ship's owner. 
It is quite evident from the examination of the two 
documents noted above that coercive measures were used by 
the Company's men unmindful of the interests of Indian 
shipping. This could be compared with the reaction of Claudius 
Rich, the Political Agent at Baghdad, when the Company's 
European inmate Savoboda (Suabada) was asked to make 
declaration to pay customs at Baghdad and not at Aleppo.^ 
Compared to the severity of restrictions imposed on the Indian 
shipping, Savoboda's highly magnified grievance had hardly 
any basis. 
One cannot avoid inferring that the Company's officials 
were not happy with the Indian ships' share of the trade 
between Turkish Arabia and India. Indian ships made modest 
profits by tapping into this prosperous commerce; but even this 
did not receive protection or consideration from the British 
authorities. The Indian merchants who suffered losses at Basra 
by the Company officials' embargo were just left to fend for 
themselves. 
I. Political Department of IS22. No H 71, pp. (73-75). p 50. 
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Chapter - 5 
[A] Mohammed All And The Trade With India 
Mohammed Ali is justly regarded as one of the first Asian 
modernisers, remarkable for his vision and organizing abilities. 
There is however one chapter of his career and work which has 
been neglected, but on which the Maharashtra Archives at 
Bombay have much information, namely, his policy towards 
commerce between Egypt and India. This had interesting 
potential for the expansion of Indo-Arab trade; but the later 
construction of the power of Mohammed Ali made it into a 
mere episode. 
As an introductory to this study, we might begin by 
noting that Mohammed Ali's interest in commerce was not only 
as a ruler but also as a participant. It is little known that he 
himself had ships plying over the Arabian Sea, and that he 
invested considerable sums in this commerce. Facts on this 
come again principally from the Maharashtra Archives. 
Before coming to power as the ruler of Egypt in 1805 
Mohammad Ali Pasha had already engaged in commerce. His 
ships plied in the Mediterranean and traded with Malta. After 
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1810 Mohammed Ali, with conclusion of a provisional treaty 
with the East India Company, received for his household use 
Indian goods worth Rs. 10,00,000 through the Company's 
agents. Until this time he seems to have established no direct 
link with Indian ports.' Mohammed Ali's contact as a trading 
magnate with Indian ports is said to have begun in 1816 and in 
the first round his ship brought from Bombay "A richly 
comparisoned" elephant which he gave as a present to the 
Sultan of Turkey. Burkhardt (1814-16) is of the view that the 
Egyptian ruler was "disposed to speculate on his own 
account"^. 
In 1818 Mohammed Ali is said to have sent a fleet of 
seven vessels to Bombay which carried a million dollars, half 
of which amount was entrusted to the care of W. Martinice and 
the other half to a Greek agent. The remittance of such a big 
amount was described as a preliminary of such a big amount 
was described as a preliminary trial for future investment at 
Bombay."* 
1. Secret and Political Department Diary No. 366 of 1810, pp. 766-67 
2. John Lewis Burkhardt, Vol. I. op. cit., pp. 30-35 
3. Secret and Political Department Diary No. 307 of 1818, pp. 734-35. The 
document also mentions the Pasha's two vessels being taken by the 
Wahabis. Henry Salt, the author of the letter, says the Pasha felt it 
absolutely necessary to use force against the Wahahis for having created 
trouble in the Red Sea. Mohammed Ali's ships also frequented Bushire 
where they were made to pay annually the "Light House" charges and 
pilotage fees of Rs. 40, (Bombay Superintendent Office, 27 July 1826. 
Political Department. Vol. 238 of'lS26, pp. 124-25) 
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Transactions through agents were the main features of the 
Pasha's business with Indian ports. In 1818 the Pasha's 
main agent at Bombay was Martruce who also served as general 
agent for English Firms like Messrs Brigg, Schatz & Welona, 
both having their business houses at Cairo and also for Messrs 
Briggs Lee and Co. of Alexandria, who operated between Egypt 
and India in conjunction with Messrs Forbes & Co. of 
Bombay.* Martruce had originally travelled to India on 
Mohammed Ali's behalf for commercial transaction. 
Mohammed Ali had another agent who looked after his business 
and lived at Sanaa.^ His elder agent at Jedda on the Red Sea 
was Hassan Agha and the ''Vakeel" who replaced him was 
Mohammed Zurgham.^ 
As Mohammed Ali became a shipowner in the Indian 
Ocean, his ships plied between Bombay and the Red Sea 
carrying cargo to various ports of the Arabian Sea and vice-
versa. We have list of his ships and their tonnage. A list dated 
I July 1818 gives dates of ships' arrivals and departures from 
the port of Bombay to the Red Sea and vice-versa. The ships on 
their voyage between Bombay and Jedda also called at other 
ports of the Red Sea."* 
1. Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 307 of 1818, po. 734-35 
2. IhiJ. p. 735 
3. Political Department. Vol.238 of 1826,p. 132; also Political Department, 
57 500 of 1831 32/33, p. 74. 
4. Secret and Political Department Diary. No. 30" of 1818, Customs Master 
to Warden 
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One of Mohammed Ali's ships was 'Suakin'' whose 
captains were Hussain and W.O. Martruce. It was a cargo ship 
of 200 tons. The information in the East India Company's 
record reveals that the ship under the Turkish flag sailed from 
Suez, calling at Jedda and Mokha, and arrived at Bombay in 
September 1816. It then sailed in convoy with a "Brig" named 
Ibucle ("3. buck" = James buck?) of 150 tons whose captain 
was Hamid. This ship too made voyages under Turkish colours. 
These ships sailed from Bombay in February 1817 for Surat 
where they loaded their cargo and finally left on their return 
voyage for the port of Suez.* Another of his ships was "^Alest 
Raymov" of 500 tons, whose earlier name was ''Bay of 
Bombay". The captain of the ship was Hussein and it was 
purchased in December 1816 by Mohammed Ali from Mrs. J.M. 
Taskeehy Hussein Aga for Rs. 1,30,000. The ship too carried 
the Turkish flag. It was cleared from Bombay for Suez in April 
1817. It was freighted principally by Premjee Purshootum, "a 
respectable native firm" of Bombay. The ship sailed again from 
Bombay in January 1818 for Surat. After having completed her 
cargo it cleared out for Suez.^ 
1. H. Shank, the Customs Master to Warden, 25 June 1818, Secret and 
Political Department Diary. No. 307 of the year I8LS. It appears the chief 
commander of both the ships was WO. Martruce. 
2. Secret and Political Department Diary. No. 207 of the year 1818 
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Yet another cargo ship '"CarbranC of 300 tons under the 
command of one Cassim arrived at Bombay under Turkish 
colours in September 1817 The ship along with other European 
ships, cleared from Bombay for Suez in October 1817. It was 
freighted by "Mahomed Alee Caiva", a respectable "Mogul 
merchant" of Bombay. The "brig", ''Fiittee Eslan", of 133 tons, 
under Turkish colours, with Captain Abdul, arrived at Bombay 
in September 1817 directly from Suez. It cleared from Surat for 
Suez in October 1817.* 
Mohammed Ali's personal interest in Indo-Red Sea 
commerce was probably an important factor behind his attempt 
to control areas across the Red Sea. He vigorously extended his 
authority over the Western portions of the Arabian peninsula. 
The Turkish marauders' efforts to frustrate the administration 
of Mohammed Ali was brought to an end by his complete rout 
of them by the third decade of the century.^ 
It may be recalled that by the beginning of the 19*** 
century the Wahabis had become so powerful that they got 
exempted from payment of customs at Jedda.^ After a pitched 
battle with the Egyptian army, their power came to an end."* 
1 Secret and Political Diary, No 307 of 1818, pp 714-15 The second decade 
of the 19th century is marked by construction of a large number of ocean-
going and coasting ships by Red Sea merchants at Bombay which may be 
taken as index of tne volume of trade between India and the Red Sea 
2 Political Department, 57 500 of 1831 32/33 
3 See Burkhardt, op cit 
4 Poliiual and Secret Department Diary. No 473 of 1819, ip 5676 
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During 1804-05 there was considerable flow of treasure from 
Mokha and Jedda. The Wahabis depredation during this period 
had become unmanageable and therefore the Indian merchants 
sent their liquid assets to Bombay.* Campaign against the 
Joasemese was also launched by Pasha's son Ibrahim Pasha in 
collaboration with the British military and naval power. 
In December 1820 the Pasha seems to have taken control 
of the province of Hejaz.^ This act of his must have further 
extended his power in the Red Sea. Mohammed Ali further 
deployed an army under the command of his son Ibrahim Pasha 
to establish full control over the coast of Red Sea as far as 
Aden and Mokha.'* 
Keeping in view the enterprising ventures and the benefit 
that Egypt could derive from the presence of the British, 
Mohammed Ali allowed them rights of free entry into his 
ports.^ However, in view of the political situation prevailing in 
Europe he also maintained neutrality. This factor again 
prevented any friction from British, though this phase was very 
short-lived. Initially it was owing to his plan to construct the 
Report on External Commerce of Bombay for the year 1804/5 
Arabia and Mocha Diary. No. 323 of 1819-1821, folio 1-1A & 2 
Political Department. No. 14 of 1820-2L p. 174 
Ibid. No. 98 of 1823 
Secret and Political Department. No. 103 of 1800, p. 7691 
Secret and Political Department Dhiry. No. 366 of 1810, p. 6786 
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Suez with his own investment, that he opposed the idea of its 
construction by other powers. 
His prohibition of import of the West Indies coffee in 
Egypt implied that the ruler wished to encourage Yemeni 
coffee. Thus his openness to British trade was not unqualified. 
This view is reinforced by some other measures taken by 
Mohammed Ali. 
In 1831 Mohammed Ali thought of a plain to transfer the 
customs of Jedda to Suez and thereby control direct trade 
relations between India and Egypt. The other reason for the 
transfer was thought of to put a check of the flow of large 
amount of treasure which was sent to Jedda for purchase of 
Indian commodities by Cairo merchants.' 
The Pasha discouraged import of such goods as were or 
could be produced locally. Wellsted noted in 1833 that 
Mohammed Ali prohibited importation of essential commodities 
from India to Yembo and made the people of Yembo purchase 
them from Egypt, at price fixed by Mohammed Ali himself.^ 
Severe penalties were pronounced if any one imported essential 
commodities to Yembo.^ The rigour of such a strict regulation 
1. SeeWcllsted, Vol. II, p. 37. 
2. //>/c/, p. 216. 
3. Ihid. 
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is borne out by the fact that the cloth that did not bear the 
Pasha's stamp, if used in Yembo, was liable to be seized.' This 
may be taken as a token of protective measure of the Pasha to 
safeguard his own developing textile industry. 
Measures were also taken to check smuggling. Officers 
were appointed to keep watch over the people carrying 
contraband.^ 
Trade of the Red Sea with India seems to have 
accelerated between 1806 and 1816. The Customs Master of 
Bombay in correspondence of 25 June 1818 says that in this 
period the English and Arabs were the principal traders 
between the port of Bombay and Mokha and Jedda."* 
At the turn of the 19'** century India's main ports of 
suppliers to the Red Sea were Calcutta, Surat and Bombay. 
Jedda by and large was the chief port for Indian goods which 
were supplied onward to Egypt. Jedda merchants purchased 
Indian goods in wholesale after the arrival of Indian fleet in the 
beginning of May. These merchants were advanced credit by 
Cairo merchants for their purchase.^ 
1. Wellsted, pp. 2l6-n 
2. Ihid, pp. 2\5-\6 
3. H. Shank, Custom Master to Warden, Bombay. Secret and Political 
Department Diary. No. 307 of 1810, p. 708. 
4. Burkhardt. op.cil.. vol. I. pp. 32-33 
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Merchandise that was purchased at Jedda was finally 
shipped to Suez and sold at Cairo from where these were 
further supplied to the Mediterranean. The returns for these 
goods were made in dollars and sequins with which the Indian 
fleet returned to India. This caused an acute scarcity of silver 
in the Egyptian market. ' According to the Customs Master 's 
report of 1814/15 there was unusual export of Mokha coffee to 
the value of upwards of Rs. 171,000 from the Red Sea to India 
destined for the United Kingdom which again caused scarcity 
of coffee in the Egyptian market.^ 
The first private English export to Suez from Bombay was 
made by Messrs Forbes and Company of Bombay in February 
1815 on a ship "Danish Beggy", whose owner was Mohammed Ali 
Cawa, a respectable native merchant, resident at Bombay. 
Mohammed Ali rendered cooperation with Messrs Brigs in 1818 
in their plan to establish a commercial company with its base at 
Cairo. The aim of those interested in this venture was to supply 
the Mediterranean with Indian produce through Egypt. 
There seems to have been considerable trade between 
Bombay Presidency and the Red Sea 1816-18 as shown by a 
statement from Bombay Custom's House dated 25 June 1818.^ 
1. Burkhardt. Vol. I, p. 35 
2. Bombay, 25 June 1818, Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 307 of 
1818, pp. 709-10 
3. H. Shank. Customs Master to Warden, Bombav, Secret and Political 
Departmeni Diary. No. 307 of 1818, p. 708 
150 
Table 
BOMBAY 
Total 
merchandise 
Treasure 
SURAT 
Total 
merchandise 
Treasure 
Grand 
Total: (Rs.) 
< 
I 
Imports 
Total 
304668 
1589730 
14485 
371288 
2280171 
English 
64488 
239900 
64488 
239900 
304388 
Turkish 
240180 
1349830 
14485 
371288 
1975783 
Import 
Treasure 
iilver: 
Dollars:(Rs.) 
rotal (Rs.) 
19,12,260 
48,758 
19,61,018 
Total 
840305 
56700 
385168 
385168 
82173 
Treasure 
Silver: 
Dollars:( 
Exports 
English 
351745 
56700 
351745 
56700 
408445 
Export 
;RS.) 
Turkish 
488560 
488560 
385168 
385168 
873728 
NIL 
NIL 
Source: Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 307 of 1818, p. 708 
The volume of trade in 1815 at the port of Jedda alone was 
worth 4 million Dollars of which the major part should have 
comprised imports from India. There was a sharp upward 
movement in the volume of trade from 1815 till 1838, when we 
have another estimate. Jedda still enjoyed its position as the 
leading port, and the major trading activity in the Red Sea 
centred here In 1833 Jedda had ten thousand tons of shipping 
beside large haglas which also carried the same amount of 
shipping ' 
1 Wcllstcd. Vol II. p 297 
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Taking 1801 as the base year the English export from 
Bombay to Red Sea had by 1921 increased three times while 
imports to Bombay had just doubled.* 
Mohammed Ali's customs policy may now be considered. 
In 1798 the rate of customs at Mokha on import of goods of the 
East India Company and British merchants was 3% advalorum. 
This rate was exactly in accordance with customs of 3% 
charged in 1730 if not earlier from the Europeans.^ The 
valuation of goods for customs in all respects was made only in 
accordance with its market price. Surat piece-goods, imported 
by the East India Company or by British merchants, were 
charged 3%. But the customs in this instance was paid not by 
the importing agency but by the purchaser who was made to 
pay the customs."* Customs on piece-goods from "mussalman 
natives" was exacted at 7.5% in Spanish Dollars or in German 
Crowns. The rate again coincides with the figure for 1730 when 
it varied from 5 to 7.5% and that too realized from the "Muslim 
and Hindu"."* The Hindus ("Hindoo"), taken as distinct trading 
1. Sultan Muhammad Al-Qasimi, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, 
London. 1986, p. 230 
2. See statements relative to the duties to be imposed on articles at Mokha 
(1798), Secret and Political Department Diary. No. 366 of the year 1810, 
p. 6807. Also K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English 
East India Company 1660-1760, Cambridge, 1978, p. 370. 
3. Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 366 of the year 1810, p. 6807 
4. Ihid: also K.N. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 370 
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community at Mokha, were subjected to a duty of %V*Vo in 
1798.' 
The mode of customs at Jedda paid by merchants in the 
year 1798 again shows variations. They paid 16% advalorum or 
piece goods which is in sharp contrast to the rate charged at 
Mokha in the same period. Native merchants were charged at 
11% advalorum. On other descriptions of goods like drugs, 
cotton, sugar candy and soft sugar including those articles 
which were calculated by weight. The East India Company and 
other European merchants paid 8% advalorum on all kinds of 
goods.^ 
A change was brought about by Mohammed Ali's treaty 
with East India Company in 1810. Clause 14 of the commercial 
treaty stipulated that Indian raw materials and Indian 
manufactured goods imported into Egypt would pay a uniform 
duty of 3% advalorum either in "kind or coin" whichever was 
demanded by the customs. The duty was deemed payable only 
after the arrival of goods at Cairo.^ 
1. Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 366 of the year 1810, p. 6807. 
2. Ihid. 
3. Ihid, p.6762. Clause 8 of the treaty exempted English merchants from 
payment of duty on goods that only passed through Egypt from India to 
Europe and vice-versa (Ibid. p. 6807). But the customs-incharge was 
empowered to check goods unloaded from British ships belonging to 
British subjects. These ships as a rule had also to carry an exact note or 
invoice of goods. On the other hand, in case goods thus carried sustained 
any damage the Egyptian Government was liable of payment of 
compensation for the damage 
153 
Clause 16 shows Mohammed All's desire for increasing 
trade with the British Empire. As token of encouragement he 
agreed to more customs concessions to the English subjects 
than the native merchants. As such the clause has a provision 
of 15% deduction in customs of goods of Yemeni or Abyssinian 
origins brought by the English subjects into Egyptian territory 
for sale.* The rate of customs on British subjects continued to 
be 3% as in the past. But the demand for a further cut in the 
rate by the English persisted. Clause 17 of the treaty set a 
reciprocal rate of 3% on goods of Egypt exported to Indian 
ports.^ The provision further stipulates, that all articles coming 
from Europe or other parts of Turkey, Syria which have paid 
import duty shall not pay any customs on their being re-
exported from Suez and Cossair. Clause 18 relates to exports of 
goods by British merchants from India, Abyssinia or the states 
of Yemen to Europe or Turkey via Alexandria or Domeitta. On 
such goods as were exported from these countries, customs 
could be exacted only at the time of export. But the customs 
thus charged were to carry a "Terchit receipt" (clearance 
receipt?) to avoid further levies particularly on goods exported 
to Turkey.^ 
I. Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 366 of the year 1810, p. 6762. 
2 Ihid. 
3 Ihid. p 6765. 
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Clause 19 for all practical purposes specifies a customs 
of 3% advalorum on export goods for consumption in Egypt or 
for re-exportation of items like vine and American tobacco 
coming from Malta. The same rate of 3% was fixed for "the 
wine of Indies" as well.' 
Clause 20 of the treaty of 1810 stipulates that those of 
the subjects of the Sublime Porte and those natives of Egypt 
could only trade with India in British ships if they agreed to 
abide by the laws of the East India Company. But ships under 
Turkish colours and with a Turkish crew were deemed at liberty 
to traffic with the subjects of the Indies in every respect at the 
rates allowed to the Company. 
If the Indian goods arrived at Mokha after March 25 
(after 20"* of Nauroz) customs on those goods increased by 50% 
(i.e. 50% of the usual duty). The Customs Master of Surat 
thought the customs charged at the rate of 2V2% from Europeans 
and 7'/2% from Mohammadan subjects to be quite reasonable.^ 
1. Foul dealing by customs authorities of the Red Sea ports, however, cannot 
be ruled out. Besides other anomalies, the customs officers for their 
personal gain brought down the cost of goods by 15 or 20%, Secret and 
Political Department Diary. No. 372 of the year I8ll.op.cit.. p. 1606. 
2. Surat January 10, 1811, Secret and Political Department Diarv. of IS 11 
No. 372. 
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The rate of customs of the year 1811 seems fairly high on 
piece-goods at Jedda. Indian, Arabian and Muslim merchants 
paid 15% on piece-goods. Large bales of Surat, Cambay and 
Patan paid a specified fee of four, six and eight dollars at 
Jedda, Mokha and Basra respectively. Customs on Indian spices 
like pepper, ginger and cinnamons was charged 10% with an 
additional fee of 2'/2%. As against the high rate of customs on 
Indian piece-goods the English goods were charged 8% 
advalorem.' Small bales of Surat, Cambay and Patan were 
charged at 1.25(S.P. $ 1.25?) each at Jedda, Mokha and Basra. 
Bengal rice paid 10%. The rate had just doubled in 1811 as 
against 1773 when the import duty on Bengal goods of all 
descriptions was 5% in Egypt.^ 
The aggregate collection of Jedda port customs in 1814, 
even after much diminution owing to duty-free passing of 
goods, has been estimated at 4,00,000 annually which 
according to Burkhardt would put an annual import of 
1. Customs Master at Surat to Deputy Secretary to Government, Surat 10 
January, 1811, Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 372 of the year 
1811,p. 1606. 
2. Imperial Record Department, Calcutta, Persian Correspondence (being 
letters which passed between some of the Company's servants and Indian 
rulers and notables, preserved at the National Archives, New Delhi), p. 
121. Also Secret and Political Department Diary, No. 372 of the year 
1811,p. 1601. 
156 
approximately 4 million dollars, "a sum certainly below rather 
than above the truth'.' Burkhardt says that the customs rate 
was uniform at all ports under the jurisdiction of the Pasha of 
Egypt during his visits.' 
In a second treaty formally ratified, with the merchants of 
Jedda, a demand for payment of joint-customs by ships, both of 
Suez and Jedda at the customs house of Suez was made by the 
Pasha of Egypt. The rate of customs was initially fixed at 12% 
but was reduced to 9% upon all imports into Suez from India 
which was 6% more that the usual customs charged on 
European goods at the ports of the Turkish Sultan. The 
arrangement was hopefully made to bring about an opening of 
brisk commerce with Egypt.^ 
A treaty was signed between Captain Bruce with the 
Imam of Sanaa on 15 January 1821. The Imam agreed to a 
reduction of VA% against previous rate of 3% on all British 
1. John Lewis Burkhardt, Travels in Arabia (2 Vols.), London, 1829, Vol. 1, 
p. 94. Out of the total collection of customs of Jedda 1/3 and subsequently 
Vi of it was shared by the Sherif of Mecca. The term for customs at Jedda 
was ashour and it was fixed at 10% but abuses sometimes led to over-
rating and sometimes under-rating {Ibid., pp. 88-89). Burckhardt is of the 
view that Pasha of Egypt took possession of all harbours and customs 
houses of Hejaz. He was under the impression that the Pasha was aiming 
to shift the customs of Jedda to Suez, a prelude to a plan to maintain direct 
link with India. But the Jeddan merchants would not let the scheme be 
given practical shape (Ibid., p. 38) 
2. Burkhardt, op. cit., pp. 435-36. 
3. Political Department, Vol. ]4/34 of 1820-21, pp. 398-99 
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exports and imports. Madodas Ransordas in his petition of 4 
April 1821 to Charles Coville, acting Governor in Council, says 
that the Imam of Sanaa levied tax on pilgrims besides exactions 
on coffee. Thus the total income accruing from customs alone 
amounted to a sum of 12,000,00 (Rs.?).* 
However, the customs rates charged at Mokha and Jedda 
for some years following Burkhardt's visit to the Red Sea 
regions are not available. The subsequent information is related 
to the year 1822. In this year a commercial treaty signed 
between Hutchinson, the British Resident at Aden, and the 
Sultan of Aden (Lohaje) stipulates fixation of a uniform rate of 
customs of 2VAVO on all imports and exports by British subjects, 
Europeans or Indians.^ British ships according to the treaty 
were exempted from payment of anchorage duty as well. 
The British Resident at Mokha in his letter of 22'August 
1824 addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Government at 
Bombay says the rate of customs charged by the Imam was 3% 
on all imports and exports above which a nominal amount of 
hatta also was charged. This action of Imam in the opinion of 
the Resident was in violation of the provision of the treaty of 
15 January 1821, which stipulated in its article 7 that "no more 
1. Political Department, Vol. 14/34 of 1820-21, pp. 398-99. 
2. Ibid. 
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shall be levied than 2!/4% upon Imports and Exports".' 
However, before the reduction to IVAVO, the normal duty 
charged on British exports and imports at Mokha had been 3%. 
The same rate of customs of 2Vi% was also charged from 
French at Mokha. 
The superintendent at Bombay writing to Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, Governor in Council, dated Bombay, July 27, 
1826, says that Mohammed Ali's merchant ships that came 
from Jedda to Bombay harbour paid the customary "Light 
House dues" annually, and pilotage fee, forty rupees more than 
English merchants ships."^ Besides, as a token of reciprocal 
measure the East India Company levied the same rate of 
customs on Jeddan vessels at Bombay which the Company paid 
at the Jedda port.^ Evidence suggests that the rate of customs 
charged at the ports of Mohammed Ali and the Sherif of Mecca 
and that on Indian ports under the jurisdiction of the East India 
Company was reciprocal: 
"Instances have occurred where the Shereef of 
Jedda has exacted heavy duties of the Company's 
1. Political Department, Vol. 22/166 of 1824, pp. 398-99. 
2. Mokha Residency, 22 August 1824, Political Department, Vol. 22/166 of 
1824, pp. 120-23 
3. Political Department, Vol. 238 of 1826, pp. 124-25 
4. /Z»/W., pp. 68-69 
159 
woolens and we have retaliated by directing the 
same duties to he levied on the Judda vessels 
trading at Bombay and Surat".^ 
J.R. Wellsted (1831) informs us that the rate of customs 
of Jedda and Yembo (another port under the Pasha's 
jurisdiction) was 10%. But goods imported into Yembo from 
Jedda under "Exemption Certificate" by the Customs master of 
Jedda was let in duty-free at Yembo. Commercially Aden had 
dwindled by the third decade of the \9^^ century, only waiting 
to be declared as British protectorate in 1838. However, the 
customs duty there too was 2V2% on all imports and exports 
besides normal harbour dues.^ Makalla, another Red Sea port 
under Mohammed Ali charged a uniform rate of 10% in 1834. 
Ships called at Makalla to evade exorbitant rate of customs 
charged at other ports of the Red Sea.^ Owing to his policy of 
customs concessions Mohammed Ali is said to have lowered the 
rate of customs of Makalla from 10% to 5%.* 
From a treaty between the British and the Turkish 
Government in 1856 it appears that dual jurisdiction prevailed 
in the Red Sea, that is, of the Ottomans and that of the 
1. Mocha Residency, a minutes of 11 May 1826 by W. Warden, Political 
Department, Vol. 238 of 1826. pp. 68-69 
2. JR. Wellsted, Vol. II, pp. 215-16 
3. Jhid, p. 397 
4. Ibid 
5. Ibid. 
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Egyptian ruler. The treaty deemed the British commerce in the 
Red Sea exempt from all charges except the regular customs 
duties.* 
It can be seen that Mohammed Ali's efforts were largely 
successful in establishing a fairly regular customs structure, 
with such exceptions as Yemen, where he did not exercise 
much control. This effort accorded with British commercial 
interests in the region, so that no conflict could arise. Egypt 
was still economically too weak commercially and industrially 
to benefit from such protective measures as Mohammed AH 
undertook domestically. Perhaps, this was the reason why his 
customs measures do not particularly reflect a real policy of 
protection. 
1. Secretary to Government to the Acting Vice-Consul, Bombay Castle, April 
1, 1^56. Political Department. Vol. 34 of 1856-57. p. 7^. 
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(B) Merchants In The Arabian Sea Trade, First 
Half, le*** Century 
As we have seen India had considerable trade with the 
countries of the Middle East. The records of the East India 
Company give us detailed accounts of their shipping which also 
shed some light on indigenous shipping, magnitude of trade and 
nature and composition of commodities as well as commercial 
practices in Indian and overseas markets. Such infromation 
has, however, to be culled from documents relating to 
individual cases. 
We may begin by considering the case of Madowdass 
Ransordass, a banya merchant and inhabitant of Bombay who 
carried on regular trade with the Red Sea, both with ports under 
the Imam of Yemen and other ports of the Red Sea, particularly 
Jedda. The correspondence of Madowdass with the official of 
the East India Company at different intervals of time, deals 
often with claims against the authorities of Yemen on account 
of losses sustained by him.* 
In a letter of 5 April 1820 referring to Madowdass 
Ransordass's earlier petition, Francis Warden, Chief Secretary 
I Political Department, op. cit.. Vol. 28/33 of 1820, p. 47 
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to the Bombay Government, speaks of having forwarded his 
petition to the officer in charge of the Residency at Mokha who 
was directed to make use of his good offices with the Imam of 
Sanaa for the recovery of his claims.* Another petition 
concerns the plunder of cargo of his ghorab Bombay Merchant. 
It is addressed to Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of 
Bombay. Madowdass says that after having called at the ports 
of Mokha and Hodaida the vessel arrived at the port of Lohaja 
on 26 June 1820 where beduin Arabs attacked the vessel and 
plundered cargo belonging to him worth $15000. The goods of 
several other merchants as well were plundered. Madowdass 
requests the chief secretary to help him obtain compensation 
from the Imam of Sanaa.^ In another petition to Elphinstone 19 
August 1820 he first refers to the Bombay Government's 
blockade of the port of Mokha and other ports under the Imam 
of Sanaa. Long before the proclamation of the blockade 
Madowdass had dispatched to Mokha his cargo on the ghorab 
(brig), the Bombay Merchant, and merchandise worth 
Rs. 130,000 on other vessels from Bombay and Calcutta. The 
goods were consigned to his agents Gangadass Munjee and 
Jairam Dayal who had left Bombay for Mokha and other places 
in the Red Sea in December 1819: they were to dispose off the 
1. Political Department, op. cit., 28/33 of 1820-21, p. 72 
2. Ibid. 
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goods and send return cargo purchased from the proceeds of 
sale. He solicited the protection of his cargo and vessels by the 
officers incharge of the blockade since they formed property of 
a British subject. The commander of the squadron was 
thereupon asked to protect the vessels upon the application of 
the ships' captains and the agents of Madowdass Ransordass, 
provided they were within the limits of the area of blockade.* 
Madowdass again submitted a petition to Francis Warden, Chief 
Secretary of Bombay, dated Bombay, 21 March 1821. In the 
petition hope is expressed for speedy recovery of the amount of 
his claim provided his agent at Lohaja or Mokha could manage 
to get the claim admitted by the Imam} If so Madowdass would 
accept it in instalments from the customs collected at Mokha.** 
Madowdass Ransordass wrote to Charles Colville, the 
Acting Governor, on 29 March 1821. Here he identifies himself 
as a 'Banya', and informs the Governor of the departure of 
many vessels of the season, expected to sail to Mokha within 3 
or 4 days. He asked for British Residents intercession at Mokha 
on his behalf.** Colville received another petition from 
Madowdass Ransordass dated Bombay, 4 April 1821. This 
1. Political Department, Vol. 28/33 of 1820, pp. 29-30 
2. Bombay, 21 March 1821, Ibid., p. 68 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., pp. 66-69. The exact object, however, does not appear in the 
petition. 
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thanks Government for help in recovering losses sustained at 
Lohaja. Madowdass further claims to have conducted trade for 
many years with the ports of the Red Sea. He has also 
knowledge of the financial resources of the Imam which he 
derives from customs: coffee duties and tax on pilgrims to 
Mecca. Thus the total income accruing from all the above 
sources amounted to $12,00,000. Finally the petitioner requests 
the acting Government to help him get indemnification for the 
loss that he has sustained. In the post script he also informs of 
the schedule of the sailing of a ship from Bombay to Mokha.* 
In another letter of 21 July 1820 to Francis Warden, 
Madowdass seeks his indulgence in the matter of his claims on 
the Government of Sanaa regarding his property plundered at 
Lohaja. The petitioner expressed strong hopes of some 
satisfactory arrangement through the British authorities for 
collection of his claims out of the customs of Mokha in 
instalments.^ 
Another petition was submitted to Elphinstone, on 27 
September 1821. The petitioner (Madhowdass) says that in 
March 1820 he sent from the port of Bombay his ghorab, 
1. Political Department, Vol. 28/33 of 1820-21, pp. 70-71 
2. Ibid., p. 78. The petition of Madowdass Ransordass, however, was directed 
by the Governor in Council to be translated by the petitioner to the 
Resident at Mokha, Francis Warden, Chief Secretary to the Resident at 
Mokha. 20th November 1821. Political Department. Ihid., p. 91. 
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Bombay Merchant whose Captain was Henry William Hyland. 
The cargo consisted of goods bound for the ports of Mokha, 
Hodaida and Lohaja under the jurisdiction of the Imam of 
Sanaa. The Bombay Merchant having touched the ports of 
Mokha and Hodaida arrived at the port of Lohaja in June 1820 
and landed her cargo there. The cargo consisted of sundry 
goods, pearls and dollars. The petitioner refers to having sent 
several ships prior to the Bombay merchant. 
Soon after having landed from the Bombay Merchant the 
petitioner's super-cargo was made aware of the appearance of 
"wandering Arabs". Henry William Hyland requested the 
Daulah (port governor) to refund customs paid to enable him to 
reload the unloaded cargo, but the Daulah refused to grant 
permission, assuring the super-cargo of protection from any 
disturbance. But the Arabs made a surprise attack and 
plundered all the goods of petitioner which amounted to about 
$15,000 in value as well as dollars in coin together with goods 
of several other merchants which ran into lakhs. The plundered 
property amounted! to 10 lakhs of dollars. This statement was 
supported by an affidavit from the master of the petitioner's 
Ghorab, W. John Lawrence Morley. Madowdass, a subject of 
the English holding a passport issued by the Company's 
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authority, requested the Government to submit a claim on 
petitioner's behalf to the Imam of Sanaa.* 
The petition by Madowdass is referred to in the letter of 
Francis Warden, addressed to the Resident at Mokha dated 20 
November 1821. Madowdass also submitted a copy of the 
petition on 12 November respecting his claims against the 
Imam of Sanaa.^ 
In another petition (12 November 1821) submitted to 
Francis Warden Madowdass thanks the chief secretary for his 
favourable response (July 1821) regarding his claim on the 
Imam of Sanaa for his property plunder of cargo at Lohaja.^ He 
also expresses hope of some arrangement by the British 
authorities at Mokha would pay him out of the customs of 
Mokha.•• 
After a period of six years Madowdass Ransordass was 
still in the hope of recovery of the claim of the losses. He was 
of the view that the Governor Mountstuart Elphinstone could 
i. The petition of the claim submitted by Madowdass is further confirmed by 
the letter of Francis Warden, Chief Secretary to the Government, 
addressed to the Resident at Mokha. Madowdass seems to have submitted a 
copy of the petition on 12' of November representing his claims on the 
Imam of Sanaa. The letter was written on 20 November 1821. Political 
Department, Vol. 28/33 of 1820-21, p. 81, 97-98 
2. Political Department. Vol. 28/33 of 1820-21, p. 81,97-98. 
3. A correspondence of Francis Warden, Chief Secretary to the Government, 
dated 21 July 1821 is in response to the Secretary Henderson who is said 
to have made inquiry of Madowdass Ransordass. The reply is obviously 
not encouraging as far as recovery at Lohaja is concerned. Political 
Department, vol. 28/33 of 1820-21. p. 76. 
4. M/c/..p. 78 
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have secured indemnification from the Imam of Sanaa. In a 
strongly worded statement he says that only through the board 
of the Governor was indemnification possible. If the 
Company's authority failed to effect recovery, "the English 
flag will be poor protection to commerce".' He proposes that 
the duty on goods he was sending to Mokha be freed of tax 
towards liquidation of his claim.^ 
Owing to the blockade of the ports of the Imam and 
embargo against vessels entering those ports, Indian merchants 
suffered considerable losses. The blockade of Sanaa by the 
squadron of the East India Company took place in April 1820. 
Its main purpose was to stop the flow of trade of all the ports 
of the Imam of Sanaa and inflict punishment on the offending 
Daulah of Mokha, indemnification of losses sustained by the 
Company and individuals and satisfaction for other offences 
and injuries.^ 
In a letter by the Secret Department of the Company to 
the Chief at Surat written from Bombay Castle, IS"* July 1820, 
describes the plan of the blockade. The native merchants of 
1. Polttical Department. Vol. 18/203 of 1825, p. 162 
2. Madowdass Ransordass (sig. in Guj?irati), Bombay, 15 November 1825 to 
Mountstuart Elphinstone. President and Governor in Council, Political 
Department of 1825, pp 162-63 
^ Ihul. 
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Surat were warned not to venture out to trade with the ports 
belonging to the Imam of Sanaa. 
There is a petition by 24 merchants, resident at Surat, 
who were regular traders with the ports of the Red Sen. It is 
addressed to Mountstuart Elphinstone, August 1820. The names 
of some of these merchants are Abdullah Wakil, Mulla 
Ruknuddin Ali, Ibrahim bin Ahmad and Al-Sayyid Abdur 
Rahman. It recites that the Surat merchants were in formed by 
the Chief of Surat that owing to war between the Company's 
troops and the Hakim of Sanaa the traders had to keep 
themselves away from the ports of the Imam. The 
Representative's report suggests that there had been very 
meagre demand for goods sent to Mokha and Hodaida the 
previous season. The agents also communicated that only 50% 
of goods could be sold by them and the other 50% had to be 
stored in the ware-houses of their agents. These agents 
included Abdul Karim, Virjee, Ranchorjee Chuttorbhoja, 
Girdher Bhanjee, Ukbhoy Vussonjee, Moolji Khodudof, 
Sewchund Chuttorbhiz, and Roopjee Freccomjee Velljee. The 
petitioners, being apprehensive of the plunder of their goods by 
I. I. Henderson, Secretary to the Government, Bombay Castle, 18th July 
1820, Ihici., Vol. 14/34 'of 1820. p 43 
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the Ruler of Sanaa, requested the President and Governor in 
Council to instruct the officers incharge of the blockade to 
ensure protection of their goods and ships together with the 
agents themselves. 
The petitioners agreed that the remaining 50% of their 
goods could be stored at Mokha though much loss was caused 
to them on this account. Money too remained uncollected 
owing to which there would be adverse effect on their credit 
with the bankers.* In response to this petition the Chief 
Secretary to the Bombay Government (18*'' August 1820), 
repeated a warning to guard against their embarking on trade 
with the ports belonging to the Imam of Sanaa at the opening of 
the season.^ 
Prajee Guness, yet another petitioner, tells of having sent 
good and merchandize to the ports of the Imam of Sanaa from 
Mandvee and Mongrol worth approximately Rs. 60,000. The 
goods were consigned to the petitioner's agents Herchand 
Moolchand and Primchand lacckad and Kanjee Vatta in 
different vessels. Prajee Guness, apprehensive of serious 
1. Political Department, Vol. 28/33 of 1820-21, p. 40. The petition was 
addressed to the Governor in Council by the merchants trading to the Red 
Sea. This was dated Surat 9 August 1820, Political Department, Vol. 28/33 
of the year 1820-21, p. 41 
2. Political Department, Vol. 14/34 of 1820/21, pp.92-93. 
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consequences to his cargo and vessel, requested the Bombay 
Government to communicate to officers incharge of blockade to 
protect his goods as well as those of his agents which had been 
landed there. The petitioner also requested permission to carry 
on trade with such other ports not under blockade as the 
officers of the squadron might deem expedient.' 
Motichand Ameechand writes to Francis Warden, Chief 
Secretary to Government, Bombay, lO**" August 1820, infroming 
him that he had shipped to Mokha and other ports under the 
Imam of Sanaa considerable quantities of merchandize before 
the declaration of the blockade. He too is apprehensive of 
severe loss of cargo, and complained that the British authorities 
should have permitted the vessels to clear out before the 
declaration of the blocka.de. He expresses the hope that the 
Government would communicate to the officers incharge of the 
blockade to ensure safety of his vessels and goods and help 
prevent confiscation of goods loaded in the /mam's territories. 
Subsequently, he requests the Secretary to allow him to trade 
with such territories of Imam as were not under blockade.^ 
1. Prajee Guness. Bombay 20 August, 1820, to Francis Warden, Chief 
Secretary to Government, Political Department, Vol.28'33 of 1820-21, 
2. Potidcal l\-pLirimL-ni. Vol. 28/33 of 1820-21, pp. 31-.^ 2 
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Dhrumsey Hemchand in his petition of 20 August 1820 
addressed to Francis Warden, Chief Secretary to Government, 
seeks protection of his ships and its cargo worth Rs.65,000. 
Before the declaration of blockade the consigner had shipped 
his cargo to the ports of the Imam, comprising considerable 
quantities of merchandise from Bombay, Bengal and 
Porebander to the value of approximately Rs.65,000. These 
were consigned to the petitioner's agents Guness, Mogchand 
and Moteechand Vuchraz and Dual Amerchand. The petitioner 
was apprehensive of most serious loss, since the "Dow 
Dhamee" and different other vessels are still in the Red Sea.* 
Another petition to Francis Warden, is from Ameechand 
Kemjee written Bombay 22 August 1820. The petitioner refers 
to the late proclamation declaring Mokha and other ports 
belonging to the Imam of Sanaa under the state of blockade. He 
submits that before the proclamation the petitioner had shipped 
to the ports of the Imam considerable goods and merchandize 
from Porebander and Bombay worth nearly Rs.50,000, 
consigned to his agents Modowji Verji, Tayroz Damoder lewa 
Lowjee and Damoder Anjee for the 'Dinging (Dingy) Bombay 
named Gunesspura, belonging to the petitioner. It sailed to the 
1. Political Department., vol. 28-33 of 1820-21, pp.33-34. 
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ports under the Imam of Sanaa together with other vessels. The 
petition too sought the Company's help to prevent confiscation 
of the goods landed in the territories of the Imam and 
permission to trade in the areas the Company's officers might 
deem expedient.' 
In a dispatch of 22"'* August 1820, 1. Henderson, 
Secretary to Government, wrote to Captain Bruce, perhaps 
Resident at Mokha, enclosing a copy of the letter from 
Ameechand Kemjee.^ A petition Bombay 22""* August 1820 was 
submitted by Maow Seaskaran Heerjee, the East India 
Company's broker at Mokha. He says in his petition that long 
before the proclamation of Imam's ports being placed under a 
state of blockade, he had dispatched cargo on board the vessels 
sailing from Bombay, Porebandar, Mangalore and Kutch, for 
Mokha, Hodaida and qther ports. These goods were to the value 
of some lakhs of rupees to be delivered to the petitioner's own 
shop at Mokha but 
Company's broker at 
consigned to Seaskaran Heerjee, the 
Mokha, for disposal at other places as 
well. The petitioner requests the president to order the officers 
Ameechand and Kemjee to Francis Warden, Chief Secretary to 
Government, Bombay, 22 August 1820, Political Department, Vol. 28/33 
of 1820-21, PP.24-25. 
I. Henderson. Secretary to Government. 22 August 1820, Ibid. 
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employed in the blockade to protect the vessels and goods and 
property belonging to him as a British subject. But this could 
only be done on the application of the commanders of the 
petitioner's vessels either on his behalf or on the behalf of his 
agents, wherever they are within the limits of the 
proclamation.' The letter was forwarded by 1. Henderson from 
Bombay Castle on IT^ August 1820 asking the Mokha 
Resident, Captain H. Bruce, to protect the property of the 
petitioner.^ 
In his petition of 23 August 1820 to Francis Warden, 
Chief Secretary, Bombay, Heerji identifies himself as the 
Company's broker at Mokha. He explains that money had been 
extorted from him by the Daulah of Mokha with a promise to 
allow the petitioner a credit in the customs. Instead the Daulah 
put a chain in his neck regardless of the consideration that he 
was the Company's broker. The Governor also fined the 
petitioner's men who were on their way to Mokha from India 
on business.•* Seaskaran Heerjee further speaks of having 
sent several vessels from Bombay, Cutch, Porebander, Veraval 
and Mangalore for Mokha. In his petition he requests the Chief 
1. Nanjee Seaskaran for Maow Seaskaran Heerjee at Mokha, the Company's 
broker, Bombay, 22 August 1820, to Mountstuart Elphinstone, Political 
Department, Vol.28 33 of 1820-21, p. 22. 
2. Ihid. 
3. Ihid.. p. 36. 
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Secretary to Government to grant him a letter so as to enable 
him to send it to the officers incharge of the blockade seeking 
their assistance against any injury from the Arabs. He also 
requests the Secretary to the Government to instruct the 
English authorities at Mokha to obtain reimbursement of the 
money extorted from him by the Daulah and take measures 
against further molestation.' In another letter to Francis 
Warden, Bombay 28 August 1820, Heerjee reports a famine in 
Yemen owing to which there was little sale of goods especially 
piece-goods that he had obtained from Surat. He further 
reports the dispatch of an army from Yemen and plunder of 
Lohaja for 15 days. Owing to the plunder merchants had fled to 
upper country and some to Kamran.^ The market at Jedda also 
was unfavourable for the sale of Bengal and Surat piece-goods. 
The coffee price had risen to 110-112 and 115 a bhar. He 
speaks of sending his dhow Salamat Ras. He informs the Chief 
Secretary for having sent one bag of coffee of SOlbs. and a jar 
of preserves on his ship and hoped the addressee would accept 
1, Political Department. Vol. 28/33 of 1820-21, p. 36. 
2. The incident finds mention in another letter of Seaskaran Heeji addressed 
to Mountstuart Elephinstone dated 6th Sharavumuud 1876/29 August 1820. 
It mentions the plunder of Sohar by the Imam's army (27"' June-lO"' July) 
and fleeing of the banya and Arab merchants to the island of Kamran and 
of the great losses sustained by them. Translation in Political and Secret 
Department, Vol. 36 2 of 1820-21, pp. 224-234. 
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it and favour him with a letter.* Yet another letter of Seaskaran 
Heerjee addressed to the Governor Elphinstone is dated S**" of 
Mahasood/8 February 1821. In this letter he says the present 
times were unfavourable owing to a very low state of trade. 
The household expenses were very high. 
Bheemjee Callianjee was the son of Seaskaran Heerjee. 
He commanded great respect among the Bombay merchants, 
and the East India Company owed a large sum of money to his 
firm. By the end of the 1820s the firm was already 150 years 
old.^ At Mokha particularly the firm had always supplied 
broker's services to the British Factory and Seaskaran Heerjee 
could with pride appeal to the Records of Government in proof 
of these services."* Seaskaran was always loyal to the English 
East India Company, and transaction between the Imam and the 
Company were generally executed through him. He enjoyed 
protection of the Company as well. Seaskaran in 1817 also 
saved a European vessel and its valuable cargo from plunder. 
He complained of the conduct of the Daulah, on the basis of 
which the Daulah was dismissed and the property of the vessel 
restored to the English authorities.^ 
1 Political and Secret Department (Turkish Arabia and Mokha), Vol. 36/2 of 
1820-21,p 219 
2 Ihid., p 38 
3. Political Department, Vol 57/500 of 1831/32/33,pl9. 
4 Ihid. 
5 Ihid 
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Bhimjee Callianjee in a letter to G.W. Anderson, 
Governor in Council (undated) reminds him that in 1824 the 
petitioner then resident at Mokha shipped on board the Brig 
May Anne under commander Lingard, a large quantity of coffee 
in 100 large bales and 25 small bales, to his agents at Bombay. 
While on her voyage the ship was seized by pirates of Barbara 
and plundered. Callianji says that he is aware of the fact that 
considerable sums of money had been recovered from time to 
time by the English Government from the "smattee" tribe of 
Barbara. He resquests that a portion of the amount so recovered 
be paid to the petitioner. Captain Lingard himself came to 
Bombay in 1825 when the General Pay Master was directed to 
advance a sum of money for support under a promise of 
repayment after the recovery of the property or its value from 
the chiefs of Barbara. The first estimate of the total loss 
according to Captain Lingard submitted to the English 
Government was S.$37,833 (Spanish Dollars), subsequently 
various categories of losses such as profit, interest, etc. were 
added to the total and the amount of claim was enhanced to S. 
$72,732. But the petition for the enhanced amount was rejected 
by the Governor in Council. In any future settlement of Captain 
Lingard's claims the Government was to be guided only by the 
first statement of the loss. 
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On account of stesrn measures taken by the English, the 
Shaikhs of Barbara on 6 February 1827 entered into an 
agreement with Captain Brumer, the commander of H.M. Tomar 
and agreed to pay S. $15,000 (Rs.32,227.2.63) in full payment 
of all demands which were made upon them on account of the 
plunder of Mary Anne. 
The total amount received by Captain Lingard towards his 
claim from T* to last as compensation for his losses was S. 
$33,718.3.20 which was equivalent to Rs.14,91,000.0.57 which 
is said to be in excess of the amount recovered by the 
Government from the Shaikhs of Barbara.' 
In his notice of information to the Board Captain Lingard 
gives the following inventory of goods which was consigned to 
Bombay on board his Brig.Mary Anne: Bheemjee's 100 large 
Muscati Bales of coffee, that of Residency Moonshi's large 
English Bales of coffee and an Arab merchant's 27 large Bales 
of Gum Arabic. All these goods were taken aboard at Mokha 
and consigned to Bombay. These were seized along with the 
property of Captain Lingard. In response the instruction was 
communicated to Captain Bremer on 20 December 1826 to 
proceed against the Shaikhs of Barbara. Captain Ligard thus 
1. Political Department, Vol. 1260 of 184-42, pp.117-18. 
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reposed his confidence and property under the protection of the 
British flag. 
Captain Bremer in his report says that a compromise was 
arrived at with the Shaikhs for a sum of S. Rs. 15,000 (Rs. 
32,227.2.63) which was less than the moiety of the admitted 
claims submitted by Captain Lingard. A sum of Rs. 1491.0.57 
was actually paid to Captain Lingard by the Government so that 
the Government was a looser to the extent of the latter amount 
in addition to the expense of the measures adopted against the 
Shaikhs.^ 
We have then a petition to George Arthor Bart, 
Government and Resident in Council, by Bheemji Callianjee (a 
Hindu merchant formerly of Mokha and now of Bombay) dated 
10 October 1842. He acknowledges receipt of reply in response 
to his application from the Secretary Willoughby dated 18 June 
1842 that the petitioner's claim on account of the loss of his 
coffee by the plunder of the Brig Mary Anne in 1824 by the 
1. Political and Secret Department, Vol. 1260 of 1841 and 1842, p. 110. In 
the post script there is a reply to Bheemjee's earlier petition by Secretary, 
Government of Bombay, 21 June 1842, in which he refuses to entertain his 
claim after such a considerable lapse of time. A forwarding letter by the 
solicitor of Bheemjee is also mentioned in the document. It is addressed to 
L.R. Reid, Secretary to Government. The solicitor refers to a petition of 
his client relative to return of cargo shipped by him at Mokha in 1824 
(1825?). The cargo was shipped on board the Brig Anne and was plundered 
by pirates. Ihid.. op.cit. 
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natives of Barbara could not be entertained owing to the delay 
in advancing his claims, a settlement of the claims of victims 
of the plunder of that ship having already been made. Bhimjee 
asserted that he had submitted his claim well in time but the 
procedure adopted by the Government for the recovery of the 
goods seized by the Barbara Arabs was made known to the 
petitioner by the Chief Secretary only after his return from 
Mokha to Bombay.* Bheemji, however, says that he was as 
much a sufferer as Captain Lingard. But the latter was 
compensated to the amount of about Rs. 35,000 for his losses. 
He accuses British Government of acting with partiality in such 
cases as the one under consideration. He blames the 
Government for not making him aware of even the amount that 
the Government received from the Shaikhs of Barbara. 
Whatever amount had been received should have been divided 
among all the victims.^ 
It appears that Company withdrew its favour from 
Bheemjee after he had left its service. In one of his petitions 
Bheemjee is seen complaining that his firm has suffered on 
account of the authorities at Mokha for having withheld 
1. Political Department. Vol. 1260 of 1841-42, ^\). 122-26. 
2. Ihid. 
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business from the House of Seskaran Heerjee whereas the fact 
was that the Company still owed a large sum of money to the 
firm. From the period the Company's affairs were conducted 
by the House of Seaskarn Heerji, money was owed by persons 
in authority both at Mokha and other ports in the Red Sea.* 
Bheemji Callianji left Mokha in 1827 leaving the firm 
under the charge of his brother Petamber Callianji: The English 
Factory too was removed from Mokha to Aden. Bheemji's 
request to the Company to appoint his brother permanently as 
broker went unheeded. Instead he was dismissed from his 
temporary service as broker and in his place another person was 
appointed. Meanwhile Bheemji's brother died of plague.^ 
By 1827 the Establishment of Seaskaran (Seshkurn) at 
Mokha and in the Red Sea had fairly well prospered."* However, 
Bheemji took his removal from the Company's service as 
broker as a disgrace for a man of his stature. He, therefore, 
suspected conspiracy behind it and wanted to know the charges. 
But his plea went unheeded. From 1827 up to 1832 Bheemji 
remained at Porebnander. He desired a relation of his. 
1. Political Department, vol. 57/500 of 1831/32/33, p. 22. 
2. Political Department, vol. 57 500 of 1831/32/33. 
I. {hid., f^. 11. 
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Russordas (Ransordass) Ameechand to be appointed broker, as 
representing the House of Seaskaran Heerji, at Mokha. He also 
requested the Governor in Council to order his subordinates at 
Mokha to provide protection to the firm that it may carry on its 
business peacefully.* Bhimji's pleas were again rejected by the 
Governor in Council on 22 April 1832.^ 
One may insert here a tabular statement of goods shipped 
by Indian merchants from Bombay on board the Ghorab or 
Brig. Bombay Merchant under the command of Captain Henry 
William Hyland and plundered at Lohaja as showing the kinds 
of goods that were exported from Bombay to the Red Sea 
during the first half of the 19"" Century: 
GOODS OF PRAGEE GANESH 
ITEM 
Cambay piece goods 
Surat piece goods 
Malabar gagrey 
Kapoor kachery 
QUANTITY 
2 Bales 
I Bale 
16 Robbins 
2 Chests 
The expences, charges or freight fee on the 
above goods at the rate of 35% a hundred: Rs. 
Total Rs. 
TOTAL VALUE (Rs.) 
6025 
1325 
125 
30 
2636 
10165 
1. Political Department, vol.57 500 of 1831/32/33. p. 25 
2. I hid. 
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GOODS OF DHARAMSEY HEMCHAND 
ITEM 
Cambay piece goods 
Cutch piece goods 
QUANTITY 
1 Bale 
5 Bales 
The expences, charges or freight fee on the 
above goods at the rate of 35% a hundred: Rs. 
Total Rs. 
TOTAL VALUE (Rs.) 
3025 
1350 
1530 
5905 
GOODS OF RAMCHAND LALLJEE 
ITEM 
Cambay piece goods 
QUANTITY 
1 Bale 
The expences, charges or freight fee on the 
above goods at the rate of 35% a hundred:Rs. 
Total Rs. 
TOTAL VALUE (Rs.) 
2750 
965 
3712 
Grand Total Rs. 19782 
The personal assistant to the Resident, Mokha in a letter 
dated T' October 1825 to Chief Secretary to Government refers 
to a complaint made by several merchants of the use of force 
and violence in the Mokha Customs House. The Nakhuda of the 
ship concerned was persuaded to let the cargo remain on board 
the ship till some arrangement with the Daulah was made.^ It 
was soon settled that payment of customs be made, and there 
should be a deduction on account of the annual purchases of 
goods for the household of the Imam.^ He was, however. 
1. Political Department. Vol. 14/34 of 1820-21, p. 428 (No.2 of 1821) 
2. //)/J.. Vol. 238 of 1826. pp.7-9. 
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surprised to learn that the merchants had landed every bale, 
paid Rs. 8,000 in advance of customs and sold to the Daulah 
voluntarily double that amount in goods to the very person 
against whom such a serious complaint had been lodged. 
These merchants wrongly asserted that they had taken the 
Qazi,s security for the payment. So far as the settlement of 
accounts was concerned, the Daulah declared his inability to 
pay more than a portion of the claim against him and agreed to 
return the rest of the goods. Therefore the merchants were 
recommended the terms offered by the Daulah, awaiting a 
reference to the Imam. However, they agreed to the former 
suggestion and left a claim against the local Government of 
nearly $8,000, but it was difficult for them to recover this 
sum.' 
Another document is a letter written by Chief Secretary 
to the Resident at Mokha, B. Dominicitte addressed to Henry 
Meriton, Superintendent of Marine. The letter is undated. It 
reports the arrival of Derria Beggy to Mokha from Jedda, it 
being understood that her destination was Bombay. Indian 
merchants as well as Ramsay and the writer were of strong 
belief that the vessel belonged to Mohammad Ali Khan whereas 
1 Political Department. Vol 23H of IH26, pp. 7-9 
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the ship was engaged by Abdur Rahman Azil. The ship was 
loaded with cargo of coffee for the East India Company and 
Surat merchants. Coffee was also consigned to other ports in 
India (the names of ports not mentioned). The specie consigned 
to Bombay by the ship amounted to G.C.(German Crown) VA 
lakhs ^ 
The Derria Beggy would be the first vessel that would 
sail from Mokha to India positively on or before 29 July 1824. 
But immediately after a letter of protest jointly signed by the 
merchants arrived from Jedda asking the Company not to allow 
their treasure being put on board the Derria Beggy because the 
ship was sailing under suspicious circumstances and belonged 
to a man of a bad character.^ Not even a single merchant at 
Jedda would deem it safe to trust their money on board the 
Derria Beggy. The merchants were alarmed when Said Aqil 
publicly asserted that the Derria Beggy was an enterprise of his 
eldest brother, the Daulah of Zofar (Dofar). The English were 
in search of that man since much earlier. As the merchants 
expressed serious concern over the safety of their money there 
had also cropped up some misunderstanding between the 
1. Political Department. Vol. 22/166 of 1824, p.50 (48-106). 
2. Ihid., Vol.. 22'166 ofhS24, p.50 (48-106) 
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English and the Mokha Government.* The merchants assembled 
at the Factory. They were advised by the Chief Secretary to 
adhere to their own judgements to act as they thought best, as 
the property was their own.^ Thus on 23 August 1824 the 
merchants landed back their money though they had paid the 
freight charges to the Nakhuda, and these were not refunded. In 
the meantime the Derria Beggy seems to have completed 
loading its cargo. The reason for the vessel's further delay on 
Mokha road for a fortnight was not made known. According to 
the information available to the Chief Secretary the news 
circulated in Mokha that Said Abdur Rahman did so and that 
too intentionally to collect the entire goods and treasure and 
make his way to Zofar where he would share it with his eldest 
brother and sell the vessel and escape into the interior. The 
Chief Secretary was therefore not in favour of Derria Beggy 
leaving Mokha for Bombay. 
The Nakhuda of the vessel visited the Factory but once 
only.^ 
Coupled with the reasons stated above and Said Aqil's 
breach of agreement to sail on the 19"" or 20"" July 1824 the 
1. Political Department. Vol. 22'166 of 1824, p. 53. 
2. Ihid 
1. Political Department, Vol.22 166 of 1824. pp. 48-106. 
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Chief Secretary sent his men for the purpose of preventing any 
more freight coming on board the ship. From reliable sources 
the Secretary was infromed that it was for more treasure that he 
remained on the roads. He was also of the intention that he 
would stop till most of the vessels bound to different ports of 
India had taken their final departure from the Red Sea. 
Curiously enough, the Derria Beggy also had on board a 
valuable investment of the Company.* 
In a letter of 5 May 1827 by the Secretary to the Bombay 
Government to the Resident at Mokha, the Secretary says that 
the Resident was to exercise his power for the recovery of the 
money of the Surat merchants which was the primary object of 
the policy in relations to the states in the Red Sea. Even use of 
force was justified.^ But through various sources it is quite 
apparent that the financial position of the Imam of Sanaa was 
so bad, that the claims of the merchants could not be met. 
These merchants were victims of losses of their cargo by the 
plunder of Lohaja. The Pasha of Jedda too had a claim of 5,000 
dollars^. 
1. Political Department, vol. 22/166 of 1824, pp. 48-106. 
2. Secretary to the Bombay Government, 5 May 1927. /A/i/.,Vol.23/278 of 
1827.p339. 
3. Mokha. 14 Mav 1827, Ihid. 
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The East India Company's Resident at Mokha in his letter 
to Devidass Herjeevandass says the Imam could not satisfy his 
whole claims owing to the anarchy prevailing in Yemen. But 
Devidass Herjeevandass, the Bombay merchant, was expected 
to be allowed reduction of V* from duties on goods imported 
and exported by the Vizir of Devidass Herjeevandass. The 
Imam was also requested to give some concessions to 
Herjeevan's trade at Mokha and Hodaida but that too was 
doubtful.* There is infromation about the claims of the Surat 
merchants in the correspondence of Resident at Mokha. It is 
stated that according to the stipulations made with the Resident 
by the late Daulah, Amir Bashir, for $21,000, which was 2/3 of 
the original claims, which during the season (in August 1828), 
had been liquidated but with some difficulty. The balance 
would become payable on or before the conclusion of the 
season. But the Resident again describes the very deranged 
state of the Imam's Finances and the realization of the balance 
at the conclusion of the season seemed to be difficult. The 
only possible resort was to stop the trade of the Imam's ports.^ 
I Political Department. Vol. 23/278 of 1827. p. 339. 
2. [hid. 
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The trade of Yemen deteriorated to such a great extent by 
1827 that Sultan Mohsin of Lohaj (Capital of Yemen) asked the 
Resident at Mokha to revive the trade of Aden which had 
declined considerably. The situation was further aggravated and 
became chaotic by the presence of the Turkish agent who 
showed much harshness towards the Yemen merchants. 
Commodities of Yemen were brought with much difficulty to 
the coast nor could the Indian goods reach the interior in 
consequence. The Sultan adopted some measures to revive the 
trade by reducing the duties for the following two years to 3% 
and after that period not more than 5%. On goods carried by 
ships of the British flag 2 1/4%, the same amount as at Mokha, 
was to be paid.' He made declaration of withdrawal of 
allegiance from the Sublime Porte and extended friendship to 
the English restoring the old relations that had been established 
during the period of the Imam's father.^ 
Next we hear of the situation prevailing in 1833 through 
private Akhbar {news) from Mokha received 31 July 1833. This 
infroms of return of Albanians under Bilmas from Hodaida to 
Mokha. This move they had made on the refusal of the Shaikh 
1. Political Department, Vol. 23/278 of 1827. 
2. [hid. 
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of the Aseree Arabs to cooperate with them in their attack on 
Jedda and Mokha. Thus the entire shipping of Surat and Bengal 
remained detained at Mokha up to 3 1 July 1833 (25*'' of Saffer), 
and the report said that they were about to return to India with 
their "Larges" undisposed of. It also was made known by the 
Secretary to Governor of the arrival of Mohammad AH Pasha at 
Jambo.' We h ave information about the return of four vessels 
to Surat from Mokha on 28 September 1833. The news 
received is dated 28 October 1833. But the nature of cargo 
they contained does not find mention. Just before the above 
information (dated 31 July 1833), another document mentions 
the arrival of the Bengal and Surat traders at the port of Mokha 
during the shipping season."* 
1. Political Department. Vol. 57/500 of 1831/32/33.^. 1>1. 
2. Ibid, p. 45 
3 Bengal and Surat traders to Jedda, April-June (season of trading at Jedda), 
Ihid. p 28 
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CHAPTER-6 
COMING OF STEAMSHIPS AND THE DECLINE OF 
INDIAN SHIPPING IN THE ARABIAN SEA 
One need not underline the fact that the replacement of 
sailing ships by steaniships in the nineteenth century brought 
about a revolution in navigation and world trade. Steamships 
began to be introduced in the Arabian Sea, and gave a crippling 
blow to Indian and Arab-owned sailing fleets. Yet it is prudent 
to recall that steamships replaced sailing ships on the high seas 
fairly slowly. Though Britain was the greatest shipping nation, 
had as late as 1860, as many as 6,876 sailing ships compared 
with 447 steamers.* 
As early as the 1830s the introduction of steam 
navigation in the Red Sea began to be planned. Wellsted (1833) 
welcomed the plan, though suitable anchorages had to be 
identified and developed. He approved of bringing steamships 
up to the port of "Mersa Zahab" (The Golden Port) in the Gulf 
of Aqaba.^ 
I. L C.A. Knovvles, The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions m Great 
Britain during the Nineteenth Centurv. London, 1947. p 299 
2 Wellsted, op.c/7.. Vol. I I , p 153 
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The Company that initiated steam-borne trade in the Red 
Sea as well as the Gulf was the British India Steam Navigation 
Company. According to Zwemer till 1862 no steamer had been 
introduced in the Persian Gulf. It was only in that year that 
steamer services began, initially for six-weekly, then for 
monthly and fortnightly and finally a weekly service was 
established. The British India Steam Navigation, being the 
pioneer, commanded other lines engaged in the trade between 
India and the Persian Gulf.' 
The Suez Canal set the seal on the supremacy of the 
steam-ship, since it could not be used by sailing ships.^ India's 
maritime trade climbed from £99.6 million in 1859 to £162.8 
million in 1877,^ partly made possible by increase in the steam 
tonnage in the Canal, which had risen by 1875-6^ to 26.5% in 
the total tonnage of both steam and sail, calling at Indian 
ports.' By 1897 English steamers dominated the Arabian Sea 
trade. English manufactures not only flooded Indian markets, 
but were carried across the sea: Reels of thread in Najd and 
jack-knives in Jabal-Shammar were all now of English 
1. S.M. Zwemer, Arabia: The Cradle of Islam, Flaming H. Revell Company, 
New York, 1900, p. 225 
2. Knowles, op.cit., pp. 299-300 
3. R.C. Dutt, Economic History of India, London, 1904, Vol. 11, p. 280 
4. D.A. Farnie, East and yVcst of Suez: The Suez Canal in Hislorv. 1854-
1956, Oxford, (Clarendon Press. 1969), p. 171 
5 Knowles, pp. 299-300. 
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manufacture. Thousands of bags of rice in Hasa and Bahrain 
were shipped in English ships from Rangoon and distributed in 
the inland area on camels. 
The currency in circulation during the last decade of the 
19"' century all along the Arabian coast from Aden to Basra 
was now the Indian rupee. The Maria Theresa dollar was 
current in the interior, but it was becoming scarce and loosing 
popularity among the Beduins of the interior. The mark on the 
rupee coin represented a girl's head (''abu binC), while the 
eagle {""abu tair" i.e. the father of a bird) was stamped on the 
Austrian dollars. 
The French also launched steamer service in the Persian 
Gulf in 1897. There was soon a break of the service but after 
some time again the service was re-opened.^ 
The British India Steam Navigation Company established 
a weekly steamer service from Bombay to Basra and back. The 
steamers called at the intermediate ports in the Persian Gulf 
after leaving Karachi, viz. Gwadur, Muscat, Jask, Bandar 
Abbas, Lingah, Bahrain, Bushire, Fao and Mohammareh. The 
journey took 14 days and the distance covered was 1900 miles.^ 
1 Zwemer, op cit , p 225 
2 Zwemer, op cit . p 225 
"< Wcllsted. ()/) t;f . p 153 
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The Aziziya Misriya Steamship Company began service 
from 1870 in the Red Sea. After some pause, it once again 
began regular service from 8 July 1872 plying between Suez 
and Jedda, Suakin and Massawa. Taking over the contract from 
the Austrian Llyod in 1873 it started a monthly mail service 
between Constantinople and Jedda. Hodaida once again 
emerged as the port for Sanaa and proved its superiority over 
other ports. The Turks controlled much of the Arabian 
Peninsula including the Suez-Aden route to the East. The Suez 
Cannal was initially important to Turkey for the transport of 
mail, troops and supply of grain from Odessa to the Turkish 
garrisons in Arabia. Abyssinian slaves, eunachs and "galla 
women" as well were exported to Turkey through the Canal.* 
By the turn of the century the sailing ships trading in the 
Arabian Sea decreased much in size and number. Between 
1884-85 and 1904-5 the tonnage of steamships using Indian 
ports had increased from 4.3 million tons to 13.5 million tons; 
but the tonnage of sailing vessels declined from 2.3 million 
tons to the insignificant one of 353,000 tons. Such sailing 
vessels as still plied were "now almost entirely native craft, 
engaged in trade with East Africa, Arabia, Persia and Southern 
Asia".^ 
1. DA. Farnie. op.cit., p. 127 
2. Imperial Gazetteer of India (The Indian Empire).(Kc^unt), up.cit. Vol 
III. p 276 
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One can see that Indian trade expanded considerably with 
the opening of the Canal. But the gain from this went largely to 
British-owned shipping; steamships could better pass through 
the Suez Canal than sailing ships. By 1904-5 the share of 
steamships in the total tonnage of India's maritime trade had 
gone up to 97.3%. By 1896(7), the tonnage of vessels passing 
through the Canal and entering and leaving the ports of India 
by that route had risen to 26.5% of the total tonnage of ships 
visiting Indian ports. 
While the Suez Canal added to India's trade generally, it 
proved to be an adverse factor for Indo-Arab trade, by the fact 
that short-range maritime trade lost its cost advantage. Entries 
of customs clearances are indicative of the fact that in 1904-5 
61% of the total tonnage of the trade was conducted to and 
from the United Kingdom and other British colonies.^ Indian-
owned sailing vessels, confined to Arabian Sea had their share 
reduced to well under 2.7% of the entire sea-borne trade of 
India. On the opening of the Red Sea route to Europe and with 
the coming of the Suez Canal, the major beneficiary was 
undoubtedly Britain, and Indo-Arab trade did not gain much as 
a consequence. 
1. DA. Farnie, p. 171 
2. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. Ill, p. 276 
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CHAPTER? 
THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL (1869) AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF ADEN 
A SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
The narrow triangular isthmus that separates Asia from 
Africa, and the Atlantic from the Indian Ocean (Mediterranean 
and the Red Sea) is a geographical curiosity that has been 
commented upon since ancient times. The project of a canal 
cutting through the isthmus at its narrowest width on its 
Western edge was dreamt of or even attempted in earlier times; 
it was only in the second half of the 19*'' century that the 
project could be realized as the result of French enterprise. 
The construction of the Canal whose plan was initially 
conceived by Mohammad AH Pasha, remained unrealized till 
the French took over construction under De Lesseps and opened 
the Canal in 1869. Palmerston opposed the construction 
particularly out of the fear that during a war France might close 
the Canal to the British. He also feared that by controlling the 
Canal the French might take over Aden and Mauritius. 
However, these dark forebodings were not fulfilled owing 
1% 
ultimately to British financial resources, which enabled Britain 
to buy up the Khedive's share in the Canal in 1875. 
The Suez Canal immensely shortened the sea route 
between Europe and India, and the overland route (Alexandria-
Jeddal Mokha) joining the Mediterranean and the Red Sea 
could now be replaced by the ships making direct voyages. 
Following the Canal's opening within a short time (21 
November 1869-1" May 1870) 940 transits were made by Arab 
boats and 145 transits by sea-going ships.* 
A Syrian author of the 19"" Century, Kurd Aly, says that 
the volume of Indian trade with Aleppo during 17"* and 18"^  
century was fairly high. But he is of the view that the trade of 
Aleppo and Damascus suffered a set back with the opening of 
the Suez Canal particularly because of the shift over of the 
merchants of Aleppo and Damascus to Beirut, and Alexandria, 
Cairo, Manchester, Tantama (?) and Marseilles and other 
African and Asian cities. The number of those who travelled 
overland to Hejaz and West Asia decreased because of the 
cheaper and faster voygage through the Canal. The trade of 
Damascus now remained confined to its own area.^ The Suez 
1. DA Farnie, p. 102 
2. Mohammed Kurd Alv. Kitah Khiilotu-S-Sham, Damascus, 1928, Vol. IV. 
p. 268. 
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Canal helped to bring even Iraq more firmly in the orbit of 
Indian Ocean trade. Previously its main trade was v^ith Iran, 
now (1869 onwards), India and Britain came to have greater 
share of Iraq's trade.* By 1914 India and Britain accounted for 
50% of Iraq's exports and 2/3 of its imports.^ 
SUEZ CANAL-INDIA 
The opening of the Canal once again elevated Venice to 
an advantageous position and made it the emporium of Indian 
goods. The credit may be ascribed to continuous efforts of the 
Venetian merchant community. Venice now became an entrepot 
of Indian goods, through the Canal it enjoyed the credit of 
being the main European port of access to the Suez route. This 
would mean its Eastern trade had risen to a very high volume. 
It became, in the words of Farnie, "the unrivalled emporium of 
Eastern trade and traffic".^ Brisk trade, therefore, led to the 
construction of a new harbour at Venice in 1869 whereby to 
eliminate the use of lighters. Venice even regained its 1847 
level of population in 1870-72."' 
1 Charles Issawi (ed). The Economic History of the Muklle East. 1800-1914, 
Chicago. The Umversit> of Chicago Press, 1966, p 135 (see also Introduction) 
2 Ibid, op cil , p 132 
3 D A Farnie. o/) c;/ p 141 
4 IhiJ. op cit For detail sec Farnie's ensuing pages on Venetian commerce 
with the East 
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TURKEY-SUEZ CANAL-INDIA 
Turkey's traditional crafts had already suffered on 
account of inflow of British industrial goods. The new routes 
from Persia via Russia and the Suez Canal greatly diminished 
the transit trade of Turkey. Uptil the later Tanzimat period the 
customs on imported goods was comparatively much lower than 
the customs on local exports goods. The ratio of exports and 
imports was 4:1. The major flow of goods was from European 
countries which gave the impression of Turkey as an European 
colony, supplying cheap raw material and in return importing 
finished industrial goods. European capital as well was 
flowing into Turkey with accelerating speed.* 
So long as the construction of railways from Bombay 
inland up to Delhi and Lahore was not complete, the Indian 
oversea trade was mainly conducted from Calcutta.^ Now, 
however, Bombay replaced Calcutta as India's principal port 
owing to the vast stream of traffic passing through the Suez 
Canal.^ 
By 1893 English trade through the Suez Canal had 
increased tremendously. The gross tonnage in 1893 that passed 
I. The Imperial Gazetteer of India. {The Indian Empire). Vol. Ill, p 273, 
2 Ibid 
3. Ihid.. pp. 292-93. 
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through the Canal was 10,753,798 of which 7,977,728 tons 
passed under the British flag. In Zwemer's view the English 
trade constituted 4/5"''' of the total tonnage. The total figure of 
ships during the same period that passed through the Canal was 
3,341 out of which no less than 2,405 ships belonged to the 
Great Britain.* 
B. THE EMERGENCE OF ADEN 
The surging increase in traffic through the Suez Canal 
brought into sudden prominence the port of Aden, which 
fronting the Indian ocean but stands close to the narrow 
entrance of the Red Sea. It had a strategic position, aptly 
described by J.R. Wellsted in 1832: it stood on a lofty 
promontry and was joined with the mainland by a very narrow 
isthmus, 200 yards in breadth, over which a causeway ran.^ It 
was thus a natural port. 
Wellsted believed that the decline of medieval Aden had 
begun with the supremacy of the Portuguese. He also adds that 
Aden, an entrepot of the Indian trade, supplied Indian goods 
through Egypt to Venice and Geneva; but its decay set in with 
the discovery of the new passage around the Cape of Good 
1 Zwcmer, Arabia- The Cradle of [slam, op. at. , p. 226 
2 J R Wellsted, Vol II. p 385 
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Hope.' The harbour had by 1832 become almost empty. The 
population as against 30,000 during the 17 '^ century was by 
1832 reduced to 800 only, consisting of Arabs, Sumalis and the 
descendents of slaves. Huts were to be seen on the ruin of the 
old magnificent buildings. There were about 20 families that 
took interest in trade; the rest subsisted either by supplying the 
Hajj boats with wood and water, or by fishing. The city 
residents included some banya merchants who monopolised the 
greater part of the trade. They lived in good houses and 
exercised considerable authority in town.^ By the middle of the 
is"' century the port had been evacuated by the Turks, leaving 
it again into the hands of the local sultan. 
Despite the fact that Aden's significance had dwindled, 
on account of its excellent harbour it was still visited by 
several vessels from the Somali ports of Berbera and Bundar 
Kassim.^ 
The ruler of Aden, Sultan Mohassan, inherited a great 
treasure from his uncle Ahmed. Ahmed had been "the most 
politic of the chiefs of Yemen". He is said to have encouraged 
trade and commerce, and invited merchants from India and 
1 J R Welstcd. vol II. p 3X3 
2 J R Welstcd. Vol II. p 392 
3 //)/(/. op cit. Vol II. p 3^ 5^-6 
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Egypt to reside in his territories.* Sultan Mohassan walked in 
the footsteps of his uncle and was equally desirous to extend 
commercial intercourse between India and Aden. He also had in 
his possession the document of the treaty his predecessor had 
concluded with Sir Home Pophan. Its content and nature were 
not known, and J.R. Wellsted was of the view that it was not 
possible to have it put into effect.^ 
Aden, in its extreme decay, still received nutmeg, pepper 
with the "chief of all spices" from India; silk-yarn too, but not 
gold and precious stones. Seventy ships of about 200 tons each 
from the Red Sea still were employed in this trade. Leaving 
Arabian ports in September the bigger ones sailed in an eastern 
direction as far as Ras Fartak and the smaller ones to Ras al-
Had, whence these sailed across the Arabian sea to Porebandar. 
Each vessel carried a pilot but few had instruments, capable of 
making observations. Even the astrolable and cross-staff were 
rare. Some of the navigators determined their position by the 
"dislocation" of the water and appearance of snakes. By 1871 
trade had come to a standstill owing to attacks on the caravans 
that passed through Yemen for Aden."* 
I. JR . Wclstcd. vol. II, p. 410. 
2 JR Wellsted. \ol. H, p. 410 
•?. ZuciHcr. •\nthia The Croclle of Islam, op. at., p. 211. 
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In 1820 Captain Haines of the Company's navy visited 
Aden and in 1829 the Directors entertained the idea of making 
Aden a coaling station for its steam-ships but the plan was 
abandoned. Following an outrage committed on the passengers 
and crew of a bagla wrecked near Aden an expedition was 
dispatched against the place by the Bombay government in 
1838. It was at this juncture that the decision to annex Aden 
was arrived at.* In January 1839 with a force of 300 Europeans 
and 400 Indian troops in the "Volage" and "Cruizer", Aden was 
bombarded and taken by storm.^ 
The area of Aden, consisting of jabel Ihsan or "Little 
Aden" including the harbour now annexed was estimated at 
approximately 35 square miles. The population exclusive of 
the garrison was only 19,239 in 1872.^ However there was 
rapid rise of Aden population since 1839. By 1880 the 
population had gone up to 35,000. Indeed, the rate of growth of 
Aden Population was higher than either Port Saeed or Bombay 
during the decade after the opening of the Suez Canal."* During 
1. Zwemer. op cit., p. 218. 
2. Zwemer. /; 218. 
3. Captain F M Hunter, An account of the British settlement of Aden in Arabia, Frank 
Cass & Co Ltd, 1968, p 2 
4 Zwemer. p 335 
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his stay from 28 October 1885 to March 1886 in Aden Zvvemer 
wrote: 
"The population of Aden is made up of Arabs, all 
Moslems, mostly sunnis of the shafii; Africans, 
mostly Somalis who are all shafii Moslems; Jews; 
natives of India, mostly Moslems, the rest being 
Hindus, a few Parsis and a few Portuguese from 
Goa. In 1872, for every five Arabs there were less 
than three Somalis; but I am told that now they are 
numerically equal. The Arabs and Somalis together 
make up the great bulk-— about four fifths--- of 
the whole. In 1872 the Jews numbered 1,435; they 
are now reckoned at more than 2,000. The 
Europeans, the garrison and camp followers 
number about 3,500 ". * 
The British spent a considerable amount of money to 
fortify and develop the port. Aden was attacked four times from 
land by Arabs but their attempts failed.^ The settlement was 
placed under the Government of the Bombay Presidency, the 
authority in Aden being wielded by a Resident and had two 
assistants for his support.^ 
1. Zwemer, p. 335. 
2. /hid 
3. /A/c/.. p. 219. 
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Aden's seizer by the British in 1839 its position as a 
prosperous city revived. It once again attained its status of 
commercial centre for all southern Arabia. But this was only at 
the cost of Mokha and Hodaida. Indeed, it could become the 
commercial capital of all Western and Southern Arabia 
provided a railroad to Sanaa was built.* But Zwemer is of the 
view that the plan could only materialize if the Turks left 
Yemen's capital. From 1839 uptil 1850 the rate of customs at 
Aden was the same as that charged at Indian ports. Zwemer 
makes us believe that from 1850 Aden was declared a free port. 
During the first 7 years after 1839 the average annual imports 
and exports of Aden were Rs. 1,900,000. In the next seven years 
the annual average rose to Rs. 6,000,000 and trade continued to 
grow. After the Suez Canal opened it grew immensely. In 1897 
it reached a high water-mark to over Rs. 30,000,000.^ 
In Aden there was a marked development of re-exports of 
gum and coffee from 1874, of ivory and spices from 1875 and 
of rubber and hides from 1876. The value of coffee increased 
five times between 1870 and 1880 and was re-exported to 
London, Marseilles, Trieste and New York. Its main imports 
were cotton textiles since 1874. By 1891 Hodaida was only 
competitor with Aden and having overtaken Mokha.^ 
1 Zwemer. op cit, p 226 
2 Zwemer, p 226 
"^  D A Farnie, op cit, p 136 
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Chapter-8 
INDIAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY AND ITS MIDDLE 
EASTERN MARKET; INDIAN IMPORTS FROM THE 
ARAB WORLD 
A new dimension was imparted to trade between India 
and the Arab world with the change in the complexion of East-
West trade as a consequence of triumph of the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain by the beginning of the 19'*' century. 
Britain now began to seek market for its products, with cotton 
textiles in the van. Since the Suez Canal was yet many decades 
away, Bombay became a redistributive centre for British 
manufactures. By 1804 the exports of Bombay had risen to Rs. 
170,92,879 whereas the imports stood at Rs. 1,19,60067 only.* 
During 1804-5 there was considerable import increase to 
Bombay of Surat cotton amounting to Rs.23,4961 in 1805 
alone. But in 1804 there was decrease in cotton import to 
Bombay from Surat owing to ill-managed operations of the 
cotton committee which ultimately led to its dissolution.^ But 
Surat's import of cotton increased to Rs. 9 lakhs during the 
same period, roughly to 4 times compared to its cotton export. 
1. Report on External and Internal Commerce of the Bomhav Presidency, Vol. 3 of 
1X04 
2. Ihul 
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a figure much higher than its supply. However, the Bombay 
export increased to Rs. 1591782. Out of this Rs. 8 lakhs was in 
treasure which was sent to Surat as a partial payment of cotton 
purchased in Gujarat.* What were the cotton goods that found 
market in the Middle Eastern countries is brought out from the 
East India Company's inventory of goods. These goods were 
"dotties", fine piecegoods, "bowchas" and "assloof.^ 
Cotton was also exported to China. The quantity of cotton 
export to China during the year 1804-5 amounted to Rs. 36 
lakhs in which the proportion of Gujarat cotton exported to 
China was very small. During 1804 the quantity exported to 
China was 50,000 Candies. There was bumper cotton harvest in 
1804. The Bombay merchants alone had bought cotton of Rs. 45 
lakhs.^ Available information suggests cost of cotton a candy 
rose to Rs. 90 with labour of Bombay ports and freight charges 
inclusive."* 
There are varying indications to believe that the 
magnitude of Indian textile export to the Arab world would 
have been on diminishing around 1807 not because of the flow 
1. Report on the External and Internal commerce of the Bomhav Presidency, Vol. 3 of 
1^04 op at 
2 Ihid 
3. "Report on the F.xternal commerce of Bombay for the Year 1804-5", External and 
Internal Commerce. Vol 4 of 1X04/5. 
4. Ihid 
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of the industrial manufacture of England alone to the Middle 
Eastern market but also because of the manufacture of cloths in 
some of the Middle Eastern cities such as Damascus, a city of 
immense capital and a centre of commerce of extraordinary 
importance. It was the importer of large quantity of fine cloth 
of India and Persia; simultaneously Damascus manufactured a 
large quantity of cloth itself. The magnitude of its cloth 
manufacture comes from the idea that there were several streets 
of warehouses from one end to the other. The number of 
manufactures of silk and cotton stuffs at Damascus alone were 
estimated at 4,000. However linen was not manufactured nor 
flax grown there.' 
Merchant capital seems to have grown quite large. Two of 
the leading capitalist merchants of Damascus namely Schatti 
and Mehemed Sua's capital is estimated at 5 million francs 
each.^ 
From 22 September 1816 to 30 April 1818 the total 
exports of cotton from Bombay Presidency was Rs. 20100. Out 
of this total the export to Turkey was Rs. 2300 and the export 
to England Rs. 17800. This would mean there was drastic fall 
1 All Bc\. />avv/v, op. at. Vol. II, pp 267-273 
2 Secret and roh.tical Department Diarv. No 307 of 1818 
3 Ihul 
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in cotton exports. But these exports only were made through 
the Red Sea. 
We have details of other textile items which were 
exported to the Red Sea from Bombay or vice-versa. The first 
of these items is broad cloth which was imported to Bombay 
from the Red sea to the amount of Rs. 3790 between 22 
September 1816 to the 30 April 1818. But the Turkish export 
of broad cloth from Bombay to the Red Sea exceeded the 
import to Bombay by Rs. 5264.* Turkish import of piecegoods 
from the Red Sea to Bombay was Rs.499 whereas the Turkish 
export of piecegoods from Bombay to the Red Sea amounted to 
Rs.39,391. Including English export of piecegoods was of 
worth Rs.l6116 from Bombay to the Red Sea the total export 
rose to Rs. 55507. Similarly the Turkish export of raw silk 
from Bombay to the Red Sea was Rs. 4971 whereas the export 
of raw silk by the English amounted to Rs. 51562. The total 
export of raw silk by the Turkish ships and the English ones 
from Bombay to the Red Sea was Rs. 4171 whereas the export 
of raw silk by the English amounted to Rs.51562. The total 
export of raw silk by the Turkish ships and the English ones 
from Bombay to the Red Sea amounted to Rs.56233. During the 
same period of 22 September 1816 to 30 April 1818 the Turkish 
export of shawls from Bombay to the Red Sea was Rs. 1,34,019 
1, Secret and I'dhncal Department Diary. No. 307 of ISIS. 
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whereas the English export was worth Rs. 11000, making the 
total to Rs. 145019. But the Turkish export of piecegoods from 
Surat to the Red Sea was fairly high - a figure much higher 
than the export of piecegoods from Bombay. It was worth Rs. 
3,84,009. The Turkish export of coloured silk from Surat to the 
Red Sea was however quite negligible and amounted to Rs. 368 
only.' However the Indian cotton goods continued to be 
exported from Bombay to the Red Sea ports even during 2" 
decade of the 19"" century which suggests the Middle Eastern 
markets had even till now the taste for the Indian cotton cloth. 
We have examples of three consignors who shipped their 
piecegoods to the Red Sea ports in June 1820 from Bombay in 
the Brig Ghorab Bombay Merchant. The detail of these goods 
are as under: 
Name of Consignor 
Prajee 
Description of goods 
Cambay Piecegoods 
Surat Piecegoods 
Quantity 
2 Bales 
1 Bale 
Amount(Rs) 
6025 
1325 
Total: 7350 
Dhurrumsey 
Uanchand 
Dhurrumsey 
Uanchand 
Piecegoods 
Cutch piecegoods 
1 Bale 
5 Bales 
3025 
1350 
Total: 4375 
Ramchand Lalljee Cambay Piecegoods 1 Bale 2750 
Total: 14775 
Grand Total including expenses, charges, freight fee at the rale of 35%= Rs. 19782. 
Source: Political Pepurtment. vol.JS 33 oflSJO-Jl. p.5(). 
I Bomba\ Customs House, Report of the Customs Master of 25 June 1818', 
Political l\'parimi:iU Diary. No. 307 of the year ISIS, pp 716-18 
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In 1832 Indian silk yarn was exported from India to 
Lohaj (Lahedsje) though manufactures of all kinds are scarce 
there.' By 1833 Mohammad Ali's scheme of self-sufficiency in 
cloth manufacture had reached some target as it is borne out by 
the rigour of his regulation which stipulated that the cloth that 
did not bear the Pasha's stamp was liable to be seized. This 
was an indication that the Pasha was taking protective measure 
to safeguard his own developing textile industry.^ 
Even though instances are there of efforts being made to 
establish cloth-weaving industry in Bombay and elsewhere in 
India on industrial pattern, one of which was cotton-spinning 
mill established in 1854 by Cwasjee Davar who was a Parsee. 
But practically India's export of textile manufacture seems to 
have been reduced substantially. Even Egyptian's manufacture 
of cloth had ceased to a great extent by 1856 under Sa'ad 
Pasha. The British imports from Suez during the year 1855 
consisted of 90% of the cotton goods."* This would have 
consisted of twist, yarn, cotton etc. It would obviously mean 
that if at all there was import of Indian textile to Egypt it was 
1 J R Wellstcd. Travels, Vol 11, p 411 Our tra\eller noted that the silk weaving 
mdustr> of Lohaj employed 30 weavers The \am in the industry was brought from 
India Ihul 
2 Ibid.p 216 
3 DA Famic. p 37 
4 Ihul 
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on very small scale. We have frequent description of the 
European manufactures such as "Grey domestics", long cloths, 
tanzeb and "madd sollam".' Those varieties of textiles imported 
into Egypt from Basra were mainly checked cotton, used as 
outdoor dresses by the country people and middle classes, both 
in Jedda and Egypt. Cotton goods to Jedda to Egypt were also 
imported from Persia.^ 
Palgrave (1862-1863) observed cotton growing at 
Kaseem. Indian silk was also exported there but the quantity 
was quite meagre. Palgrave says that cotton-shrub of Kaseem 
was identical in species with that cultivated in Gujarat and 
Cutch. The inhabitants of Kaseem were well acquainted with its 
use but the quantity was quite meagre for export but there was 
hope of favourable circumstances of cotton cultivation that 
might enhance the wealth of the country. It was mainly because 
of the congenial climate and fertile soil of Kaseem. The cotton 
plants were numerous as in India and the quantity was also not 
inferior to India.^ But despite all this there was market shift in 
the pattern of trade. As like 17''' century, 18"' and IQ"' century. 
1 Famie, p 37 
2. Ihid. 
3 WG. Palgra\c. Personal narrative of a year's Journev through Central and 
Eastern Arabia (IH62-63). London. 1 ^08, p.' 149 
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Middle Eastern countries remained the main market of Indian 
cotton textile. This phenomenon suggests that the English 
Industrial Revolution and manufacture of cheaper and attractive 
textile of Britain had yet to occupy its prominence in textile 
export to the Middle Eastern countries. It is quite likely the 
situation might have changed after the opening of the Suez 
Canal 
However, Middle East was still importing large amount of 
Indian textiles and silks. In return Middle East sent to India 
pearls, dates, fruits, horses, carpets and a large amount of 
bullion. It was indeed a strange precipitation in trade position 
that on one side the crafts of the Middle East was dwindling 
whereas Indian craft was improving. Urban markets in both the 
Middle East and south-east Asia cattered remarkable influence 
on the growth of cotton in Gujarat and on the Eastern coastal 
India.* 
Date by far was the main export of the Middle East to 
India. Mesopotamian region remained by far the main producer 
of dates though date was grown in all parts of Arabia including 
upper Egypt, Syria and Asia Minor. According to an estimate 
\ Charles Issawai, Decline of Middle Eastern Trade', in D S Richard (cd ), Islam 
ami the Inu/e of Asia. Oxford. 1970. pp 259-60n 
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the River country i.e. Tigris and Euphrates alone produced 
150,000 tons.' Hasa and Oman too produced date but the 
quantity was comparatively inferior than that of Basra.^ 
1. Zucmcr. op cit, p I22ii 
2. Ihiil. 
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CONCLUSION 
The maritime trade of India till the end of 18"' century, 
still annually accounted for a substantial volume of both 
exports and imports. Besides, the considerable shipping in 
the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, bulk of India's trade from 
Coromandel-Malabar coasts and Bay of Bengal passed to the 
south-east Asian regions of Siam, Perak, Malacca and 
Indonesian Archipelago as far as Philippines and South 
China. Many traditional merchant communities of India 
traded, particularly in cotton piece goods and received in 
return the products of those regions. From China they 
preferred silk, tea and Chinaware. The trade, was evidently 
lucrative and prosperous. The Ducth merchants of the 
Coromandel and the West Coasts in the meantime shifted 
their base of operation to Batavia in Indonesia which was 
strategically and commercially more suitable to them. From 
India the VOC (Dutch East India Company) procured textiles 
for sale to south-east Asian regions and purchased the 
products of south-east Asia for export to Europe. Soon after 
their migration to Indonesia, the Dutch took to coffee 
cultivation and sugar-cane plantation. On the other hand the 
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lucrative trade of Mokha coffee now largely came under the 
control of the East India Company; whereas its competitors 
had a very small share in it. 
The French had their commercial and political 
headquarters at Pondichery and carried on brisk trade in 
Indian commodities with the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. 
Their main business with the Red Sea was in coffee which 
they bought and brought to Pondichery for transhipment to 
France. Their trade with the countries of south-east Asia was 
almost negligible. This region, therefore, saw many Indian 
trading magnates developing huge business links with the 
countries outside India. They had dealings with European 
companies as well. Nawab of Arcot was one of them. He 
owned his own ships. This is evident from the well-
maintained diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai. The diary reveals 
multidimensional facts about the trade and trading 
communities of south India and their dealings with European 
companies. From the same diary we get information about 
the French association with the indigenous business 
magnates including the Nawab of Arcot. 
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The defeat of the French by the English in the Carnatic 
wars was the turning point in the history of maritime trade in 
the Indian Ocean. The East India Company acquired control 
over the entire Indian Ocean and the bulk of the Indian trade 
passed into its hands. Carnatic wars, therefore, mark 
watershed that no foreign or indigenous power in India could 
challenge the East India Company's supremacy on the high 
seas. French presence, thereafter, had been reduced to a 
negligible mark in the Indian Ocean and they could no longer 
pose any serious threat to the British. The Dutch also found 
themselves under compulsion to quit their last settlement at 
Chandarnogor in Bengal and thus further providing 
opportunity to the English to consolidate their military and 
commercial bases of operation in Bengal. These events, 
therefore, changed the outlook of the Company from a 
merely commercial enterprise to governing and controlling 
power on an alien soil ushering in an era of colonialism in 
India. 
Surat, was a big port on the western coast of India, it 
survived till the end of the Is"* century. This was partly 
because of the shift of loyalty by Indian merchants to East 
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India Company and many of them joined the Company's 
service. Secondly, the East India Company had yet to 
develop Bombay. However, Bombay replaced Surat when the 
Company shifted its major establishments over there with a 
large number of population. K.N.Chaudhuri is of the view 
that the decline of Surat was gradual. Whereas, the trade of 
Surat, we are told, by the middle of the century had expanded 
to such an extent that Indian shipwrights had to enlarge the 
shipping capacity to accommodate more and more goods. 
Rice, sugar, textiles, grains and indigo constituted Indian 
commodities to Red Sea and Persian Gulf regions. Coffee, 
ivory, almonds, Venetian falsebeads, sena leaves and incence 
and dry and green fruits, horses, iron and copper metals were 
brought as return cargo. There was constant flow of bullion 
(gold and silver) throughout the century. By and large the 
aggregate volume of India's trade with the countries of the 
Arab world remained fairly high throughout the century. In 
some respects it even surpassed the volume of the previous 
century. 
A specific feature of maritime activities in Indian 
Ocean is characterised by centuries-old navigational 
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conventions. These were common not only to the countries 
bordering the Indian Ocean alone but broadly speaking to all 
Asian countries from the littorals of north-eastern Africa to 
as far as Japan. While the customary law of wreckage 
provided the confiscation of goods of a wrecked ship by a 
state, at the same time there are many examples of salvage by 
the Indian rulers as well. The role of State in relation to such 
conventions had a significant bearing on the navigational and 
commercial activities in Indian Ocean. Besides, there were 
many other conventions related to freighting of goods, 
departure of a ship, property of a deceased, insurance etc. 
which were accordingly made known for public information 
through notification or verbal communications. What is more 
important for our period in this regard was the safety of 
Indian shipping. Since the East India Company maintained 
its supremacy on the high seas the Indian shippings were 
largely subjected to operate under the Company's flag by 
entering into mochalka or penalty bond. 
In India maritime trade and commerce was never a 
monopoly of mercantile communities alone. During Mughal 
period we hear of rulers, members of royal household and 
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high nobles taking active part in trading activities. They 
owned ships and traded with many countries of Persian Gulf, 
Red Sea, Arabian coast and eastern coast of Africa. This 
practice continued throughout Mughal period and following 
the Mughals the rulers of IS"' and 19**' centuries also never 
missed an opportunity to take part in maritime trade and 
make profit. These rulers could enlarge their profit in 
commerce through manipulating their official status and 
misusing the services of local officials. 
These rulers often referred to as 'chief merchants' or 
'Trader-rulers', owned ships and maintained commercial 
relations with countries of the Indian Oean shores. The 
prominent among 'Trader-rulers' during 18*'' century were the 
Nawab of Gujarat, Raja of Tanjore, the Nawab of Arcot, 
Nawab Haider AH and his son Tipu Sultan. The latter had a 
well organized trade with the countries of the Persian Gulf, 
the Red Sea and other ports of coastal India. In order to build 
his country strong and safeguard it from the menace of 
foreign invasion he embarked on an ingenious plan of raising 
a formidable and strong navy, but the circumstance and his 
financial condition were unfavourable to him, therefore, the 
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plan remained unmaterialized. In the meantime, Tipu met his 
tragic end. 
Tipu was always ready to help a friendly country even 
by overlooking the law of his own land. Thus responding the 
letter of the Iman of Muscat he went out of the way to help 
the two Hindu merchants and subjects of the Imam. Where as 
for the East India Company, he was an eye-sore and a 
formidable enemy. Their main target was to remove Tipu 
from the political scene of India in order to further 
consolidate their colonial rule in India. 
Another 'Trader-ruler' having his operations in the 
Middle East, was Mohammad Ali Pasha of Egypt. Before 
coming to power as Ottoman Governor of Egypt his ships 
plied in the Mediterranean and he had lucrative business at 
Malta. However, very little is known about his shipping in 
the Indian Ocean and his trading affiliation with the East 
India Company. Nevertheless for transacting his Indian 
business with EIC the Pasha had his agents posted either at 
Bombay or Calcutta and his ships plied between India and 
the Red Sea. 
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With the expansion of Pasha's rule to Turkish Arabia, 
the Arab provinces responded to changes brought about by 
industrial development in Europe. We observe the 
penetration of capitalism into the non-capitalist market with 
the supply of manufactured goods to Asian markets. This 
penetration drastically changed the entire outlook of the 
markets of Middle East. The concept of free trade, purely a 
western idea to the traditional world of Asia was, indeed, 
alien to the Asian rulers and merchants. The Ottoman Sultan 
agreed in principle to the demands of the English which they 
had made in the Treaty of Dardanelles, concluded on 5*'^  
January 1809. Mohammad Ali Pasha in similar manner was 
made to agree to various terms of a treaty which he had 
signed with the East India company in 1810. 
Pasha seems to have taken some stringent measures to 
promote the export of his country. He imposed restrictions 
on import of West Indies Coffee to encourage Yemeni 
Coffee. He discouraged import of such goods as were or 
could be produced locally. It was observed in 1833 that the 
Pasha prohibited import of essential commodities from India 
to Yemen and the people there were asked to procure them 
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from Egypt. Thus the Indian cloth that did not bear Pasha's 
stamp, and was on sale in Yembo, was liable to be seized. He 
also put a strict vigilance on smuggling. 
However, at the turn of 19*'' century India's main ports 
for supply to the Red Sea were Calcutta, Surat and Bombay. 
We have information on English exports to Suez from 
Bombay. Trade touched a high level mark between the 
Bombay Presidency and the Red Sea during 1816-18. 
Evidence suggests that the volume of trade between the 
Indian ports and those of Red Sea was very high. The volume 
of trade in 1815 at Jedda alone was worth 4 million dollars, 
of which the major share seems to have been the imports 
from India. There was a sharp upward movement in the 
volume between 1815 and 1838. Jedda, as a leading port of 
the Red Sea, thrived on supply from India. In 1833 the port 
received 10000 tons of shipping, besides large baglas whose 
tonnage touched almost the same level. 
Pasha, it is said, made sincere efforts to regulate 
customs structure. He intended to modernise customs rules 
despite differences in rates from item to item. His reign was 
marked by the executions of various treaties of trade and 
commerce with the British Government. 
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The fall of Seringapatam in 1799 and the end of the 
Napoleonic influence on the Indian Ocean littoral vis-a-vis 
the Red Sea (1798), as assessed from the mercantilist 
perspective led to the British dominance over the 
international trade. The disintegration coupled with 
degeneration of the Turkish Empire at the turn of the 19' 
century as the only largest buffer zone to sustain European 
hegemonic pressure, had created a power vaccum in the body 
politics of Asia. Still many trading nations were struggling to 
rub shoulders with each other, and it was only to 
counterbalance the French pressure in the Mediterranean and 
the Levant that capitulations were signed between Great 
Britain and Turkey. 
Britain had all along tried hard for more than fifty 
years to establish her hegemony over international trade and 
to a great extent enjoyed it. The emergence of Germany as a 
strong military and economic power soon shattered the 
British hopes of dominance over the world economy. 
Colonial India under the British imperialism, suffered 
irreparable economic loss owing to large scale de-
industrialisation coupled with deurbanisation. This 
imbalanced the Indian overseas trade. British imports of 
industrial machine goods increased and export of Indian 
224 
piece goods declined. Further, gradually India was forced to 
supply primary goods. Such a development which had far 
reaching effect on India's economy dated from l^ * quarter of 
\9^^ century and continued thereafter. Export of cotton piece 
goods and silk goods gave way to raw cotton, indigo and 
opium. 
During the Ottoman dominance over Arabian peninsula, 
the French and Dutch enjoyed privilege of reduced rate of 
customs. Where as for Indian merchants there were different 
rates of customs, and the English during 19"' century pressed 
for more concessions. 
For European companies and free traders the rates of 
customs charged at ports of Arabian sea and the Persian Gulf 
was a crucial issue which involved substantial amount. Since 
1730 Europeans were levied only 3% customs on all 
descriptions of goods at ports under the Imam of Yemen. But 
Indian Muslim and Hindu merchants were subjected to 
customs payment ranging from 5 to 7.5%. Further, the East 
India Company enjoyed certain exclusive privilege while the 
Indian merchants were denied it as they did not have any 
mercantile organisation similar to European companies. 
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During 19"" century the rate varied as per the quality of 
goods on the one hand and the nationality of the merchants 
on the other. The levy on Surat goods was 5% provided the 
goods were exported to Mokha by EIC or the British 
merchants. The Muslim merchants (most probably Indian 
Muslims) paid 7V2% whereas the Hindu merchants were 
subjected to SVAVO. The medium of payment was either 
Spanish Dollar (S. $) or German crown. 
A significant feature of Indian trade with the Arab 
world is marked by the considerable flow of treasure into 
India through the ports of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf 
during 18"' and \9^^ century. The flow was either in the form 
of bullion or liquid assets sent to India as remittances 
through bill of exchange known as hundi which was a legal 
tender (written order) equivalent to a Bill of Exchange. 
There were certain features common to a 'bill' and a hundi. 
In a period when traveling by sea was hazardous and the 
frequent shipwrecks happened the only possible option open 
to merchants was to send their remittances through bankers 
or sarrafs and get the bills of exchange issued to be 
discounted at one of the Indian port-cities. For our period we 
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have various records of the English East India Company 
which contain information on hundis, particularly in relation 
to coffee trade. In a hundi certain amount is mentioned and it 
is payable either at sight or on a determinable future date. 
Further more, "both the instruments of credit are subject -to 
stamp duty". 
Indian bankers (sarrafs) had long attained 
specialisation in their business. During the l " half of \9^^ 
century numerous Indian commercial financial firms had 
earned reputation of international level.***** Their 
credibility was so well established in the world money 
market that they advanced credit to various companies. The 
East India Company was one of them. However, in the 
commercial circles this organisation led to the system of 
remittance. These remittances to Indian port-cities were 
made in form of treasure and bullion as during IS*** century. 
The process of preparing Bills of Exchange is quite 
interesting. The exchange rates of various international 
denominations in the world exchange market varied from 
time to time. For instance, in 1832 the value of rupee went 
down by 15% and value of Crown became more stable from 
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the level of 1757. Thus the exchange rate continued to vary 
in the money market. 
We have seen that during the r ' h a l f of the 19*'' century 
many petitions of claim against the Imam of Sanaa were 
submitted to the Governor in Council at Bombay. The amount 
of losses, particularly, enable us to evaluate the quantum of 
trade the Indian merchants had with the ports of Mokha, 
Jedda and other ports of the Red Sea. These petitions that a 
large number of Indian merchants belonging to Surat and 
Bombay had regular and prosperous trade with those ports 
and had faced many maritime problems. We also have 
significant and valuable information, which had not been 
taken note of relating to the blockades organized by the East 
India Company, to warn the government of Sanaa and punish 
the governor (Daulah) of Mokha. The documents clearly 
indicate that how the merchants from Bombay and Surat had 
lodged complaints with the East India Company, pleading 
that their goods were either seized, or robbed. The 
Company's officials were requested to direct the Resident at 
Mokha to take care of the safety of ships and goods 
belonging to the Indian merchants. 
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During our period the items of exports from India 
mainly constituted the cotton piece goods, silk and silk 
goods. As far as the imports of goods into India were 
concerned we are told that the demand for horses still 
continued in India till the end of the 19"" century. The other 
import commodities were dry and green fruits, woolens, 
carpets and sena leaves, besides import of bullion which still 
continued in India. 
The steam shipping, the opening of Suez Canal and 
tele-communication revolutionised trade from India to 
Europe and the Red Sea. Apparantly the steam shipping and 
Suez Canal helped the European trade more. India's 
European maritime trade because of steam shipping, 
increased from £ 99.6 million in 1859 to f 162.8 million in 
1877. With the introduction of steam shipping by EIC in 
Arabian Sea its trade naturally increased. The trade of the 
Gulf regions, Arabian coast and Eastern coast of Africa had 
risen from 4.3 million tons in 1884-85 to 13.5 million tons in 
1904-05. 
Trade between India and the Red Sea by sailing ships 
during the above period declined from 2.3 million tons to 0.3 
million tons. Nonetheless, the introduction of steam shipping 
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and the opening of the Suez Canal did considerably affect the 
increase in the volume of commerce as well as the trade 
destinations. Now Aden and Turkey emerged as potential 
marts for the goods imported from India. The Gulf countries 
alone remained no more the target of Indian goods which 
were now directed to Aden and Turkey where new markets 
for Indian piece goods came into being. This fact reveals that 
although the trade between India and Gulf countries would 
appear to be declining, but infact the total volume of trade 
Aden and Turkey had increased. The East India Company 
with the introduction of steam shipping to Persian Gulf 
compensated their earlier losses. 
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